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1. SUMMARY: Petr contends that the lower courts erred 
in granting resp's petn for writ of habeas corpus (1) in 
refusing to apply a ~rmless error a~alysis to a determination 
that resp had been indicted by a grand jury from which blacks 
I he eyhaiA~{8vt issue ·~ s DOte itos CotA.r-t s lv"' IJ 
l~ s~ , 1 /5 ca.se doe.s 
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had been systematically excluded: and (2) in failing to 
dismiss the petn for failure to exhaus ----
remedies. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Petr, a black man, was 
indicted for murder by the grand jury of Kings Co., Calif., in 
~ Prior to trial he moved to quash the indictment on the 
~ ground that blacks had systematically been excluded from grand 
jury service in Kings Co. The State conceded that no black 
had ever sat on the grand jury in Kings Co., but introduced 
evidence that until the end of World War II the black 
population of the county was roughly one percent, and since 
~ 
World War II the percentage of blacks had only increased to ~ ~~;g 
approximatelM e percent. (One grand jury of nineteen 
-"'\. 
persons was appointed by the county trial judge each year. 
Grand jury qualifications were set by state law, and included 
a subjective element concerning the juror's character and 
integrity. I note that prior to 1962 only four persons had ---=--- -
ever been indicted in Kings Co.--all other criminal 
prosecutions were instituted through information.) 
Based on this evidence, the state TJ, who was the same 
judge who had been charged with selecting grand juries for the 
six years from 1956 to 1962, held that resp had failed to 
carry the burden of proving systematic discrimination on the 
basis of race. Petr was then tried, convicted, and sentenced 
to death. His conviction was upheld on appeal to the Cal. -
S~: that court agreed with the TC's determination that 
petr'~ indictment should not have been quashed because of 
- 3 -
racial discrimination in grand juror selection. Petr's death 
sentence was 
s~ . Ct. and 
In 1978 
vacated on three separate occasions by the Cal. ---------------~~
now has been commuted to a life sentence. 
---~ 
16- year~~;;r he was indicted, resp brought 
this federal habeas petn. The original federal TC held that 
petr had made out a prima facie case of systematic exclusion 
of blacks from the county grand jury based on the statistical 
disparity presented to the Cal. TC. After that judge died, 
another judge (Karlton, J.), took over, and ordered an 
evidentiary hearing because he did not feel that the 
statistics alone were sufficient to establish systematic 
discrimination on the basis of race. In the meantime, the 
State moved to dismiss the petn on various grounds, including 
/ 
something akin to laches, and failure to exhaust available 
state remedies. As to the laches argument, the TC held that 
it had been waived because it had not been presented in the 
original response to the petn. The State does not question 
that determination here. 
The TC had more difficulty with the State's argument that 
any additional evidence in support of resp's claims should 
first be presented ·to a state court. In particular, the State 
focused on new testimony from a statistical expert hired by 
resp, which evaluated the probability that no black would be 
chosen for grand jury service in Kings Co. if such jurors were 
chosen at random, given the percentages of blacks in the 
county during each year, and the number of grand jurors 
chosen. The expert concluded that the chances of that 
·, 
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happening were extraordinarily low. The State contended that 
the exhaustion requirement of the habeas corpus statute 
mandated that this evidence first be presented to the state 
courts. In its second opinion, Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. 
Supp. 1189, 1200-1202 (E.D. Cal. 1982), the TC rejected the 
State's argument. It first noted that this Court's opinions, 
see, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 u.s. 270, indicate that the 
exhaustion requirement is met when a habeas petr "fairly 
presents" his claim to a state court. It also noted that this 
court's opinions leave unclear what constitutes a fair 
presentation of a claim. The court applied a test of whether 
the new material placed the case in "a significantly different 
posture": if so, resp was required to return to state court. 
Here, the court reasoned, the expert testimony did not even 
present new "evidence": it only interpreted evidence which had 
been before the state courts earlier. This testimony did not 
place petr's claim in such a significantly different posture 
that more exhaustion was required. 
Some time later, see Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 
(E.D. Cal. 1983), the TC reached the merits of resp's claim 
and found that the evidence adduced made out a case that 
blacks had systematically been excluded from grand jury 
service in Kings Co. The court then went on to address the 
State's argument that this finding did not mandate issuance of 
the writ, because the systematic exclusion constituted 
harmless error. Relying on this Court's opinion in Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), in which five members of this 
- 5 -
Court had rejected a similar if not identical claim, the court 
refused to apply harmless error analysis and issued the writ. 
On appeal, the CA9 affirmed in a split decision, on the basis 
of the TC's opinions. Judge Anderson dissented on the 
exhaustion ground. He stated that the testimony of the 
statistical expert was "new evidence," and that "the 
evidentiary basis for [the] claim changed significantly in the 
present habeas corpus proceeding ..•. " 
3. CONTENTIONS: First, petrs argue that harmless error 
analysis should apply in grand jury discrimination cases just 
as it does in many other habeas cases. Petrs note that 
because of an unusual split in the Mitchell case, the five 
members of this Court who took the position that harmless 
error analysis did not apply consisted of only three members 
who joined in the Mitchell result, coupled with the two 
dissenters. Petrs note that given this unusual split at least 
one circuit has questioned the precedential value of this part 
of Mitchell. See United States ex rel. Barksdale v. 
Blackburn, 635 F.2d 1115 (CAS 1981) (en bane). Petrs also 
vehemently argue that the majority was wrong in Mitchell. 
Grand jury discrimination cases do not involve the guilt or 
innocence of the deft, nor do they involve the fundamental 
fairness of his trial. Any error in choosing the indicting 
grand jury can hardly be harmful where subsequently a properly 
chosen petit jury found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
writ of habeas corpus should be reserved for the former 
- 6 -
situations. Violations of law in choosing the grand jury may 
be remedied by other means. 
Second, petr argues that this case should have been 
dismissed because resp's claim was not properly exhausted, 
since resp adduced substantial new evidence in the federal 
courts. Petr suggests that the lower courts have had 
difficulty in determining when new evidence or arguments 
presented in federal court, on a claim similar to that brought 
in state court, require a habeas petr first to go back to 
state court. Petr cites Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466 (CA3 
1976), and Gurule v. Turner, 461 F.2d 1083, 1084 (CAlO 1972), 
for the proposition that even though a claim may have been 
presented in state court, when "the evidentiary basis" of the 
claim changes "dramatically" as presented in federal court, 
that evidence should first be presented to the state courts. 
Here a sophisticated statistical analysis was presented in 
federal court but not in state court, and the state courts 
should have had a chance to pass on this evidence. 
4. DISCUSSION: On the first question, concerning 
harmless error, the lines were fairly clearly drawn in the 
Mitchell case, and unless a member of this Court is going to 
reconsider his vote in that case this case is not worth taking 
on that score. Although the CAS questioned the precedential 
value of Mitchell, no lower court has taken the position that 




The exhaustion problem is more troublesome. This Court's 
opinions suggest that it is not enough merely for a habeas 
petr to assert a particular claim in the state courts; that 
claim should be well enough presented so that it can be fairly 
'- --------------said to be the same claim presented to the federal courts. 
There seems to be some difficulty in the lower courts in 
drawing a line between a claim properly presented and not 
properly presented, when the difference really goes to the 
evidence offered in the two proceedings. I think that the 
TCs' test--whether the new evidence places the claim in "a 
~ 
significantly different posture"--is on the right track, and 
is in general accord with the other CA opinions. In addition, 
it does not seem unreasonable for the TC to conclude that 
resp's presentation of an analysis of statistics already 
available in state court did not significantly change the 
case's posture. It certainly could be argued that evidence 
that a federal court would deem highly significant in deciding 
the case--such as, perhaps, the evidence here--should first be 
presented in state court; but if the TC's analysis is on the 
right track this case is really factbound. In addition, it 
could be argued on the other side that a reexhaustion 
requirement might run into problems with state abuse of the 
writ laws. Petr does not really argue that there is a split 
in the circuits on this question, and I do not find one; 
therefore, unless the Court wishes to speak in this area and 
thinks it can be of some help, this case may not be the case 
to take. 
- 8 -
This case probably should be discussed, and I recommend 
CFR. 
Response has been waived. 
December 13, 1984 Englander CA opn only in ptn 
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J URISDI CTION AL 
STATEMENT 
M ERITS MOTION 
G N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
.-.--. . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... .. . v Burger, Ch. J . . . .. . ..... . .. . . . 
Brennan, J . . ................. . ,_/ 
White, J ...... . ... .. . . ....... . ~ ... . ....... . ...... . . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .~ ... ............ . 
Blackmun, J ................. . v. ............... .. 
Powell, J ...................... 
7 
. . . . ............ ... . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . ....... . . . 
v Stevens, J ....................................... . 
O'Connor, J ............ ·1 j, .......... .......... . 
No. 84-836 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
March 29, 1985 Conference 





Appointment of Counsel 
SUMMARY: Resp asks the Court to appoint Clifford E. Tedmon 
as his attorney pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46.7. 
On March 4, 1985, the Court granted cert in this case to 
review the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a DC 
overturning reap's 1962 murder conviction based on a finding 
that blacks were systematically excluded from the grand jury 
which indicted petr. On the same day, the Court granted petr's 
request to proceed in forma pauperis. Having been granted ifp 
status, resp is eligible for appointed counsel murder Rule 46. 
'' 
- 2 -
Mr. Tedmon received his JD from Humphrey's College, School 
of Law in 1968, and was admitted to the practice of law by the 
State of California in 1970. He was appointed to represent resp 
in the proceedings below and states that he is familiar with the 
issues presented by this case. It appears that Mr. Tedmon, who 
has been a member of the Bar of this Court since 1970, was an 
effective advocate for his client below. I recommend that the 
motion be granted. 
There is no response. 
3/26/85 Niddrie 
March 29, 1985 
Court "Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 . . . Assigned ........ ... ....... , 19 . . . 




Motion for appointment of counsel. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Burger, Ch. J ....... ......... . 
Brennan, J ............ . ...... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Powell, J .................... . 
Rehnquist, J ................. . 
CERT. 
G D 
Stevens, J ........................... . 




N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D 
84-836 
No. 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
LFP/djb 8/12/85 
No. 84-836, Vasquez, Warden v. Hillery (CA 9) 
Memorandum to File: 
This memo is being dictated at home on the basis of having 
read the brief opinion of CA 9, and the briefs of the parties: 
The Attorney General of California on behalf of the State and 
appointed counsel on behalf of respondent. The court of appeals 
affirmed on the basis of the "excellent opinion" of the DC -
an opinion not included in the State's Petition for Cert. 
I assume the DC's opinion is in the appendix, but do not have 
that document with me. 
It is fair to say, I think, that the briefs on behalf of 
the parties~ are inferior. The State's brief is too long, 
repetitive and poorly written. Respondent's brief is far too 
conclusory to be very helpful. 
The case presents an important question that may require 
clarification of prior decisions involving alleged discrimination 
in the selection of grand jurors. The case also affords an 
opportunity for the Court to resolve the 4/4 split in 
Connecticut v. Johnson as to the applicability of the "harmless 
error" rule. 
Respondent was convicted of a particularly brutal murder 
of a 17 year old girl committed in 1962. He was sentenced to 
death but imposition of the death penalty was reversed by the 
Supreme Court of California in 1965. Respondent had two subsequent 
No. 84-836 2. 
"penalty trials" with each again resulting in imposition of a 
death sentence that was not imposed in view of changes in 
California law. 
In January 1978, respondent commenced habeas corpus proceedings 
in ~t,!l state and federal courts. In the state court, respondent .)'/..c- /-L-.C..I-
relied only on the record of his original trial. In the federal ----· ---- ~- --------~~------~----~ 
court, however, the allegations were found to be sufficient to 
state a prima facie case of systematic exclusion of blacks from the 
'------------------~ ----
grand jury. Respondent is a black. Accordingly, the DC held an 
evidentiary hearing at which ~an~~~~~~ eviden~ was 
introduced, including the testimony of a "forensic actuary". This 
expert, based on computer analysis, testified that "there was little 
probability that the 62 all non-black . grand juries could have been 
selected in Kings County from 1900 until 1962." He further testified 
that his analysis could not prove intent but merely proved probability. 
The expert recognized, moreover, that "only 19 black persons would - ----
have served throughout the 62 years between 1900 and 1962 if the 
selection system had been perfectly random." 
The state introduced no rebuttal to this testimony, but relied 
on the evidence at trial and primarily on the facts proved at trial 
as summarized by the Supreme Court of California. 
,. 
No. 84-836 3. 
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California court summarized to be particularly 
1\ 
relevant. State's brief, p. 36-38.) Among other things, that 
court noted th t "evidence based on census records established that 
in 1960 blacks only 5.1 per cent of the total population 
of Kings County, and that prior to World War II the proportion had 
been one (1) per cent or less." It also was shown that blacks often 
had served on petit juries4 ~e county clerk, who checked the 
proposed grand jury list to determine qualification, testified that 
"n<:_ _ ~~-~~?.a!:~~~-- !=-~ __ E_C:~.~-~.P~ ~J;l~~er" was inc:L_'!:~~d ~~-~~_:ds. 
At that time, apparently, one had to be a registered voter to serve 
on juries. The grand jury was appointed by the judge of the superior 
court (the same court that tried respondent). His testimony is 
summarized in the California Supreme Court's opinion. In substance, 
?"L. 
he said that since his appointment in 1956 he had not found a black 
whom he thought was properly qualified, and that he had had no 
desire to exclude blacks. Moreover, grand juries in this county 
....... ..__ .-..--
considered both criminal and civil cases, with the greater part of 
- -------· ----'-----~'~ 
its time devoted to the civil cases. In the decade ending in 1962, 
more than 1,000 prosecutions were initiated by information while onl 
four were initiated by indictment, and only one of these was against 
~
a black defendant. See brief, p. 38. The State says that these 
---·-~ 
"factual findings .•• are binding on federal courts pursuant to 
• 
No. 84-836 4. 
Sumner v. Mata". This point was never fully developed in the 
State's brief. 




Di~th~C commit error in applying the 
per se}~l~ of Rose v. !-iitchell, 443 u.s. 
545 "where there is overwhelming evidence 
of defendant's guilt and where the defendant 
received a full and fair trial"? 
As respondent introduced evidence before the 
DC in this habeas case (particularly the expert 
testimony) that had never been introduced in 
the state habeas or at the state trial, was 
there a failure to exhaust state remedies 
required by law? Judge Anderson of CA 9 
dissented from that court's decision on this 
ground. 
Although I think quite possibly we could agree with Judge 
Anderson and decide this case on the failure to exhaust, the more 
important issue - as I view it now - is where there is constitutional 
error involving grand jury appointments, may the harmless error rule 
ever apply? This is a question left open in Connecticut v. Johnson 
~4~ 
the case in which I held on the authority of Chapman that the 
1 
harmless error rule properly could be applied. 
No. 84-836 5. 
Unless I conclude that stare decisis requires otherwise, 
I am strongly inclined to reverse CA 9. The difficulty comes 
from Part II of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, ----- .... 
443 U.S. at 556, where he said that when discrimination in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment is proved, the Court will 
"quash the indictment .•. without regard to prejudice". I believe 
this is what is referred to as the per se rule. o~x t~r 
Justices joined Blackmun's opinion (Brennan and Marshall), but 
--~- ·------~-\...- - "1.-- --;! 
two Justices (White and Stevens) did join Part II's conclusion. 
Justice Stevens, however, qualified his support for Part II in -· his separate opinion in which he indicated that but for stare 
--···--.---~ 
decisis he would agree with Justice Jackson's dissent in 
Cassell v. Texas. Justice Stewart filed a separate opinion 
concurring in the judgment, but arguing that "a claim of 
discrimination in the selection of a grand jury or his foreman 
is not a ground for setting aside a valid criminal conviction." 
443 u.s. at 579. Rehnquist joined Stewart, and I wrote ~ 
separate opinion disagreeing with Justice Blackmun. I indicated 
·-·---~~·~..............-
in my opinion that the precedential value of Rose was subject to 
serious question. 
I do not recall whether any case subsequent to Rose has 
clarified the situation left by the various opinions in that case. 
My clerk will check on this. 
As perhaps my clerks know from what I have written in 
dher cases (e.g., Bustamonte), I have agreed with much of what 
~dge Friendly wrote in his often cited article entitled "Is 
Innocence Irrelevant?", 38 Chicago Law Review, 142. Judge 
friendly was primarily concerned with the exclusionary rule, and 
in substance we agreed with him as to Fourth Amendment cases in 
my decision in Stone v. Powell. 
This case is a classic example of why, in my opinion, it 
is irrational to have an automatic Rule of Reversal in a federal 
habeas case where constitutional error is found to have exited, 
but where no one questions the guilt of the defendant. Such a 
rule would seem to be particularly inappropriate where the error 
alleged is discrimination in the selection of a grand jury where 
as in this case - there is no claim that respondent failed to f 
receive a full and fair trial by a petit jury that had been 
fairly selected. 
~
The state says that retrial of respondent for a crime 
committed 23 years ago would be virtually impossible. 
Respondent, with a substantial criminal record, will be back on 
the street. It is not easy to see that any societal interest is 
furthered by such a rule. 
I may have implied above that had I been the Attorney 
General of California I would have argued, on the basis of the 
opinion of the California Supreme Court as to what was proved at 
the trial, that respondent had failed to prove discrimination in 
the selection of the grand jury. Certainly there was no 
intentional discrimination. In view of the limited number of 
blacks in the county, and California's rather elaborate rules at 
the time applicable to the qualification of jurors, it is not at 
all remarkable that there had been no black members of grand 
juries. Moreover, criminal cases were rarely initiated by grand 
juries rather than by information - another factor that minimized 
~e opportunity to name blacks. They were included on petit 
juries. 
Despite what I have said above, I would like my clerk's 
view on the decisions of this Court. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
I~ 1())1:z ~~~A.&A.v-~~ 
wjs 10/04/85 a--..._1 ~ ~ ~ ,lc) ~ ~ ~ 
~ .aA,.L- vzd. . 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell October 4, 1985 
From: Bill 
Re: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
/ 
Cert to CA9 
./ 
Argument scheduled: October 15, 1985 
Questions Presented 
1. Does a finding of intentional discrimination in the 
--~ ........ _ - -
selection of a grand jury necessarily require reversal in all 
circumstances, even on collateral review? 
2. May a habeas peti tione'r present statistical evidence 
of discrimination to a federal court without having presented the 
same evidence to state court? 
2. 
Background 
Respondent Hillery was indicted for the murder of a 
fifteen-year-old girl in 1962. He sought to quash the indictment 
based on alleged discrimination in the selection of the grand 
jury which indicted him. In support of his grand jury 
discrimination claim, Hillery (who is black) presented evidence 
that no black had served on a Kings County, Calif. grand jury at 
least since 1956. The state judge before whom Hillery made his 
grand jury discrimination claim -- Judge Wingrove -- was also the 
judge responsible for selecting the grand jury. Judge Wingrove 
refused to recuse himself, but made comments from the bench which 
he said should be considered his testimony. Judge Wingrove 
claimed that while he had never selected a black to serve on a 
grand jury, that was simply because he had never found a 
qualified black grand juror. Accordingly, he denied Hillery's 
motion to quash the indictment. 
Hillery was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1965, 
the California Supreme Court affirmed Hillery's conviction (and 
affirmed Judge Wingrove's finding of no intentional 
discrimination in grand jury selection), but reversed the death 
sentence. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692 (1965). Hillery was 
resentenced to death; the California Supreme Court reversed. 
People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 795, cert. denied, u.s. 
~~1967) • Hillery was again resentenced to death: this time the 
~ California Supreme Court reversed based on its finding that the 
death penalty violated the state constitution. People v. 
Hillery, 10 Cal.3d 897 (1974). 
3. 
Following the final ruling on his death sentence, Hillery 
filed for state habeas, alleging, inter alia, grand jury 
discrimination. Hillery's claim was denied in 1978. Hillery 
then sought federal habeas relief, again raising the grand jury -----......, 
discrimination claim. 
The DC asked the parties to supply statistical evaluations 
of the grand jury discrimination claim, and Hillery responded by 
presenting statistical evidence that showed that there was only a 
2 in 1000 chance that a random selection system would have 
generated the result that no blacks served on a grand jury from 
1956 to 1962. Furthermore, Hillery ·introduced evidence that no 
black had served on a Kings County grand jury from 1900 to 1962. 
The state introduced no statistical evidence, but apparently 
relied on Judge Wingrove's testimony, the state court findings, 
and the fact that few blacks had lived in Kings County during the 
relevant period. The state also argued that Hillery's claim 
should be barred because he had not previously presented his 
statistical evidence to state court. 
The DC found that Hillery had fairly presented his claim 
to state court. Habeas petrs are permitted to introduce evidence 
at federal hearings that wasn't introduced at state hearings, as 
long as the nature of the claim isn't altered. Here, the 
statistical data did not really change the nature of the claim, 
but merely constituted additional evidence (or even analysis of 
existing evidence). Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189 (E. D. 




On the merits, the DC found that Hillery's statistics 
established intentional discrimination. The DC was not bound by 
the state court findings on this issue, because Hillery had not 
received a "fair hearing" of his claim in state court, by virtue 
of the fact that the judge who heard Hillery's discrimination 
claim was the same person who actually selected the grand juries. 
Hillery v. Pulley, 563 P.. Supp. 1228, 1235-1237 (E.D. Cal. 1983). 
The Vf:c found that the California Supreme Court had not made any 
factua~findings of its own. Id. at 1236-1237. 
CA9 affirmed on the basis of the DC's "excellent" 
opinions. 
Discussion 
It is perhaps best to begin by noting what is not at 
issue. First, the state's petition for cert does not raise the 
question whether the DC should have accorded the state's factual 
findings greater deference. Second, the cert petition does not 
raise the question whether the DC correctly found intentional 
discrimination on this record. In my view, the first of these 
questions would be interesting and perhaps worth this Court's 
attention, but it isn't raised by the petition and isn't 
discussed . (except for a passing reference in the state's brief) 
by the parties. I'll therefore proceed to the question whether, ____ _____....___..,- - __ .__ ___ _ 
assuming a finding of intentional discrimination in the selection 
a grand jury, Hillery is automatically entitled to a new 
5. 
I. The Rule of Automatic Reversal 
Beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 u.s. 303 
(1880), the Court has consistently concluded that the criminal ( 
conviction of a black cannot stand if it followed an indictment 
handed down by a grand jury from which blacks were excluded. 
E.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 u.s. 625 (1972): Cassell v. 
Texas , 3 3 9 U • S. 2 8 2 ~ ; Pierre v • Louisiana , 3 0 6 U. S . 3 54 
(1939); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 u.s. 110 (1883). The principle 
announced in these cases has been extended in three different 
directions, in each instance without any satisfying explanation 
that might justify the extension. First, the automatic reversal 
rule has been applied to cases in which a group was discriminated 
against although not 
-~-~~ vCastaneda v. Partida, 
n-~~- . been applied to cases 
completely excluded from the grand jury. 
430 u.s. 482 (1977). Second, the rule has 
in which the defendant was not a member of 
the group discriminated against. Peter s v . K i f f , 4 0 7 U • S • 4 9 3 
(1972). Third, the rule has been applied on federal habeas 
review. Castaneda v. Partida, supra. Cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
u.s. 545 (1979) (plurality opinion). This case involves the last 
of these extensions. 
In Castaneda v. Partida, the Court granted habeas relief 
to a Hispanic petitioner who claimed that Hispanics had been 
discriminated against in grand jury ' selections. It was conceded 
that the petitioner's own grand jury was 50% Hispanic, and that 
the locality was largely administered by Hispanic officials. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the relevant local officials 
had used a procedure that resulted in the substantial 
6. 
underrepresentation of Hispanics, who comprised roughly 80% of 
the county's population. The parties did not raise, and the 
Court did not address, the question whether grand jury 
discrimination was harmless error or whether the claim was one 
which could properly be raised See Castaneda 
v. Partida, supra, at 508 n. 1 dissenting). 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 decide 
these questions. 1 won't rehearse the various opinions in Rose, 
which you correctly summarize at page 5 of your memorandum to the 
file in this case. 1 note only that 1 agree with your 
assessment, 443 u.s. at 582 n. 3, that Rose does not foreclose · 
-- -=:::: 
further consideration of the cognizability of grand jury 
~--------------~-----------------------------------
discrimination claims. There are at least two reasons why this ---is so. ~, the conclusion that grand jury discrimination 
requires reversal of a conviction was not necessary to the 
Court's holding. (The Court concluded that the petitioner in 
Rose failed to prove intentional discrimination.) Second, while 
five Justices joined the portion of Justice Blackmun' s opinion 
which found grand jury discrimination claims cognizable on 
federal habeas, only three of those joined in the Court's 
judgment. The h~ng of the Court, therefore, is "that position 
taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 169 n. 15 
(1976). "That position" in Rose is simply that the Rose 
petitioner did not prove discrimination. 
Two post-Rose decisions are worth noting. First, in 
/ 
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 u.s. 73 (1983), the Court divided 4-4 
7. 
on the question whether Sandstrom error could ever be harmless. 
In your dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices 
Rehnquist and O'Connor, you argued that Chapman v. California, 
386 u.s. 18 (1967' must be applied .. in light of the facts of each 
case ... 460 u.s., at 95. The plurality maintained that Sandstrom 
errors virtually always prejudice the defendant's right to a fair 
and impartial jury determination of his guilt, and so cannot be 
harmless except in the rarest cases. !d. at 85-87. Connecticut 
v. Johnson did not discuss the question whether grand jury 
discrimination was ever (or always) harmless error. 
/ 
Second and more important, in Hobby v. United States, 104 /~ 
s.ct. 3093 (1984), the Court a.f.~d the conviction of a ----... 
defendant who charged that the government had discriminated 
against blacks in the selection of grand jury foremen. The Court 
conceded that such discrimination violated the constitution, but 
concluded that reversal was not an appropriate remedy for the 
violation, given the minor import of grand jury foremen in the 
federal system. 104 S. Ct. , at 3095-3097. The Court 
distinguished Rose on the grounds that (1) Rose assumed without 
deciding that discriminatory selection of grand jury foremen was 
constitutionally equivalent to discrimination in the selection of 
the entire grand jury, (2) Rose was an Equal Protection and not a 
Due Process case, and (3) the Tennessee foremen at issue in Rose 
played a more important role than foremen in federal grand 
juries. Id. at 3097-3098 • 
. . 
8. 
As I've already indicated, I don't think Rose bars the 
Court from again considering whether the rule of reversal applies 
on habeas review, and neither Johnson nor Hobby in any way 
forecloses such an inquiry. There are three separate ways of 
-----------------
approaching this question; all three yield the conclusion that 
Hillery should not receive a new trial simply because the grand 
jury that indicted him 23 years ago was discriminatorily 
selected. 
A. Harmless Error 
y-
In Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282 (1950), Justice Jackson 
~ 
dissented and argued that discrimination in the selection of a 
grand jury is necessarily harmless where the defendant has 
received a fair trial by an impartial petit jury. In his 
concurrance in Rose, Justice Stewart took up this argument and 
developed it in some detail. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 574 
(1979) (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
I think Justice Stewart's analysis of the question in Rose -is correct. As he noted, the role of the grand jury is to 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
accused may be guilty of a crime. The petit jury then determines 
whether the accused actually is guilty, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the latter determination was fairly made, the former 
cannot have been incorrect. The accused cannot, 
therefore, have been prejudiced by any racial or other bias in 
the composition of the grand jury. 
t\~.1~~ 9. ~ 
(\_y~,~~~~ 
/-h> .,L~:.p.s.~ ~--
There are two responses generally offered to this 
position. The~, advanced by Justice Blackmun in Rose, is 
that grand jury discrimination calls the integrity of the 
judicial system into question, and therefore can never be 
harmless. The argument proves too much. Every constitutional 9+ ~ 
error by definition raises questions about the constitutional 
adequacy of the system of justice. VChapman v. California, 386 
u.s. 18 (1969), nevertheless holds that constitutional errors are 
not automatically prejudicial. See United States v. ~asting, 461 
u.s. 499, 509 (1983) ("it is the duty of a reviewing court to 
consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that 
are harmless, including most constituional violations"). See 
also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 u.s. 73, 94-95 (POWELL, J., 
dissenting). 
The~ response is more sophisticated, but in my view 
equally wrongheaded. The amicus brief filed by the Legal Defense 
Fu~tly authored by 6 Am~ argues that 
grand jury discrimination can never be harmless because of the 
discretionary role the grand jury plays in determining not only 
whom to indict, but for what. Had blacks sat on the grand jury 
which indicted Hillery, the argument goes, the grand jury might 
have chosen to charge 
~~ rst-degree murder. 
~-~~ properly constituted 
Hillery with some lesser offense than 
Since it's impossible to know how a ;-~t 
grand jury would have exercised i~ 
discretion, it's equally impossible to conclude that the 
-----------~-~
discrimination in grand jury selection was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt • 
. ,_,.·~ 
This argument presupposes that a defendant has a ------
constitutionally protected right to have a grand jury err in his 
favor. The grand jury determined that there was probable cause \ 
to believe Hillery had committed first-degree murder. The Legal 
Defense Fund's argument is that Hillery is prejudiced because, 
had the grand jury contained blacks, it might have incorrectly 
determined that there was no probable / cause. The point of 
harmless error analysis is to determine whether, had the system 
functioned as it should have, the result would have been the 
same. It distorts the concept of "harm" in harmless error to 
'--- __. - -----'-""" ---- -
conclude that a defendant is prejudiced because the system ~ight 
~---- ---------~--------------------------------------~ 
~ 
have erred in his favor had a given violation not occurred. 
Thus, when a TC erroneously admits evidence he should have 
excluded, an appellate court asks whether, had the evidence been 
excluded, a reasonable jury would have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The fact that an unreasonable jury might have 
ignored the evidence and acquitted the defendant does not make 
C.~f 
the TC's error prejudicial.  
> ~~"- '1 
Although I agree with Justice Stewart's position on he f-wv-
1"\ ~ 
harmless error issue, I note that the Court cannot adopt that W/t> 
~ 
position without explicitly overruling past decisions. Justice ') 
Jackson raised precisely the same argument in Cassell v. Texas, ~ 
and the Court nevertheless reversed the conviction in that case. 
Moreover, the Court has impliedly rejected the harmless error 
argument by consistently reversing convictions in grand jury 
discrimination cases beginning over 100 years ago. 
11. 
Stare decisis may not be reason enough to reject Justice 
Stewart's position. Compare Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 593-594 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting) (stating that but for stare decisis, he 
might agree with Justice Stewart's harmless error position) with 
Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 u.s. 595, 600 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) ("Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought 
not to reject it merely because it comes late") (quoted in 
Justice Stewart's concurrance in Rose, supra, at 575 n. 1). But 
it appears from the several opinions filed in Rose that a (j~ 
5' 
majority of the Court is unlikely to accept the position that ~~ 
Justices Blackmun, ~ 
Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White are all on record in Rose ~~ 
as rejecting Justice Stewart's position. And I see no principled~( 
grand jury discrimination is always harmless. 
~ 
way of limiting Justice Stewart's position so that in some (but ~ 
t:;J~ 
not all) cases grand jury discrimination would be harmless error.~
L1 ~ <:l. 
t~~ 
B. Stone v. Powell (G/1 ~ ?U~r . ) 
 Vk.'' ~ t+/<::.' • I~~ 
You argued in Rose that grand jury discrimination claims
,, .......... ~__...., > 
should not be cognizable on federal habeas under the rationale of 
~------------------------- ---~----~----------~~ Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976). Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 
at 581-587 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). Nothing the 
Court has decided since Rose forecloses this position. I won't 
restate your argument here . I note, however, that nothing the 
./Court has decided since Rose forecloses this position. Indeed, ~ 
Hobby supports your position, since it explicitly divorces the 
finding of discrimination from the decision as to what remedy is 
appropriate. Hobby, supra, at 3095. 
12. 
There is an additional not made in your opinion 
in Rose, that supports your position. One might argue that 
granting habeas petitions whenever grand jury discrimination is 
established permits petitioners [!_§) effectively t<{imi t their own 
sentence. 
The argument goes like this. Under the habeas corpus 
statute as presently constituted, Hillery is free to bring his 
first habeas petition at any time. There is no statute of 
limitations. The only limitation is that, under habeas Rule -
9(a), if Hillery should have brought the petition sooner and if 
the government is prejudiced in responding to the petition, the 
petition may be dismissed.! Thus, the fact that California may 
be unable to retry Hillery if he is set free has no bearing, ? 
under the habeas statute, on whether he may prevail on his 
petition in this case. 
That approach may make some sense if the role of habeas 
corpus is to protect arguably innocent persons who were jailed 
after unfair trials. One mi~ht not wish to preclude a 
potentially innocent petitioner from winning his freedom simply 
because he has already served twenty years of his sentence. But 
1 Rule 9(a) states: 
A petition may ~ dlsmi§sed if it appears that the ~te 
of which the respondent is an officer has been prejuajced 
in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its 
filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on 
grounds o c e co no ave a owl dge by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances 
prejudicial to the state occurred. 
13. 
if habeas corpus applies to claims -- like a claim of grand jury 
discrimination -- that are completely unrelated to the gui2:..: of ~~ 
the petitioner, then a clever petitioner may, in effect, commute ~f 
- ------ - -. l4..'XIIf 
his own sentence by waiting until retrial is impossible to seek wt.~ 
~I. 
his release. Thus, the absence of a statute of limitations for 
habeas claims implies a limitation of habeas relief to cases in 
which guilt is somehow in doubt. 
C. The State's Ability to Retry the Petitioner 
Your position in Rose was that grand jury discrimination ( ~ !_~ 
should never be a cognizable claim on federal habeas. There is a ~ 
principled argument for a more moderate position that would 
permit the Court to deny Hillery's claim in this case but still 
grant relief in cases that do not involve the enormous delay 
that's present here. So far as I know, the argument I'm about to 
make has never been addressed by this or any other federal court. 
?H.~.k. 
Precisely because the automatic reversal rule ~ a useful 
'\ 
deterrent and not a constitutionally commanded remedy, 2 the Court 
2 Hobby, supra, at 3095. If the reversal rule is not a 
deterrent, but is designed to vindicate some interest held 
by the defendant, there is no way to explain cases such as 
Peters v. Kiff, 407 u.s. 493 (1972), in which a white 
defendant successfully challenged the exclusion of blacks 
from the grand jury which indicted him, and Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 u.s. 482 (1977), in which a Hispanic 
petitioner successfully raised a grand jury discrimination 
claim despite the fact that half of the grand jury which 
indicted him was Hispanic. In Peters any bias the jury 
might have had was in the defendant's favor: in Castaneda 
the grand jury which indicted the petitioner was plainly 
within the range of random possibility. The only 
plausible claim in Castaneda was that over time, fewer 
Hispanics were selected than would have been under a 
random rule. 
1tun..f o1 c:.fl 14. 
~~~~ 
(.;t ~~~~~ . 
.1\. is free to hold that it does not apply in cases where the state~
would have difficulty retrying the habeas etitioner. This ~ 
6"'Yl. 
approach would directly address the problem (which this case H/c 
seems to present) of the habeas petitioner who delays filing his 
petition long enough to prevent the state from retrying him. In 
addition, this approach would not necessitate overruling any 
prior decisions of this Court. The vast majority of the Court's l 
grand jury discrimination cases arose on direct appeal. In such 
cases, the delay in awarding relief will not, ordinarily, 
preclude retrial. The only grand jury discrimination cases in $ 
which this Court has granted relief on habeas are Castaneda v. ) 
Partida, 430 u.s. 482 (1977) and Peters v. Kiff, 407 u.s. 493 
(1972). In Castaneda, this Court's decision was handed down only 
five years after the petitioner's indictment. In Peters, the 
analogous time period was six years. In neither case did 
petitioner delay in filing his habeas petition.3 
A rule that required reversal only when the government is 
not prejudiced in its ability to retry the petitioner would still ~ 
deter discrimination. The cases in which the grand jury 
3 This Court has decided two cases in which habeas 
petitioners have raised grand jury discrimination claims 
long after the conclusion of their trial. In Francis v. 
Henderson, 425 u.s. 536 (1976), the Court denied the 
discrimination claim because the petitioner had not raised 
it before the state trial court. In Tollett v. Henderson, 
411 u.s. 258 (1973), the Court held that the petitioner 
could not raise the discrimination claim because he had 
pled guilty pursuant to competent legal advice. Francis 
was decided 11 years after the petitioner's trial: in 
Tollett the same period was 25 years. 
'11-a d.L~-1- 15 0 
~ ~ ~ .6t/116-
~~ dt ~~~ .. 4A.k:;... ~ 
discrimination claim is being raised long after the first trial 2..' 
~ 
are precisely those cases where reversal of the conviction would ~, 
~ 
have little deterrent value. In this case, for example, there is 1 ) 
no allegation that California authorities continue to ~ 
discriminate in selecting grand juries; the judge whose 
discriminatory policies are challenged here died eighteen years 
ago. 
At the same time, a prejudice-to-the-state limitation 
would reach those cases in which the social cost of reversing 
convictions is the greatest. When a grand jury discrimination 
claim is raised soon after trial, before the state's evidence has 
gone stale or disappeared, retrial (and re-conviction) may not be 
v 
difficult. See Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 557-558 (plurality 
op.) (arguing that the state may always retry a successful 
claimant, and that "the State remains free to use all the proof 
it introduced to obtain the conviction in the first trial"). 
This can hardly be said about cases where the state must try a 
defendant for a crime that occurred more than two decades ago. 
Finally, I note that the delay in this case does not~ 
~ 
appear to have been justified. Hillery first raised his grand I""J4o.f 
-~
jury discrimination claim in 1962. He renewed the claim on-r~. 
direct appeal, and the California Supreme Court affirmed in 1965. ~ 
.__•t;, 
Nine years later, he raised the claim in state habeas .~ 2. 
r'71 
proceedings. Following the denial of the claim in state habeas 
proceedings in 1978, he turned to federal court. The only 
justification offered for this delay is that from 1965 to 1974 he 
was litigating the legality of his sentence. I don't see how 
16. 
Hillery's grand jury discrimination claim could have depended on 
the outcome of his challenge to his death sentence, however. The 
record does not reveal any plausible ground for the nine-year gap 
during which Hillery failed to press his grand jury claim. 
Neither the DC nor the CA9 considered whether the delay in 
-----~-- -...__~~-""'--
bringing the petition prejudiced the state's ability to retry 
........._____ ___ . ·- ----~~~.--.. -- ,.. 
Hillery. Thus, if the Court were to accept this argument and 
j~ 
hold that such prejudice bars a grand jury discrimination claim ...... 
~ 
on federal habeas, the Court should remand to the CA9 for ~ cf-




Dissenting from the CA9's disposition of this case, Judge 
Anderson argued that Hillery did not exhaust his state remedies. 
Hillery concededly failed to offer any expert testimony on the 
statistical likelihood of purposeful discrimination when he 
pressed his claim in state court. The state argues, and Judge 
Anderson agreed, that this deprived state courts of the 
opportunity fairly to assess Hillery's grand jury discrimination 
claim. 
The exhaustion requirement has two elements: Hillery must 
have made the "same claim" to state court, and the claim must 
have been "fairly presented." Picard v. Connor, 404 u.s. 270, 
275-276 (1971). Since Hillery did challenge, on federal 
constitutional grounds, the racial composition of the grand jury, 
he meets the first element. The issue here is whether the grand 
17. 
jury discrimination claim was .. fairly presented., to the state 
court, despite the absence of the expert statistical evidence 
introduced in the DC below. 
In my view, Hillery did fairly present his grand jury 
discrimination claim. First, the critical facts supporting 
Hillery's claim the absence of any blacks on his own grand 
jury or any other grand jury selected during Judge Wingrove's 
tenure were presented to the state court. Second, the 
statistical analysis of which the state complains here was 
offered after the DC had asked for further statistical evidence. 
Hillery should not be penalized for helping the DC augment the 
record so that the DC would be better able to adjudicate the 
discrimination claim. Third, this Court has in past cases 
considered similar statistical analyses which either were offered 
for the first time in appellate briefs or were developed by this 
Court on its own. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 u.s. 482, 496 n. 
17 (1977): Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 u.s. 625, 630 n. 9 (1972). 
Therefore, I recommend that the Court affirm on the exhaustion 
issue if it chooses to reach that issue. 
This discussion is purposely truncated, because I do not ~ 
think you need to reach the exhaustion issue to decide the case~~ 
Furthermore, I'm not sure this is a good case in which to develop 
sound doctrine. I find no split in the CAs on how to analyze the 
question when the failure to introduce evidence means that the 
petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies: it appears that 
the CAs approach the issue on a case-by-case, fact-specific 
basis. E.g., Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466 (CA3 1976). Unless 
18. 
that approach yields an answer that seems wrong, there is no 
reason for this Court to delve into the issue. As I've said, I 
think the answer the CA9 reached here was correct. Should you 
disagree and wish me to discuss this question in more detail, I 
would be happy to supplement this memorandum. 
III. Conclusion and Recommendation 
I recommend that the Court reverse. I have discussed 
three possible lines of analysis, and I think all three make 
broadest and perhaps most sensible of these is 
Justice Stewart's position that grand jury discrimination is 
harmless error. This is also the least likely to obtain five 
vote~Your own position, that grand jury discrimination claims 
should not be cognizable on federal habeas, is also sensible but 
may also lack five votes, at least unless one of the five who 
joined part II of Justice Blackmun's opinion is willing to change 
his mind. I have offered ~hird possibility that the Court has 
not previously considered, in the hope that perhaps it might 
convince a majority. This third position would require a habeas 
grand jury discrimination claim prejudiced ~s 
- (i) 
ability to retry the petitioner. 
an~e d: lay was ~stified, 
If the court found prejudice, , ~f 
- ~t 
the petition should be denied. ~ 
~ 
A broader approach would be preferable, but this last approach 
may be the only road to reversal on which a majority will travel. 
I recommend that the Court not reach the exhaustion issue.( 
If the Court disagrees, I recommend affirmance on that issue. 5 ~ 
'·' ;,t 
F.J-~~to~ 2.) 
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TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: October 14, 1985 
RE: Vasg,uez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Argument date: October 15, 1985 
Cert to CA9 
I'm sorry to deluge you with memos. Upon rereading 
the memo I gave you this afternoon, I realized I had mis-
cited Nix v. Williams. My memo suggests that Nix is a 
harmless-error case. It is not. In Nix, the Court 
applied the inevitable-discovery rule to permit the ......--... __ _ 
admission of evidence which the prosecution had obtained 
in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. This is of course functionally equivalent to a 
harmless error analysis, and I therefore think it supports 
the point that this Court has not applied an automatic 
--------------------~~--------
reversal rule to errors that arguably affect the integrity 
of our system of justice. I should simply have cited Nix 
separately. 
) 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: October 14, 1985 
RE: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Argument date: October 15, 1985 
Cert to CA9 
1. My recollection concerning the state's cert 
petition was correct. The state did not question the 
sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, in my view, 
Castaneda makes it very hard to reverse the CA9 on 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. I'll discuss this at 
some more length following argument if you wish. 
2. Your recollection of the number of indictments 
handed down by grand juries in Kings County was correct. 
In 
,/" 
the decade ending 
criminal indictments __ __. 
in 1962, 
brought 
there were only four -----. 
(compared to 996 
informations). The only black indicted was Hillery. -----------------...-/ 
~· •·;,. 
2. 
1 do not think these facts bear on the question 
u ~ 
whether there was intentional discrimination. Castaneda 
firmly establishes that the makeup of the particular 
-------------------
defendant's grand jury is almost irrelevant; the issue is 
/ ( \ 
whether over time grand juries systematically excluded (in ____., 
whole or in part) some identifiable group. I think this 
logically implies that what matters is not how many 
defendants were indicted over the relevant period, but 
rather how many grand jurors served over the relevant 
period. From the number of grand jurors, and from blacks' 
proportion of the eligible population, courts can 
determine whether or not one might reasonably infer 
intentional discrimination from blacks' statistical 
under representation. 
3. You asked for case citations for the 
proposition that there are many constitutional errors that 
might call the integrity of our system into question, but 
which nevertheless do not prompt automatic reversal. 
Following are a few examples which you might find useful. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 u.s. 18 (1967) 
this Court's leading harmless-error decision -- the 
applied harmless error analysis to a TC's comment on 
'· 
3. 
the defendant's failure to testify at trial. - --. Under 
Griffin v. California, 380 u.s. 609 (1965), the TC's -
remarks violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment right 
.---·--~-
against self-incrimination (as applied to the states 
-~
through the Fourteenth Amendment). I note that the error 
in Chapman was both (1) committed by the TC and not by 
police, and (2) a direct violation of an important 
--·-~- . ..._,_ 
._--·· .. 
constitutional right. See Griffin, supra, at 613. Thus, 
"-- . -~..__--~ 
Justice Blackmun's "integrity" argument logically applies 
at least as strongly to Chapman error as to grand jury 
discrimination. 
Likewise, the Court has applied harmless error 
analysis both to the admission of evidence seized in 
-----~-
¢.. '1 violation of the Fourth Amendment, Chambers v. Maroney, ( =~\ 399 u.s. 42 (1970), ~d to the admission of evidence or 
) statements obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 
2501 (1984); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 u.s. 371 (1972). 
See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 u.s. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing judged under the harmless 
----
error standard). Moreover, a claim that a defendant has 
not received the effective assistance of counsel which the 
Constitution guarantees him requires a showing that 
4. 
counsel's ineffectiveness II ' d. d \1.... h pre1u 1ce t e defendant. 
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). This is 
so even though ncounsel made errors so serious that ------
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment. n Id. at 2064. It's hard to imagine 
an error which more directly impinges on the integrity of 
the judicial process than a failure of the accused's trial 
counsel to live up to the minimum standard which the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees. 
I think the reason behind these cases was aptly 
expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Chapman, 
supra. Justice Harlan noted that nparticular types of 
errors have an effect which is so devastating or 
inherently indeterminate that as a matter of law they 
cannot reasonably be found harmless.n 386 u.s., at 52 n. 
7 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Where the error's effect is 
not inherently ndevastatingn or nindeterminate,n the Court 
~ -----
has usually found (and should always find) that harmless 
error review is appropriate. The njudicial integrityn 
argument which Justice Blackmun advanced in Rose does not 
comport with this analysis and (in my view) is 
inconsistent with the cases cited in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
5. 
I hope this has been responsive. I will of course 
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.l'uprtmt Gfcnui gf tlft~b .ttatt• 
-.uJriqt&tn. ~. <!f. 20~ll~ 
THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE 
October 19, 1985 
RE: No. 84-836, Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Bill, 
·Will you take on a dissent in this case? 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to: Justice Powell 
Justice O'Connor 
Regards, 
C HAM8ERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.Jltpftntt CJI&mri .n Uft ~h .Jtah• 
.ulting~ ~. CJI. 2.0t?~~ 
October 21, 1985 
Re: No. 84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery. 
Dear Chief, 
I will be happy to take on the dissent in this case. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: Justice Powell 
Justice O'Connor 
Sincerely, 
· ; .... 
. . 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
jlupuuu ~4tUrl gf tlft ~nittb' .l'hdt.-
"uJtinghtn. ~. ~ 211~.)4.~ 
November 7, 1985 
Re: 84-836 - Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
November 7, 1985 
84-836 Vasquez v. Hillerv 
Dear Thurgood: 
In accord with my discussion at Conference, I probably 
will write in this case. 
What~ver may be the merit of invalidating the convic-
tion after a fair trial because of an improper composition 
of the grand ;urv, J view the rule that you apply as proba-
bly i.napplicable to this case. 
Here, the defendant was tried, convicted and sen-
tenced to death in 1962. His grand jury discrimination claim 
was dented by the Cal:! fornia Supreme Court in 1965. The 
claim was not raised in two subsequent appeals to that 
court. It was first raised on state ha~eas in 1974 -- nine 
years after it had been decided. The claim was not raised 
in federal habeag until 1978. Hillery, fairlv convicted of 
a brutal murder (and sentenced to death three times), will 
quite possibly be placed back on the street because of a 
claim he raised in federal court sixteen years after his 
conviction. 
In all U.kelihood, it is now some years too late to 
retry Hillery. It could well be that the Court's opinion in 
this case will encourage convicted persons with long sen-
tences to defer seeking habeas relief until retrial becomes 
difficult or impossible. 
It may be awhile before I write, and for this reason I 











.JUSTICE w .. . .J. SRENNAN, .JR. 
Dear Thurgood: 
November 8, 1985 
No. 84-836 
Vasquez v. Hil'lery 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
.tn.prtmt Qfltllrt of tltt ~ittb .ttalt.G' 
Jhurlfi:ngton, J}. Of. 2ll',?~~ 
November 8, 1985 
No. 84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Thurgood, 
I think I will wait'til the dust settles 
before voting on this. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
. . 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttprttttt <!Jourt of tlrt ~tlt ~tatts 
'Jtasfringfon. ~. <!J. 2ll~'l.~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
; ' 
November 11, 1985 
Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Dear Lewis: 
As I understand it, your principal disagreement lies 
not so much with the longstanding remedy for discrimination 
in the grand jury as with its application in this case. 
Even were I to accept your characterization of Hillery's 
conduct, I could not agree that it would be wise 
decisionmaking on our part to overrule solid precedent 
merely to reach a particular result in one extraordinary 
case. 
I believe the record belies your suggestion that 
Hillery was somehow derelict in bringing his federal claim. 
Hillery first raised his claim in 1962 before his trial 
began. Thereafter, he raised it at each step of appellate 
review, until the California Supreme Court affirmed his 
conviction in 1965, explicitly rejecting the claim of 
discrimination. This Court denied certiorari in 1967. At 
the same time that it affirmed the conviction, the 
California Supreme Court reversed Hillery's death sentence 
on other grounds and remanded for a second sentencing 
proceeding. After resentencing, Hillery was free to appeal 
only his sentence, which he did, and that sentence was 
affirmed in 1968. Immediately thereafter, this Court issued 
its decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 u.s. 510 
(1968) , which served as the basis for the reversal of 
Hillery's second death sentence in 1969 and a remand for a 
third sentencing proceeding. The third death sentence was 
then appealed and reduced, on constitutional grounds, by the 
California Supreme Court in 1974. 
For the entire 9 years that had elapsed between the 
conviction and the petition for state habeas, therefore, a 
period upon which you seem to place great emphasis, Hillery 
was engaged in constant litigation of his sentence in the 
state courts. Because the California Supreme Court had 
rejected the discrimination claim on direct review in 1965, 
Hillery was not free to raise it in conjunction with these 
challenges. It would be truly odd if we were to hold that 
he should have waived his opportunities for review of his 
sentence (and in the meantime quite possibly be executed), 
in order to launch an immediate collateral attack on the 
conviction. Moreover, it would be inappropriate for us to 
require a state prisoner to initiate litigation in federal 
court while his case is the subject of ongoing review in the 
state courts. 
As soon as he received his life sentence in 1974, 
Hillery filed for state habeas on the grand jury claim, 
which took 4 years to be resolved against him. We have 
never before sought to penalize a prisoner for having filed 
for state habeas before seeking federal habeas. Within a 
month after final denial of state collateral relief, Hillery 
petitioned for federal habeas. Much of the collateral 
relief was sought pro se. In light of this history, I 
cannot imagine at what stage you believe Hillery forfeited 
his right to federal relief. 
I would also like to respond to your concern that our 
opinion "will encourage convicted persons with long 
sentences to defer seeking habeas relief until retrial 
becomes difficult or impossible." Although it is hard for 
me to believe that any prisoner would voluntarily sit in 
jail for years, knowing he has a meritorious claim that 
could result in his freedom, I am willing to concede the 
possibility in theory. But there is simply no indication 
that this is such a case. If we are to consider creating a 
new rule of law to account for such a practice, I suggest 
that we should wait until we are confronted with an instance 
of the deleterious conduct you foresee. 
Finally, despite many recent attempts to restrict the 
scope of federal habeas by statute, Congress has yet to 
impose any time limit on the filing of habeas petitions. I 
do not think we can responsibly manipulate a judicial 
harmless-error rule to do just that. As Harry asked at oral 
argument, in what year does the error become harmless? 
The State conceded at argument that it would seek to 
retry Hillery, who has already served 23 years of a life 
sentence. Because the evidence against him was almost 
- 2 -
' I 
entirely tangible (tire tracks, glove prints, etc.), I am 
not as pessimistic as you are about the chances for 
reconviction. In any event, I do not think this unique 
factual setting should alarm us into overlooking the far-
ranging consequences of attempting to preserve the 
conviction in this case by fashioning a radical change in 
the law. 
I'm at a loss as to why I am given the special I 
treatment mentioned in the last paragraph of your letter. 
My only hope is that you do not break the record previously 
established in Topco. 
Justice Powell 
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Jlulfinghtn. ~. Of. 2llbi'l~ 
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---~ J). OJ. 2ll~,.~ 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN NOVember 15 r 1985 
Re: No. 84-836, Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Justice Marshall 





November 19, 1985 
Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Draft Dissent 
I thought I'd tell you how the draft dissent in 
this case is organized before you dive in, so that your 
reading might be more productive. 
The basic point of the draft, in a nutshell, is 
that the "automatic reversal rule" is an inappropriate 
remedy for the "wrong" of grand jury discrimination in the 
context of this case. The reasoning goes like this: 
1. Part I establishes that the Court is free to 
choose whether to grant the relief requested in this case. 
Nothing in the Constitution compels this particular 
remedy. Consequently, the Court should look to the 
utility of the remedy as a means of either remedying any 
harm to respondent or deterring discriminatory conduct. 
2. Part II A then looks at whether respondent has 
suffered any harm because of the discrimination. The 
2. 
answer, unsurprisingly, is no. The bulk of this part is 
taken up with rebutting a novel theory of the majority's: 
that the discriminatory selection of the grand jury might 
have "infected" the framing of the indictment. The 
Court's argument, which is skillfully made · in Justice 
Marshall's opinion at page 8, seeks to equate 
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury with 
discrimination in the decision to charge respondent. 
Though interesting, I think this argument is plainly 
wrong, for the reasons laid out in the draft. 
3. At this point, the only justification left for 
vacating respondent's conviction is a deterrence 
rationale. Part II B looks at the deterrence argument, 
and concludes (i) that the Court's decisions don't 
foreclose a decision that relief is barred where the state 
would find retrial difficult, and (ii) that the deterrent 
purposes of the remedy applied here are ill-served when 
the remedy is applied years (here, decades) after the 
wrong occurs. The concluding paragraph states that you 
would remand for a determination of whether the State 
would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to retry 
respondent. If it would (as I assume it would), then you 
would deny relief. 
3. 
As this discussion shows, the text does not 
explicitly analyze the application of the harmless error 
rule to grand jury discrimination. Part II A does, of 
course, discuss why the discrimination causes respondent 
no harm. ln addition, I have included a long footnote at 
the end of part II A (footnote 8) explaining why you agree 
in principle with Justices Stewart and Jackson that grand 
jury discrimination should be analyzed as harmless error. 
I thought this treatment avoided any confusion between the 
dissent's main argument and the Stewart-Jackson argument. 
This seems to me to be especially important given that the 
main argument is one that hasn't before been raised. 
If you prefer to treat the harmless error point 
differently (i.e. in the text), I would recommend placing 
the discussion in footnote 8 in a separate section at the 
end of the opinion, or perhaps condensing it and adding it 
to the end of part II A. 
lfp/ss 11/20/85 





have read your 
from editing and 
MEMORANDUM 
DATE: Nov. 20, 2985 
Vasquez v. Hillery 
draft dissent with 
a couple of riders 
admiration. 
(subject to 
discussion), 1 have only two substantive questions. 
1. The dissent, as drafted, is based in the end on 
the long lapse of time. It is argued that the precedents 
relied upon by the Court have not involved comparable 
delay, and therefore are not controlling. The "bottom 
line" would be a remand to consider whether the delay has 
prejudiced the state. This is a defensible position, and 
you argue it quite persuasively. 
An alternative argument that now is made only 
tangentially in footnotes would involve two principal 
points. First, as indicated rather roughly in my Rider A 
on p. 3, the time has come to reconsider the 
constitutional soundness of the line of cases relied on by 
the Court. Second, and this occur red to me only upon 
reading your superbly written footnote 8, 1 think we could 
make a persuasive argument that the more recent line of 
2. 
cases (those cited in n. 8) provide the controlling 
precedents. It is the Court, therefore, that ignores 
stare decisis. As you point out, rational distinction 
can be made between grand jury discrimination followed by 
conviction at a fair trial, on the one hand, and the cases 
you cite in n. 8. In the end, this may simply be 
application of the "harmless error" doctrine. I think of 
Chapman as the origin of the doctrine - but I am not sure. 
Strickland, involving the right to counsel, cannot be 
distinguished on principle and common sense from the right 
to a properly selected grand jury. 
we could then move on to say that even if the Court 
has erred in not following the more recent and more 
relevant line of cases, this case is distinguishable. 
Here, you would make the argument in IIC - possibly in 
somewhat condensed form - that in any event because of the 
unprecedented delay and resulting probable prejudice to 
the state, a remand rather than reversal. 
I do not think adoption of this alternative 
organization of our dissent would require much more than 
relying on the cases cited in n. 8, and moving this 
discussion to the text - perhaps with some elaboration. 




stare decisis recognition of these more recent and more 
relevant cases. 
2. If we decide - and the question is an open one 
with me - to adhere to the present organization of the 
dissent 1 I am inclined to omit - or at least summarize 
perhaps in a note - the following: beg in with the last 
sentence on p. 21 and omit to the point indicated on p. 23 
near the bottom of that page. The reasons underlying the 
rule of deterrence are fairly obvious. Also 1 I do not 
think the rule is based solely on deterring the law 
enforcement officials who are alleged to have made the 
error in question. Their successors presumably also may 
be deter red. 1 do think we could at least include in a 









DATE: Nov. 20, 2985 
84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery 
I have read your draft dissent with admiration. 
Apart from editing and a couple of riders (subject to 
discussion), I have only two substantive questions. 
1. The dissent, as drafted, is based in the end on 
the long lapse of time. It is argued that the precedents 
relied upon by the Court have not involved comparable 
delay, and therefore are not controlling. The "bottom 
line" would be a remand to consider whether the delay has 
prejudiced the state. This is a defensible position, and 
you argue it quite persuasively. 
An alternative argument that now is made only 
tangentially in footnotes would involve two principal 
points. First, as indicated rather roughly in my Rider A 
on p. 3, the time has come to reconsider the 
constitutional soundness of the line of cases relied on by 
the Court. Second, and this occurred to me only upon 
reading your superbly written footnote 8, I think we could 
make a persuasive argument that the more recent line of 
cases (those cited in n. 8) 
precedents. It is the Court, 
stare decisis. As you point 
2. 
provide the controlling 
therefore, that ignores 
out, rational distinction 
can be made between grand jury discrimination followed by 
conviction at a fair trial, on the one hand, and the cases 
you cite in n. 8. In the end, this may simply be 
application of the nharmless errorn doctrine. I think of 
Chapman as the origin of the doctrine - but I am not sure. 
Strickland, involving the right to counsel, cannot be 
distinguished on principle and common sense from the right 
to a properly selected grand jury. 
We could then move on to say that even if the Court 
has erred in not following the more recent and more 
relevant line of cases, this case is distinguishable. 
Here, you would make the argument in IIC - possibly in 
somewhat condensed form - that in any event because of the 
unprecedented delay and resulting probable prejudice to 
the state, a remand rather than reversal. 
I do not think adoption of this alternative 
organization of our dissent would require much more than 
relying on the cases cited in n. 8, and moving this 
discussion to the text - perhaps with some elaboration. 
We would emphasize on the failure of the Court to accord 
' . ~ 
3. 
stare dec isis recognition of these more recent and more 
relevant cases. 
2. If we decide - and the question is an open one 
with me - to adhere to the present organization of the 
dissent, I am inclined to omit - or at least summarize 
perhaps in a note - the following: beg in with the last 
sentence on p. 21 and omit to the point indicated on p. 23 
near the bottom of that page. The reasons underlying the 
rule of deterrence are fairly obvious. Also, I do not 
think the rule is based solely on deterring the law 
enforcement officials who are alleged to have made the 
error in question. Their successors presumably also may 
be deterred. I do think we could at least include in a 
note what you have to say about Judge Wingrove. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
vde 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: November 21, 1985 
RE: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Second Draft Dissent 
There are two points I should raise concerning our 
previous discussions about the first draft. 9 ~[}J. 
1. You suggested cuttin~~mpletel the discussion 
of how the passage of time lessens deterrent force of 
the reversal rule. My concern is that that idea is 
mentioned early in the text, and logically it complements 
the notion that reversal is a costlier remedy when imposed 
many years after the conviction. Accordingly, I've cut 
most--but not all--of the relevant discussion. What 
remains is the paragraph carrying over from page 28 to 
page 29. 
2. The quote from Justice Brennan's speeeh is 
f/'w'J~ 
found at note 4. Since speaking to you about this, I 
asked Mike what he thought. Mike's view was that the note 
2. 
didn't add anything, and that it might seem as though you 
were indirectly weighing into the recent newspaper debate 
about the Court's role. I thought I would ask Anne her 
view, and I will let you know what she says. 
3. I attach the first draft for purposes of 
comparison. I also attach my memo to you about the first 
draft for reference. The numbers of the sections have 
changed, but I have changed little in the discussion of 
the time lapse argument. 
lfp/ss 11/22/85 VAS SALLY-POW 
2nd draft 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Bill DATE: Nov. 22, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery 
I dictate these comments as I read your draft of 
November 21. 
1. Part I, as I suggested, moves the essence and 
the decisions of note 8 in the first draft to the text as 
a separate and distinct argument. I think this is a 
helpful move. Apart from some editing and marginal 
comment, I make this suggestion. If, as I think, Chapman 
- decided in 19 is the fountainhead of the modern 
harmless error doctrine, I suggest we begin our response 
2. 
to Justice Blackmun's weak answer to Justice Stewart with 
Chapman rather than with Hastings. Then, I would follow 
the chronological order in which our cases were decided 
Goleman v. Alabama, Gerstein v. Pugh, u.s. v. Hastings, 
and Strickland. To the extent there is quotable language 
in these cases, it might be well to add it either to the 
text or in a footnote. 
Chapman spoke in terms of harmless error, whereas 
Strickland turned on the absence of "prejudice". I do not 
perceive a practical difference - at least not a 
constitutional difference - but the concepts are 
different. 
Wainwright v. Sykes involved procedural default. 
Did it not also have a "prejudice" component? And is 
there any help in two SOC cases written about three Terms 
3. 
ago- one from Ohio and the other from o.c.? These cases 
expanded on Wainwright. 
~ 
On may have been Engle. 
A 
Do these 
cases help us tangentially? 
2. 1 suggest that following the paragraph that 
identifies the cases since Chapman upon which we rely, we 
made add something along the following lines: 
~n the cases cited above, the related doctrines 
of harmless error or the absence of prejudice 
were applied where the following constitutional 
violations occurred (i) the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments (Chapman)~ (ii) the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments (Gerstein v. Pugh)~ and 
(iii) the Sixth Amendment, incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Strickland). Grand jury 
discrimination is a violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. No reason has been 
suggested - nor do 1 believe any ~be -
why the Court should think that more doubt is 
'cast . on the integrity of the judicial 
process' by one violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than by other violations of that 
Amendment, or indeed than by violations of the 
Fourth and Sixth Amendments. In my view, for 
example,~ould be irrational to argue that a 
grand jury violation followed by a concededly 
fair trial and conviction is a more serious 
violation of constitutional rights than a Sixth 
Amendment violation of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. 
washington, supra. 
At least since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
u.s. 335, 344-345 (1963), this Court repeatedly 
has recognized that the integrity of our system 
of criminal justice depends in major part upon 
the right of an accused person to the effective 
assistance of counsel. Moreover, it bears 
repetition that the racial discrimination in 
this case is once removed from the trial itself. 
The discrimination did not infect the validity 
of the trial itself as did the constitutional 
violation in the cases cited above. Respondent 
here had the full benefit of counsel's 
assistance in his trial, in his three appeals to 
4. 
the Supreme Court of California, and in his 
state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
The only error relied upon in this case had no 
effect whatever upon the trial and conviction of 
respondent by a petit jury.~ 
5. 
Bill, the foregoing is a rough draft of what I'd 
like to add as a substitute for the last sentence 
beginning on page 7. Feel free to improve the foregoing, 
and make sure it is accurate - or to disagree as to its 
utility. Some rephrasing of the full paragraph on page 8 
would be necessary. 
3. Take a look also at the last paragraph in 
Part I - the paragraph in which we would rely to some 
extent on Bill Brennan's speech. I now have genuine 




There are, however, decisions of this Court that justify -
in language that may be quite appropriate - the overruling 
of a long line of cases. This last paragraph in Part I 
can be based on what the Court itself has said about the 
necessity of reexamining precedents that either are 
incompatible with more recent constitutional doctrine or 
that for other reasons have lost contemporary relevance. 
There is a quote in one of Justice Douglas' opinions to 
the effect that stare decisis does not apply with equal 
force to constitutional decisions as each Justice is sworn 
personally to uphold and obey the Constitution and 
therefore is free to make his own decision. I would not 
quote Douglas. 
4. After having made such a persuasive argument 





find it a little difficult to find appropriate language to 
move into Part II. The following as a possible substitute 
for the last sentence in Part I and the first sentence in 
Part II: 
"In my view the Court itself disregards the 
principles of stare decisi~~~not following the 
more recent line of cases that cannot be 
reconciled - either in law or logic - with the 
cases the Court chooses to follow. I would 
dissent from the Court's decision for this -reason. But assuming only for this case - that 
1\ 
the now established harmless error principles 
are inapplicable, and assuming further that the 
absence of any prejudice also is irrelevant, I 
still dissent. I would reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals because none of the prior 
grand jury discrimination cases governs a case, 
like this one, in which the error took place 
over two decades ago making retrial unlikely" 
. ' 
8. 
5. On p. 10 the draft, in characterizing the 
Court's reasoning, says that it would "make race an 
element of the substantive offense". What you have in 
mind here, Bill, is not clear to me. I understood Justice 
Marshall's argument to be that had there been a black 
member of the grand jury, he might have persuaded the 
white members not to indict despite the fact that there 
was overwhelming evidence against respondent. There are 
flaws in this argument, as you indicate on p. 17, and in 
any event the argument is fanciful on its face in view of 
the evidence against respondent. (Is a unanimous grand 
jury vote required in California?) 
A second question is whether there must be a 
"finding of intentional discrimination" by a grand jury in 
issuing an indictment. The two cases cited are not 
9. 
criminal cases, and I do not recall any authority 
regarding the action of a grand jury. Please take a look 
at page 16 and 17 in light of these comments. I do agree 
that n. 6 is excellent. 
6. We should make better use of Jackson's 
dissent. At some appropriate place we could say that 
Justice Jackson, demonstrated the prescience that marked 
his judicial career, recognized in v. 
that where a defendant is convicted in a concededly fair 
trial a constitutional flaw in the composition of the 





~ e:--6 te c;.!_~ 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: November 24, 
RE: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Third Draft--Dissenting Opinion 
t rfJ, 
Jt/2-~ 
You will note that part !--the harmless error 
section--has been largely rewritten. I tried to follow 
your suggested organization, and added a few points of my 
own. You should note in particular the language 
concerning the rule of stare decisis on pages 4-5. Is 
this what you had in mind? 
In addition, drawing on your rider, I drafted a 
short concluding section (labelled part Ill) . It -
~ 
necessarily repeats points that have already been made, 
but I think it may nevertheless be a useful summary. If 




I shoul ention a particular phrase that 
On pages 11!, the revised draft says: 
·- / ------troubled you. 
The point [of the Court's argument] appears to 
-
be that an all-white grand jury from which 
blacks are systematically excluded may be 
influenced by race in determining whether to 
indict and for what charge. Since the State may 
not imprison respondent for a crime if one of 
its elements is his race, the argument goes, his 
conviction must be set aside. 
2. 
All I mean to suggest is this. Justice Marshall argues 
that race may have 
deliberations. This 
infected the grand jury's 
(A<<>'\J;"':\ t. Jlu.<-t) ~ """'~ """~ 
means that respondent charged 
~ --
because of his race. The State can't charge only blacks 
with murder, because the effect of such a practice would 
be the same as a statute that defined murder as a killing 
by a black person. The talk of race being an "element of 
the offense" is meant merely to capture that thought. If 
you think it confuses more than it helps, 1 '11 take it 
out. 
I should also add that Anne is obviously an 
outstanding editor, in addition to being easy to work 
with. I hope she winds up on the faculty at U. Va., so 
that 1 can get her to mark up my articles. 
'10: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: November 27, 1985 
RE: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Justice Blackmun's Memorandum of Nov. 27 
Attached is a Memorandum from Justice Blackmun, in 
which he takes issue with the dissent's characterization 
of his opinion in Rose v. Mitchell as a "plurality" 
c:pinion. Justice Blackmun states that a majority of the 
Court joined every part of his opinion, and the u.s. 
~ports labels the opinion an "Opinion of the Court." 1 
I think the appropriate response to this point is 
---------------------~--------
contained in footnote 10 of the dissent. There the 
dissent states that "two of the Justices who joined the 
relevant portion of the plurality opinion dissented from 
the Court's judgment." The footnote goes on to cite Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) for the 
proposition that the Court's holding is the position taken 
by those members who concurred in the judgment on the 
narrowest grounds (where the concurring members are 
necessary to a majority). 
~I 
It may well be that five or more Justices agree on 
a particular abstract proposition of law, but it cannot be 
.._ ___ ....., 
that such agreement automatically renders the vehicle in 
which it is e~~~~ "opinion of the Court." The 
-------· ~ 
"case or controversy" requirement of Article Ill bars the 
Court, acting as the Court, from issuing advisory 
opinions. Consequently, an "opinion of the Court" can 
only be issued in order to explain the reasons for the 
COurt's judgment. The dissenting Justices who joined part 
of Justice Blackmun's opinion in Rose were not joining in 
a reason for reaching the judgment, because they disagreed 
with the judgment. Since the Court--speaking as "the 
Court"--does not have the authority simply to issue 
opinions on abstract propositions of law divorced from any 
judgment, it follows that Just ices who dis sent from the 
judgment cannot transform a plurality into a "Court" 
simply by agreeing with portions of the plurality's 
analysis. 
.For these reasons, 1 think the dissent's 
terminology is proper, although 1 confess that 1 know of 
no other case quite like Rose on which 1 can rely for 
support. Justice Blackmun correctly notes that the U.s. 
Reports labels his opinion an "Opinion of the Court," but 
1 don't think that can resolve the issue of the opinion's 
precedential significance, which is what's really at issue 
in any dispute over defining the proper label. 
1 see four options. First, you could drop a 
footnote the first time the word "plurality" is used, on 
' 
page 4 (line 5). The footnote could repeat the argument 
summarized above. Second, you could simply change the 
terminology in the dissent, referring to Rose as a Court 
opinion but dropping a footnote explaining that it does 
not have the precedential value of an ordinary Court 
opinion. ~ you could refer always to "Justice 
Blackmun 's opinion," and explain in a footnote why that 
opinion was not, in your view, truly a Court opinion. 
Fourth, you could do nothing and wait for the inevitable 
attack, either by Justice Marshall or by Justice Blackmun 
in a concurrance. 
My own preference is for the third option. That 
might be less offensive to Justice Blackmun, while still 
getting your own point across. I'll be happy to implement 
any of these proposals, however. 
~upr~ <!j:ourt of tlr~ ~nitt~ .ita.tts: 
Jf~ts:ltittgtctt. ~. <!):. 2ll~J!.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN November 27, 1985 
Re: No. 84-836, vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Lewis: 
I have just read your strong dissenting opinion in 
this case. I note that you seem consistently to refer to 
the opinion in Rose v. Mitchell as a "plurality" opinion. 
See, for example, the fifth line on page 4 of your opinion, 
the next to the last line on page 5, the next to the last 
line on page 6, etc. 
May I respectfully suggest that Rose v. Mitchell was 
not a plurality opinion. This is evident from the line-up 
~the end of the headnote and from the description at the 
top of every page of the opinion. It is true that there 
were different majorities for various parts of the opinion, 
but I think there was a majority for every part. 
Justice Powell 
Sincerely, 
j ~ k J+J9t 







~t-U-- ~ ~ r-t-
~1._1-k ~ ~ 
Justice Powell 
Bill 
December 2, 1985 




Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
~~~ 
(Revised) changes in response to Justice Blackmun's 
memorandum of Nov. 27 
~!- . 
Following are my revised changes in response to 
Justice Blackmun's Memorandum of Nov. 27. 
1. On page 4, change the first sentence of the 
first full paragraph to read: "In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
u.s. 545 (1979), the Court contended that the principle of 
these cases is inapplicable to grand jury discrimination 
claims, because grand jury discrimination 'destroys the 
appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt on the 
integrity of the judicial process.'" At the close of that 
sentence, insert the following footnote: 
Although all parts of JUSTICE BLACKMON's 
opinion in Rose v. Mitchell were joined by four 
other Justices, its precedential weight is 
subject to some question. In particular, part 
II of the opinion--the part that discusses the 
legal principles applicable to grand jury 
discrimination claims generally--was not joined 
by five Justices who also joined in the 
judgment. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 
169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that 
position taken by those members who concurred in 
the judgment on the narrowest grounds"). 
Moreover, the opinion's discussion of general 
L principles was wfiGl±y irrelevant to the result, 
l~(;.l' ~h turned on the insufficiency of the 
<~ evidence of discrimination. I .t;._ js ....t;.bU.Q... XI: ittle-
more than an advisory opinion. See Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 u.s. 83, 94-95 (1968); Frankfurter, 
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 
1002, 1005-1007 (1924). 
2. 
2. On page 5, text three lines from the bottom of 
the page, change the citation to read: "E. g. , Rose v. 
Mitchell, supra, at 551; id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting)." 
3. On page 6, text two lines from the bottom of 
the page, change the citation to read: "see Rose v. 
Mitchell, supra, at 558-559 (weighing costs and benefits 
of awarding relief to petitioners claiming grand jury 
discrimination)." 
4. On page 11, change footnote 10 
renumbered, it will be footnote 11) to read: 
In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, 
supra, I took the position that, where a habeas 
petitioner is given a full opportunity to 
litigate his grand jury discrimination claim in 
state court, he should not be permitted to 
litigate the claim again on federal habeas 
corpus. 443 u.s., at 579 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced 
that my conclusion was correct. Nor do I 
believe that in this case stare decisis weighs 
s±roR~ly against reexamining the question 
whether a defendant should be permitted to 
relitigate a claim that has no bearing either on 
his guilt or on the fairness of the trial that 
convicted him. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, decided 
in 1979, is the only case in which this Court 
has examined the issue, and Rose's authority is 
questionable. See note 4 supra. 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in 
this case, for I conclude that the judgment 
should be reversed on two other grounds: the 
harmlessness of the error, and the 
inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases 
in which the discrimination claim is raised so 
long after the claimant's conviction that 
retrial is difficult eoL~~s:~ 
3. 
(once 
5. On page 13, change the first sentence of the 
first paragraph to read: "In Rose v. Mitchell, supra, the 
Court reasoned that the rule of automatic reversal imposes 
limited costs on society, since the State is able to retry 




to use all the proof it introduced to obtain the 
conviction in the first trial.'" 
.. 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Bill 
DATE: December 2, 1985 
RE: Vasquez v. Hillery, No. 84-836 
Draft changes in response to Justice Blackmun's 
memorandum of Nov. 27 
Following are my suggested changes in response to 
Justice Blackmun 's Memorandum of Nov. 27, in which he 
objected to the use of the word "plurality" to describe 
his opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545 (1979). 
1. On page 4, change the first sentence of the 
first full paragraph to read: "In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
u.s. 545 ( 1979) t JUSTICE BLACKMON argued that the 
principle of these cases is inapplicable to grand jury 
~ 
discrimination claims, because 9rane j1:1ry _.discrimination 
'destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts 
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.'" At the 




i resegR~ ~Rak JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion ~ 
Rose v. Mitchell is denominated an "opinion 
the Court" in the United States Reports. 443 .0( 
I~r Jftlf-View, fioweoltl~, that label ~ 
cannet properly apply to part II of the opinion-
-the part that discusses the legal principles 
applicable to grand jury discrimination claims 
generally. That part of WS'f-!eiS ~K~W:N's~ 
opinion was joined by only two other Justices;'\ 
who also joined in the judgment. Ibid. 
(syllabus). In addition to these three, JUSTICE J 
WHITE and JUSTICE STEVENS, both of whom authored , 
dissenting opinions, expressed agreement with 
part II of JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion. Id., at 
588 (WHITE, J. , joined by STEVENS, J., 
dissenting) ; id. , at 593 (STEVENS, J. , )' 
dissenting). The precedential status of this 
portion of JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion thus rests 
on the of the two dissenters. 
Five or more Justices ee on a 
particular abstract proposition of law, bu i-45-
c~nnot ~e that such agreement automatically 
renders the medium of its expression an "opinion 
of the Court." The Constitution forbids •the0 
C~o~=& to-. isel*e advisory opinions 1• IJiiC fftl::lBt H~.ake 
o c · of 
actual coRt~~~Q.. Flast v. Cohen, 392 u.s. 
83, 94-95 (1968); see Frankfurter, Note on 
Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 1005-
1007 (1924) • It follows that an "opinion of the 
Court" must be a reasoned explanation of a 
judgment in which a majority of Justices join. 
The dissenting Justices who joined part II of 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell 
did not thereby join in an explanation for the 
judgment in that case; to the contrary, they 
expressly dis sen ted from that judgment. Their 
agreement with JUSTICE BLACKMON's statement of 
~rincipl~ thus ~Ano m6De precedential weight 
than the ~t of their comments in dissent. See 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) 
(Court's holding is "that position taken by 




the narro est grounds"). . J 
~ ~ 
fl~ .~/~~ ' 
·~ ~ J_J;;;;;:t- ~ I 
 ~~1-J:.lJ... ~ ~ ~-............_; 
3. 
2. On page 5, text three lines from the bottom of 
the page, change the citation to read: ., E • g • , Rose v . 
Mitchell, supra, at 551 (opinion of JUSTICE BLACKMON); 
id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id., at 590-591 (WHITE, J., dissenting)." 
3. On page 6, text two lines from the bottom of 
the page, change the citation to read: 11 See Rose v. 
Mitchell, supra, at 558-559 (weighing costs and benefits 
of awarding relief to petitioners claiming grand jury 
discrimination) ... 
4. On page 11, change footnote 10 
renumbered, it will be footnote 11) to read: 
In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, 
supra, I took the position that, where a habeas 
petitioner is given a full opportunity to 
litigate his grand jury discrimination claim in 
state court, he should not be permitted to 
litigate the claim again on federal habeas 
corpus. 443 u.s., at 579 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced 
that my conclusion was correct. Nor do I 
believe that in this case stare decisis weighs 
strongly against reexamining the question 
whether a defendant should be permitted to 
relitigate a claim that has no bearing either on 
his guilt or on the fairness of the trial that 




in 1979, is the only case in which th1~Court ~
has examined the issue. The discuss on in ~ 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion in Rose was w.A&ily '....~ ~r 
iu.e~e~ tl:w;t res.loll.t ..,. wbie~ turned on the r,....,-
sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. 
Moreover, that discussion did not command the 
support of five members who also joined in the 
judgment, and __ is therefore not binding 
precedent. See note_4 supra. 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in 
this case, for I conclude that the judgment 
should be reversed on two other grounds: the 
, harmlessness of the error, and the 
inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases 
in which the discrimination claim is raised so 
long after the claimant's conviction that 
retrial is difficult or impossible. 
5. On page 13, change the first sentence of the 
first paragraph to read: "In Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 
JUSTICE BLACKMON argued that the rule of automatic 
reversal imposes limited costs on society, since the State 
is able to retry successful petitioners, and since 'the 
State remains free to use all the proof it introduced to 
obtain the conviction in the first trial.'" 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.i'uprtutt Qfltlttt of tlft ~b i'hdte 
11htelfi:nghtn. ~. <!f. 21lbi-"'~ 
December 5, 1985 
Re: No. 84-836-Vasguez v. Hillery . 
Dear Byron: 
I have your note about the first paragraph of 
page 9 of the opinion. The reason for that paragraph 
is to answer a portion of the dissenting opinion. 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu.prtmt Qflturlltf t!tt ~tb .Statts 
.as!pnghm.lO. <q. 211~'1~ 
Re: No. 84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
I 




JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.l'nprtmt <!fanrlaf tfrt ~tb .l'talt.e' 
Jluftinghm. ~. <!f. 2tl,?~~ 
December 13, 1985 
84-836 - Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Thurgood, 
I would appreciate your showing in a 
footnote that I do not join the first 





Copies to the Conference 
/ 
, 
,ju.punu <!Jourl of tq~ ~ttitd· ,jtwg 
~u!rhtghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll&f~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
December 18, 1985 
Re: No. 84-836 - Vasquez v. Hillery 
Dear Lewis: 
Please show me JOlning your dissent. 
R~ards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
84-836 Vasquez v. Hillery (Bill) 
TM for the Court 10/19/85 
1st draft 11/7/85 
2nd draft 11/13/85 
3rd draft 12/5/85 
4th draft 12/19/85 





1st draft 11/26/85 
2nd draft 12/4/85 
3rd draft 12/10/85 
4th draft 12/20/85 
Joined by WHR 12/85 
CJ 12/18/85 
SOC concurring in the judgment 
1st draft 12/10/85 
LFP letter to TM 11/7/85 
Seeing Justice Never Done 
The case that would not end torments a California town 
. -. ' 
Hanford, Calif., is a farm community, the kind of place where people know 
each other by name and trust each other 
by nature. "You can go downtown with-
out a dime in your pocket, do your shop-
ping and come back to pay later," says 
City Councilman J. Brent Madill. "It's not 
faceless like L.A." In any town, the brutal 
killing of a teenage girl leaves a deep 
mark, but in Hanford the wound remains, 
24 years after the crime. And now the 
U.S. Supreme Court has rubbed 
the wound open again all these 
years later. 
Emerging from fundamen-
tal precepts of the Constitution, 
Supreme Court rulings are fash-
ioned to guide justice through-
out the country. But their im-
print is felt most immediately 
on a smaller scale among the 
people whose controversies the 
court has ruled upon. People in 
Hanford understand the larger 
principle the court recently 
reaffirmed- that blacks may 
not be systematically excluded 
from grand juries-but most in 
town are horrified that the re-
sult may be the release of a man 
they believe is a fearsome killer. 
In March 1962, the body of 
15-year-old Marlene Miller was 
found dumped in an irrigation 
ditch behind her home, a pair 
of scissors embedded in her 
throat, her shorts and under-
pants slit open. Within hours 
police arrested Booker T. Hil-
house lawyer, continued to attac~'his 
conviction because blacks had been~elib­
erately excluded from the grand jury that 
indicted him. Last month the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled 6 to· 3 that he mtiSt be 
charged and tried again or set free . It was 
a decision that saw such ordinaril:y con-
servative Justices as Sandra Day O'Con-
nor and Byron White joining such llberals 
as William Brennan and Thurgood Mar-
shall. The state argued that although 
school class. Joan Pegues, assistant city 
editor of the Hanford Sentinel, puts it 
more simply: "When you say 'Hillery' 
around here, people turn purple." 
A few in town see it differently. Bur-
della Minter, who moved to Hanford in 
1973, began researching Hillery's case af-
ter being asked to sign one of the petitions 
to deny him parole. An organist for the 
black congregation of the Second Baptist 
Church, she helped lead a drive in sup-
port of parole for Hillery, mustering 480 
signatures. Minter believes that if a fair 
trial finds Hillery guilty, he should go 
back to prison. "If you do the crime, you 
do the time," she says, with the air of 
someone who has thought about what the 
words mean: her own stepson is 
serving time in San Quentin for 
rape. But the proceedings must 
be fair, she argues. "There's 
racism here now, and there was 
racism back then." 
Now 54, Hillery , is being 
held at Vacaville, where he 
awaits the next step. Within a 
few weeks, local authorities are 
expected to decide whether to 
charge Hillery again. Very like-
ly, they will, despite the vexing 
problem of how to retry him 
nearly a quarter of a century af-
ter his alleged crime was com- ' 
rnitted. "It's a frustrating case 
for us," complains Kings Coun-
ty District Attorney Robert 
Maline. "For a jury to base 
credibility on old court tran-
scripts is difficult." As many as 
nine key witnesses may have 
died since the original trial. 
Others have moved away. Old 
pieces of evidence, like the belt, 
the scissors and the tire track 
photographs, will have to be 
dug out of storage. Worse, although the 
Supreme Court's Miranda decision was 
not handed down until four years after 
the killing, local rulings on its retro-
active application may permit Hillery's 
lery Jr. , a local black ranch hand already 
on parole from an earlier rape conviction. 
Circumstantial physical evidence, includ-
ing his belt and tire prints from his car, 
was found near the scene of the crime. 
Hillery insisted on his innocence, but a 
jury found him guilty of murder, and he 
was sentenced to death. 
L----- - ---- --=--=.:.:.:.:.:__.:.:__.:.:...Jo;;l attorney to exclude statements made by 
Then began the sort of unremitting 
and tortuous legal battle that leads critics 
to complain that justice is never final in 
the U.S., while admirers say that justice is 
never prematurely closed off. Twice Hil-
lery's sentence was thrown out by the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court because of irregu-
larities in the sentencing phases of his 
trial. Twice he was recondernned to 
death. Then in 1974 his sentence was re-
duced to life because of a California deci-
sion barring capital punishment in the 
state. Since then, Hillery has come up for 
parole eight times, and each time he has 
been turned down after petition drives or-
ganized in Hanford gathered thousands of 
signatures opposing his release. 
Meanwhile, Hillery, an energetic jail-
TIME, FEBRUARY 17, 1986 
Local front page In 1962; Hillery In 198e 
"These people won 't/orget it." 
blacks should not have been intenti'onally 
excluded from the judge-selected Kings 
County grand jury, it was "a harmless er-
ror." But Justice Marshall responded for 
the majority that overturning the convic-
tion was "the only effective remedy for 
this violation" and was "not dispropor-
tionate to the evil that it seeks to deter." 
"Where's the justice?" asks Council-
man Madill. "Is there any justice?" Most 
of Hanford believes little attention was 
given to deterring the larger evil. "It's an 
absolute shame that the Supreme Court 
has to take such a gruesome crime to 
make a social statement," says Deputy 
Kings County Planner Bill Zumwalt, who 
had been a member of Marlene's high 
his client after his arrest. Stiffer mod-
ern rules on evidence gathering may also 
apply. 
"Something about this killing has 
stirred this community," says William 
Prahl, California's deputy attorney gen-
eral. "These people won't forget it." 
Neighbors say that Marlene's parents, 
now in their 70s, dread the possible re-
opening of the case. They still reside 
in Hanford, though the house they lived 
in at the time of their daughter's death 
has long since been torn down. The 
memories have been harder to demolish. 
"The sad thing is that it keeps coming 
back," says Marlene's brother Walter Jr. 
"We have not been allowed the time 
to heal." And the end is still not in 
sight. - By Rlc'-"d Llluyo. 
Reported by Paul A. Wltteman/Hllnfonl 
73 
lfp/ss 11/20/85 Rider A, p. 3 (Vasquez) 
VAS3 SALLY-POW 
The Court today relies on a .. century .. of 
precedent. My respect for state decisis has been stated 
many times. (Cite cases- e.g., Garcia last Term). It 
was recently observed, however, that decisions .. must be 
subject to revision over time, or the Constitution will 
fall captive •.. to the anachronistic views of long gone 
generations... (See WJB's speech). There are numerous 
examples of the Court concluding that an interpretation of 
the Constitution adopted decades ago has lost its 
essential meaning, and no longer is an interpretation 
compelled by the Constitution or that serves the original 
purpose. (Cite cases in a footnote) No one would suggest 
that discrimination in the composition of grand juries 
2. 
occurs frequently today, or is a problem comparable in any 
respect to the widespread prevalence of discrimination 
when this line of precedents was established in 18 __ _ 
Where, as here, there was a fair trial, societal interests 
far outweigh whatever limited deterrent effect may result 
from overturning a valid conviction because of grand jury 
discrimination. 1 therefore think that the time has come 
for a critical reexamination of the line of precedents 
upon which the Court relies. It is unnecessary to do 
this, however, because in my view these precedents simply 
do not apply to a case, like this one, in which the 
asserted discrimination occurred in 1962. 
1Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. 
See People v. Hillery, 10 Cal.3d 897, 519 P.2d 572 (1974): 
ante, at n. 2. That sentence was ultimately reduced 
to life imprisonment because the California Supreme Court 
found that imposition of the death penalty was in all 
cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. 
!bid. 
2According to 1960 census figures, 4.7% of Kings County's 
population was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 
1228, 1232 (E. D. Cal. 1983) . Respondent's grand jury 
consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom were white. 
ld . , at 12 31 . 
. ., 
3under the Court's harmless error decisions, the fact that 
society has an interest in deterring discrimination is not 
relevant to whether the error in this case is harmless. 
The Chapman v. California standard asks whether the 
particular defendant has been harmed by the violation, not 
whether the violation causes some societal injury. See 
Hasting, supra, at 510-511. Thus, for example, we have 
applied harmless error analysis to the admission of 
illegally seized evidence, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 
42 (1970), without regard to the societal interest in 
deterring violations of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United 
States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984). 
7 
one Justice recently observed, decisions "must be 
\ subject to revision over time, or the Constitution will 
fall captive • . • to the anachronistic views of long gone 
generations." Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1985, at Al5 
L
(quoting speech of JUSTICE BRENNAN at Hastings College of 
Law, Nov. 18, 1985). 
5The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's 
~ 
conviction in 1963; on rehearing 
1\ 
in 1965, the court 
reversed respondent's sentence~ but again affirmed his 






/ ~~~ .1.-..t p~~' 
Jln the ten years preceding respondent's indictment, !tlngs-
~ -h -h--L trt-~ 
County grand juries ~ed~ three persons, none 
of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 710, 
401 P.2d 382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 u.s. 938 
(1967). These facts render any claim that respondent was 
indicted because of his race ~~ul. 
The only 
directed not at 
~l discrimination in this case was 
respondent but at the black residents of 
Kings County, who (the District Court found) were barred 
from serving on grand juries because of their race. There 
:5 
is nothing in the record that WGHlQ support a finding that 
1\ 
the members of the grand jury themselves discriminated 
against anyone on the basis of race, or that they 




7Thus, neither respondent nor the Court contends that 
respondent's conviction is tainted by the absence of any 
blacks on the trial 
~
jury. ~spondent concedes that the 
1\ 
State did not discriminate against blacks in selecting 
petit jurors generally; he presumes (quite correctly) that 
that concession bars him from challenging his conviction 
on the basis that the jury that tried him contained no 
black members. 
8The California Supreme Court's detailed discussion of the 
evidence against respondent is found in People v. Hillery, 
I\ 
supra, at 699-702, 401 P.2d at 386-388. 
~~--~~ 
9I.-.c;;t.e..._.a.01§.-1'rlree1'l""te~~~~.t.R-at J(espondent woul~ ~ able to 
attack his indictment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
grounds. See United States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 345 
(1974) ("an indictment valid on its face is not subject to 
challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the 
basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence") (citing the 
Court's opinion · in Costello, supra). 
tne!-Y suggest 1'\ that, assuming such an attack were permitted, 
respondent can show no violation of any personal right in 
this case. 
101n my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 1 
took the position that where a habeas petitioner is given 
a full opportunity to litigate his grand jury 
,-
discrimination claim in state court, he should not be 
permitted to litigate the same claim again in federal 
habeas corpus. 443 u.s., at 579 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 1 remain convinced that my conclusion 
kov u...;,_ ~ 
was correct. Nor do 1 believe that stare decisis weighs 
A. 
~ against reexamining the question whether one such 
:• 
' 
as respondent should be permitted to reli tigate a claim 
that has no bearing on either his guilt or on the fairness 
of the trial that convicted him. 
1~7~ 
The plurality opinion in 
A 
Rose is ~e the only instance in which this Court has 
examined this issue. The discussion in that opinion was 
unnecessary to the result, as it turned on the sufficiency 
of the habeas petitioners' evidence. Perhaps more 
important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant 
portion of JUSTICE BLACKMON's plurality opinion dissented 
~-
from the Court's judgment. 443 U.S., at 588 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For 
that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the 
Court's rejection of this argument in Rose is binding 
precedent. Id., at 582 n. 3 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
the judgment) ; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.S. 153, 
169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken 
by those members who concurred in the judgment [where 
necessary to a majority] on the narrowest grounds"). 
~ 
It is unnecessary to reach this issue in this case, 
1\ 
for I conclude that the judgment should be reversed on a 
narrower ground: the inappropriateness of the Court's 
remedy in cases where the discrimination claim is raised 
so long after the claimant's conviction that retrial is 
unlikely if not impossible. 
''1 
11The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 u.s. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant 
was indicted in November 1874; this Court's decision was 
rendered in March 1880. 
reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad 
faith on the State's part can be shown. Because 
respondent suffered no injury from the Kings County's 
discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly 
complain if he is given a windfall only when he raises his 
claim promptly. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been 
blameless in the long delay in raising this claim. The 
California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
L' ,. 
!D 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next 
raised the claim in 1974, when he sought post-conviction 
relief in state court. During the intervening nine years, 
respondent raised repeated challenges--ultimately 
successfully--to his death sentence. None of these 
challenges could possibly have required a new trial on 
guilt. Thus, there is no apparent reason why respondent 
could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction 
relief on the grand jury discrimination claim, which if 




This is a risk ;~~ate where the claim 
~ 
goes to the petitioner's guilt or innocence, or where the 
A 
claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to the 
~ 
petitioner, but there is no reason to ~i~,·:-t--w1fte-











lfp/ss 11/22/85 Rider x, Vasquez 
2nd draft 
VASX SALLY-POW 
It cannot be questioned that at least since the 
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education this 
Court has never tolerated racial discrimination. With the 
exception of the cases relied upon by it today, the 
Court's decisions - so far as I can recall -have involved 
cases where there were victims of discrimination. In this 
case respondent was not victim. The grand jury 
discrimination did not in any way taint the trial in which 
he was convicted of murder - a trial the fairness of 
which, as I have emphasized, is not questioned. 
To be sure, there is a long line of cases, 
primarily involving direct rather than habeas corpus 
........... 
2. 
review, in which grand jury discrimination was viewed as 
sufficient to overturn even a fair trial. The most recent 
of these was a plurality decision in Rose. Justice 
Blackmun's opinion eloquently reiterated our commitment to 
assure equal protection under the law to all citizens. 
Where the grand jury discrimination had been followed by a 





(i) preservation of respect for the 
judicial process; (ii) the assumption that reversal would 
have a deterrent effect; and (iii) the further assumption 
~'1~ 
that the convicted defendant could be retried. ~ 
I ~ J- 1 ~~ 
lN\ }A, ;r, 
As shown above, in the more modern cases 
/t 
convictions are not overturned where the constitutional 
error is harmless or where such as error is not 
prejudicial. It cannot be said credibly that the 
. • 
3. 
integrity of our system of Justice is any less implicated 
in these cases than in Rose. Precisely in the interest of 
judicial integrity, recent cases have not hesitated to 
~~~~ 
apply harmless error analysis in Fourth, Fifth and Sixth 
1"\ 
~
Amendment cases, or - for example - in a major Sixth 
""' ~kf-k~ 
Amendment case to reverse where the defendant could show 
'\ ) 
no prejudice. 
What has been said above in Part liB with respect 
to the deterrence argument, makes two points neither of 
which was considered in Rose. The first is the diminishing 
likelihood of effective deterrence where the 
constitutional error occurred many years ago. Secondly, 
there was no serious weighing of the societal interest in 




Finally, Ji n ne~~ or the~ases relied on by 
Court was the time spread between conviction and the 
resort to federal habeas corpus relief so great that 
successful retrial was unlikely. 
the 
In sum, none of the reasons relied upon by the 
Rose plurality has any relevancy here. The Court's 
decision today is an example of a mechanical type of 
justice in which reason is subordinated to a mistaken 
~ 
4. 
reliance on the wrong cases, the vital interest of society 
A 
- particularly in the age in which we live - in not having 
constitutionally fair convictions of dangerous criminals 
overturned is ignored. 
.• 
' •• , •. t. 
lAccording to 1960 census figures, 4.7% of Kings County's 
population was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 
1228, 1232 (E.o. Cal. 1983). Respondent's grand jury 
consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom were white. 
Id., at 1231. 
2 E.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 551 (1979) 
(plurality opinion) : id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J. , 
concurring in the judgment): id., at 590-591 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
3The only purposeful discrimination in this case was 
directed not at respondent but at the black residents of 
2 
Kings County, who (the District Court found} were barred 
from serving on grand juries because of their race. There 
is~y nothing in the record that would support a 
finding that the members of the grand jury themselves 
discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or that 
they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
4Thus, neither respondent nor the Court contends that 
respondent's conviction is in any way tainted by the 
absence of any blacks on the trial jury. Respondent 
concedes that the State did not discriminate against 
blacks in selecting petit jurors generally; he presumes 
(quite correctly} that that concession bars him from 
3 
challenging his conviction on the basis that the jury that 
tried him contained no black members. 
5rn the ten years preceding respondent's indictment, Kings 
County grand juries indicted exactly three persons, none 
of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 710, 
401 P.2d 382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 n.s. 938 
(1967). These facts render any claim that respondent was 
indicted because of his race almost fanciful. 
6The California Supreme Court's detailed discussion of the 
evidence against respondent is found in People v. Hillery, 
supra, at 699-702, 401 P.2d at 386-388. 
'.• 
4 
71 do not mean to imply that respondent would be able to 
attack his indictment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
grounds. See United States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 345 
(1974) ("an indictment valid on its face is not subject to 
challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the 
basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence") (citing the 
Court's opinion in Costello, supra). I mean only to 
suggest that, assuming such an attack were permitted, 
respondent can show no violation of any personal right in 
this case. 
8These same points support the proposition that grand jury 
discrimination, when raised by one fairly convicted of the 
is harmless error. As 
Justice Stewart noted in his separate opinion in Rose v. 
Mitchell, other kinds of pretrial error do not justify 
overturning a conviction unless they prejudiced the 
defendant. E.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 119 
(1975) (illegal arrest); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 u.s. 1 
(1970) (denial of counsel at preliminary hearing). See 
Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 576-577 and nn. 3-4 (Stewart, 
J., concurring in the judgment). Responding to this 
point, the plurality in Rose argued that grand jury 
discrimination "destroys the appearance of justice and 
thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial 
process." 443 u.s., at 555-556. But every constitutional 
~~ k ~~ k r: JIA- )-u 
error in some sens~ raisef questions abett~ the .. integrity 
of the judicial process ... Nevertheless, the Court has 
kinds of constitutional violations. United States v. 
Hasting, 461 u.s. 499, 509 (1983): Connecticut v. Johnson, 
460 u.s. 73, 94-95 (1982) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Thus, 
in Chapman v. California, we held that a trial judge's 
improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify--a 
~ 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--was not 
1\ 
a proper basis for reversal if harmless. 386 u.s., at 21-
24. we ~held that a defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel must show that counsel's 
ineffectiveness prejudiced him in order to obtain relief. 
Strickland v. washington, 104 s.ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). 
This is so even though "counsel made errors so serious 
that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. It is difficult to 
imagine an error that more directly affects the integrity 
7 
of the judicial process than a failure of the accused's 
counsel to satisfy the minimal standard of quality that 
the Sixth Amendment guarantees. 
At the very least, the 
/;eel~ ~ 











reverse respondent's conviction absent ~ plausible 
.. ~~~4_ 
showing of prejudice to respondent is 1\...Gge,., a~ the cases 
cited above .- s;:w. But the Court has previously rejected 
the argument that harmless error doctrine applies to 
claims such as this one. Cassell v. Texas, supra; Rose v. 
{~/i 
fJ ~) J Mitchell, supra. I with arguments the cannot agree 
~~ 
~ ~ ~ advanced in those cases--or in this one--but I am 




593-594 (STEVENS, J • , dissenting). My vote does not, 
~ therefore, rest on an application of the harmless error 
~ 
 rule. 
rl1 ~ t:/. 1-tJ ~ 
d....-~~1--
~Yf~~? 
9In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, I took 
the position that where a habeas petitioner is given a 
full opportunity to litigate his grand jury discrimination 
claim in state court, he should not be permitted to 
litigate the same claim again in federal habeas corpus. 
443 u.s., at 579 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). 
I remain convinced that my conclusion was correct. Nor do 
I believe that stare decisis weighs strongly against 
reexamining the question whether one such as respondent 
should be permitted to reli tigate a claim that has no 
bearing on either his guilt or on the fairness of the 
trial that convicted him. The plurality opinion in Rose 
is to date the only instance in which this Court has 
examined this issue. The discussion in that opinion was 
~ ,_,-f 
unnecessary to the result, ~h turned on the sufficiency 
~ 
,·. 
of the habeas petitioners' evidence. Perhaps more 
important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant 
portion of JUSTICE BLACKMON's plurality opinion dissented 
from the Court's judgment. 443 U.S., at 588 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting) : id. , at 593 (STEVENS, J. , dissenting) • For 
that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the 
Court's rejection of this argument in Rose is binding 
precedent. Id., at 582 n. 3 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
the judgment): see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 u.s. 153, 
169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken 
by those members who concurred in the judgment [where 
necessary to a majority] on the narrowest grounds"). 
r~;lt unnecessary~ reach this issue in this 
case, for I conclude that the judgment should be reversed 
on a narrower ground: the inappropriateness of the 
/IJ 
Court's ~n in cases where the discrimination 
claim is raised long after the claimant's conviction 
.I 
10The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 u.s. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant 
was indicted in November 1874; this Court's decision was 
rendered in March 1880. 
llThe reason for this delay 
,_.t ~- I @ 
s 
~ cl: 'It 
is irrelevant, e~cep~ insg(2I-
~k~ 
bad faith on the State's par)1· Because 
respondent suffered no injury from the Kings County's 
discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot 
• J. 
~ r r 1\. complain J tho.t ~~...-c~~~-i'r~--w-;..,.,....'""""'N.l only when he -
raises his claim promptly. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been 
blameless in the long delay in raising this claim. The 
California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next 
raised the claim in 1974, when he sought post-conviction 
relief in state court. During the intervening nine years, 
respondent raised repeated challenges--ultimately 
successfully--to his death sentence. None of these 
challenges could possibly have required a new trial on 
guilt, so there is no ebvieas reason why respondent could 
not 
""'c='4~~ ~1..../­
simultaneously ~ post-conviction 
'1 
relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, ~h if successful would 
" 
require a new trial • 
!I 
/7-
12under the Court's approach, it appears that someone in 
respondent's position might be wise to wait to raise his 
discrimination claim until the State could no longer retry 
him, thereby commuting his own legally imposed sentence. 
This is a risk we may wish to tolerate where the claim 
goes to the petitioner's guilt or innocence, or where the 
claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to the 
petitioner, but there is no reason to permit it when the 
petitioner simply serves as a private attorney general who 
protects the public's interest in nondiscriminatory grand 
jury selection procedures. 
~~ .. ..... ; 
2nd draft 
lfp/ss 11/26/85 Rider A, p. 5 (Vasquez) 
VAS5 SALLY-POW 
The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rationale system of justice - one that fully 
preserves constitutional rights but recognizes that a 
violation may not have affected in any way the fairness of 
a particular conviction. As noted above, it is conceded 
in this case that the grand jury error did not affect the 
fairness of respondent's trial or injure respondent in any 
cognizable way. 1 therefore would reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Note to Bill: It seems to me that the transition 




in Part 11 can be better stated. Both of these now refer 
to "harmless error". 1 have tried in my suggested rider 
to harmonize the two paragraphs somewhat more clearly. 1 
would leave the first paragraph of Part 11 as it is now 
written. 1 also have some question, Bill, as to the 
utility of footnote 4. We do say elsewhere that there is 
a substantial societal interest. Perhaps the first 
sentence in the note could be revised to say in substance: 
"Society clearly has an interest in deterring 
discrimination and an equal interest in 
deterring violations of other constitutional 
rights. The Chapman v. California standard, 
however, focuses primarily on whether the 
particular defendant has been harmed by the 
violation." 
1 also would hesitate to cite Hastings again, as 
1 think this is the weakest of the cases on which we rely • 
lfp/ss 11/20/85 Rider A, p. 2 (Vasquez) 
VAS2 SALLY-POW 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a 
rational system of Justice. No one questions that 
respondent is guilty of a murder so brutal that he was 
sentenced to death. Nor does anyone question the fairness 
of his trial. 
84-836 s--u.... ~ t. ... "'-f(j 
1-e> ~ 
VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent ) ~ a black man J ~ was indicted by a 
grand jury having no black members for the stabbing murder 
of a 15-year-old g ir 1. A petit jury found respondent 
guilty of that murder beyond a reasonable doubt, in a 
trial -whose fairness is unchallenged here. Twenty-three 
1\ 
years later, we are asked to grant respondent's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus--and thereby require a new 
'i J.4w.- ..- n.. 1-.-Lt-~
trial--on the ground that blacks were purposefully 
.1\ 
excluded from the grand jury that indicted him. It is 
undisputed that whatever race discrimination tainted the 













grand jury selection process in Kings County, California 
has long since disappeared. It is also undisputed that a 
grand jury that perfectly represented Kings County's 
population at the time of respondent's indictment would 
~ 
have contained one black member. 1 The Court holds that 
I\ 
respondent's petition must be granted, and that respondent 
;J b, = 2 ;e: 
nust be freed unless the State is able to convict him 
again, more than two decades after the murder wRieh EJa"e -
r:t-se to this ea~ 
® ---;7--.,; { To-.....t.b.o.s.e.. untra~neii .in the law s mysteries, thiv -result must seem oddJ The Court nevertheless finds its 
decision is compelled both by a century of precedent and 
by the interests of respondent and of society as a whole 
~ ~ ~~ u( t::t()~ 
in ending f;~is pour' hmlM fOFHI -.£ race discriminatio~. I ~ 




ill-suited to the wrong that prompts it. 
p-c €u..,.< H t..-e~cd.L t?'7-UI-~-=-­
suffered no harm from the 1\d~intirra-:t: OI-¥--- s:s~J.eoti-e az:: Q5. ~e 
~ ~~~ .. ~~~~ 
grand jury that in~ ~c ~l:li;J,.e -"\ society's 
/\. in endin~?s..a~~~~~;·•·~~ 
J<t-1-~ .. q f 
,.; respondent's conviction twenty-three years after the 
~~ ~ ~ ~J-,L ~ ... 4. ~  k "'.a-u-t-~ 
~-im-i~c~~~as>- li+~eva~e -as ~deterrent ~!Itt r 
~t.e-£..~--~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~.tlf£..1~ 
A would-be wrongdoers, AespQcially -wl:l~ comparee eoo /\the harm 
t 
~d-<.,.A4-
society suffers by freeing a fairly convicted ~ whom the 
1'\ 
~~ 
state IA«¥ be unable to retry. 
" 
Finally, in my view, the 
I 
recedent on which the Court relies does not apply t? 
' cases, like this one, in which the relevant 




'11 Jf ~J '1 ~I~ 
ll ~..Q.o._J}Qt.L_o..f__cg~uarr.sl '•lit:h the p:repo~it:ienO 
~at race discrimination in grand jury selection violates 
fue Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 
The question in this case is not whether the state erred, 
but rather what should be done about it. The question, in 
other words, is whetherJ~ ~~rfd ~{e-
~t;:;:,.. ~ 
A compelled either by the Constitution i~f or by the need 
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against race 
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush 
v. Lucas, 462 u.s. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 
u.s. 228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal 
Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of 
automatic reversal" that the Court applies today. In 
'c 
5. 
Hobby v. United States, 104 s.ct. 3093 (1984), we conceded 
that the discriminatory selection of grand jury foremen 
violated the Constitution, but we also concluded that 
reversing the petitioner's conviction was an inappropriate 
remedy for the constitutional violation given the minor 
import of grand jury foremen in federal criminal cases. 
104 s.ct., at 3095-3097; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 105 
s.ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) (suppression of evidence obtained 
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally 
compelled); United States v. Leon, 104 s.ct. 3405, 3412 
(1984) (suppress ion of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 489 (1976); see generally 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1 (1975). 
6. 
notion that discrimination in the makeup of the body that 
charged the defendant com~els reversal of the defendant's ..... ~ 
conviction. Rather, as in Hobby, the Court in this case 
must determine whether reversal of respondent's conviction 
is an "appropriate remedy" for the purpr l exclusion of 
blacks from grand juries in Kings County, California in 
1962. Hobby, supra, at 3095; see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
u.s. 545, 558-559 (1979) (plurality op.) (weighing costs 
and benefits of awarding relief to petitioners claiming 
grand jury discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The Common Law 
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 u. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) 
(arguing that judicially created remedies are appropriate 
only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifically 
intended federal right"). That determination depends on 
(i) the utility of this particular remedy in either 
7. 
correcting any injustice to respondent or deterring 
unconstitutional conduct by state officials, and (ii) the 
remedy's costs to society. United States v. Leon, supra, 
at 3412-3413; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 489. 
II 
1he utility of the remedy depends on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court 
perceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury 
discrimination: harm to the respondent's interest in 
being fairly charged and convicted based on factors other 
~.L.t__- ~ ·-
than his race, and harm to society's interest in st~;plng~ 1\ • 
rae ial bias. I turn 
now to a consideration of these interests, and of the 
8. 
degree to which they are served in this case by the rule 
the Court applies. 
A 
The Court does not contend that discrimination in 
the selection of the grand jury that indicted respondent 
calls into question the soundness of the grand jury's 
decision to indict. Such a contention could not withstand 
reasoned analysis. Kings County's grand jury found 
probable cause to believe that respondent had committed a 
vicious murder. Respondent was subsequently convicted of 
~ 
that char~ in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are 
Hws-1-
not now challenged. The conviction, ~h was affirmed on 
bk.-/'1~-
direct appeal~and never since challenged, establishes that 
the grand jury's finding of probable cause was 
. ~;. 
9. 
indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575-576 
G.Dttt.ufri ~ ir~. +1.4 j~ltt.lU:t 
(Stewart, J., 8i&•&R@~! ): Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282, 
A 
301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless finds that discrimination in 
the selection of the Kings County grand jury potentially 
harmed respondent, because the grand jury is vested with 
broad discretion in deciding whether to indict and in 
framing the charges, and because it is impossible to tell 
whether this discretion would have been exercised 
differently by a different grand jury. Ante, at 8. The 
point appears to be that a grand jury from which blacks 
are systematically excluded might, in effect, make race an 
element of the substantive offense. Since the State may 
"~ . . n~ not 1mpr 1son respondent for a crime one oft\ ~ose elements-'\ 
lf.v?<: fri' ~ ~··~·~~ - ~!-La..~~ 
-- ~~t:( -
10. 
is his race, the argument goes, his conviction must be set 
aside. 
The argument ignores established principles of 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. We have 
consistently declined to find a violation of the Equal 
Protect ion Clause absent a finding of intentional 
discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 u.s. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. 
Da v is , 4 2 6 U • S • 2 2 9 , 2 3 9 ( 19 7 6 ) • There has been no 
showing in this case--indeed, respondent does not even 
allege--that the Kings County grand jury indicted 
respondent because of his race, or that the grand jury 
failed to indict white suspects despite similarly strong 
evidence against them.3 Nor is it sensible simply to 
assume that such an impermissible discrimination might 
11. 
exist because the grand jury had no black members. We 
have never before suggested that the racial composition of 
a grand jury gives rise to the inference that indictments 
are racially motivated, any more than we have suggested 
that a suspect arrested by a policeman of a different race 
may challenge his subsequent conviction on that basis. 
Instead, as the Court acknowledges, a criminal defendant, 
validly convicted, must show that he was "deliberately 
charged on account of his race" in order to obtain 
rever sal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 (citing United 
~ates v. Batchelder, 442 u.s. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Since respondent has not even alleged any discrimination 
directed at him, he cannot claim the discriminatory effect 
~~I; 
wl+i.ch, according to the . Court, justifies granting relief 
in this case. 
'. 
12. 
The Court's novel discriminatory effect argument 
1.4, 
neither . t:. f. ~/.e_,t. d~ . . )US 1 ISS preVIOUS eClSlOnS 
1 
in this ar~e nor 
sensibly explains the outcome of this case. For example, 
in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 u.s. 482 (1977}, the Court 
ordered a new trial for a Hispanic petitioner who was 
indicted by a grand jury half of whose members were 
Hispanic. Whatever value such a result might have, it 
cannot be justified on the ground that the grand jury 
indicted the petitioner because of his race. The same 
point is made by other cases in which the indicting grand 
jury included members of the defendant's race, but in 
which there was evidence of systematic underrepresentation 
~ 
over time. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 u.s. 346 
(1970}; Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282 (1950}; see also 
id., at 290-291 (Frankfurter, J., concurring}. 
13. 
The facts of this case, meanwhile, illustrate the 
opposite difficulty with presuming harm to respondent 
because of the racial composition of the grand jury that 
indicted him. 
~a.hrv--1-
At the time respondent was charged, &eme 5% 
"" 
of the residents of Kings County were black. Hillery v. 
_./ 
Rllley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 1983). With 
such a small percentage, a random selection system could 
well have resulted in a grand jury identical to the one 
that indicted respondent; on the other hand, a perfectly 
representative grand jury--one whose composition reflected 
the county's racial mix--would have contained only one 
black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. 4 See Akins v. Texas, 325 u.s. 398, 403 (1945). ~ 
h/~..-1-tv ~ ,....e..c./Lc.-c..l-/ t...-/- 1'?1A-~ ")4..() ~ 
seems-~~nseless to draw such an inference solely from the 
"'\ 
14. 
fact that persons outside the grand jury discriminated 
against blacks other than respondent. 5 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision 
to indict is placed to one side, it is impossible to 
conclude that respondent was injured in any cognizable way 
by the discriminatory selection of Kings County's grand 
juries. It may be conceivable--though hardly likely, 
given the strength of the evidence against respondent in 
this case 6--that a different grand jury might have decided 
not to indict, or to indict for a less serious charge. 
The fact remains, however, that the grand jury's decision 
to indict was correct as a matter of law, given 
respondent's unchallenged subsequent conviction. 
Respondent simply has no right to a grand jury that errs 
in his fa;ft most, he has a right not to be bound 
15. 
over for trial ( i) based on insufficient evidence, 
Costello v. United States, 350 u.s. 359, 364 (1956) 
(Burton, J., concurring), or (ii) based on impermissible 
factors such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 u.s. 
448, 456 (1962). 7 There is not even an allegation, much 
less any record support, for the propositio~ that this 
right was in any way violated. The Court's decision in 
this case cannot, therefore, be justified as a means of 
redressing any wrong to respondent. Any error ~, as to 
~~ 
I...+ ~ r -,k4.1,_..a. ~-~ -~...., .. --~ ~ 1 /. ~.... • 




is not harmed in any cognizable way 
by the grand jury discrimination that prompted his claim, 
the Court's decision must stand or fall based on its value 
16. 
as a deterrent to government officials who seek to exclude 
particular groups from grand juries, ~~ainst the 
-1 
cost that the Court's remedy imposes on society. United 
a.,... J~ ~LJJJ 
States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413. A ;rite Court r...ightl.¥ 
~zes 
A 
that grand jury discrimination is "a grave 
constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the 
conviction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected 
body. That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously 
suggests, compelled by precedent; equally important, it ~ 
~~~~~1-E;L-?/-
se·nse~s f&! la9!. 
The cases on which the Court relies involve 
relatively ~¥apses of time between the defendant's 
1'\ 
trl.al and the ~~c.l~;· ~ el1ef.  This fact is unsurprising, 
17. 
since the Court only recently determined that claims of 
grand jury discrimination may be raised in federal habeas 
oorpus proceedings. See Rose v. Mitchell, supra. 9 Prior 
to 1970, the Court's grand jury discrimination cases all 
arose on direct appeal from the jurisdiction that 
convicted the defendant. In all of these cases, the time 
between the defendant's conviction and this Court's 
decision was six years or less. 10 
Before today's decision, the Court had twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 u.s. 
482 (1977), 
~~ 
the Gonrt reMered it..s decision five years 
.....\ 
after the petitioner's indictment. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 
u.s. 493 (1972), the Court's decision was announced six 
years after the habeas petitioner's indictment. Both 
18. 
decisions thus involve delays comparable to the kind of 
delay the Court often sees in cases arising on direct 
appeal. 
s 
None of these cases foreclose the possibility that 
"' 
where the discrimination claim is raised many years after 
the defendant • s conviction, and where the State can show 
that the delay prejudiced its ability to retry the 
~ 
defendant, the Court ~t deny relief. Indeed, the Court 
""\. 
has decided only two cases in which such an argument might 
have been raised. In both instances, the Court denied the 
requested relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 
425 u.s. 536 (1977) (petitioner raised grand jury 
discrimination claim seven years after his conviction; 
Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds) ; Tollett v. 
&:!nderson, 411 u.s. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand 
··. 
19. 
jury claim twenty-one years after conviction; Court held 
that the claim was foreclosed because the petitioner had 
pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). It is 
thus an open question whether the long delay we find in 
this case makes it inappropriate to grant respondent's 
petition for habeas corpus. 
Respondent's petition, in which he first raised his 
grand jury discrimination claim before a federal court, 
was filed sixteen years after his conviction.ll Seven 
~ 
years have passed since the petition was filed. It is now 
1\ 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for 
murder, and since the discrimination that prompts his 
claim for relief. The Court finds this time 
lapse irrelevant to its analysis. In my view, it is 
~!--( 





lessens ;.!:;T r emed? 's 
A 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545 (1979), the 
plurality argued that the rule of automatic reversal 
imposes only limited costs on society, since the State is 
able to retry successful petitioners, and since "the State 
remains free to use all the proof it introduced to obtain 
the conviction in the first trial." Id., at 558. This 
~Y is not the case when r~~"::; 
after the original conviction. Particularly in a trial 
whose outcome turned on the jury's credibility judgments, 
long delays effectively eliminate the State's ability to 
reconstruct its case. Even where credibility issues are 
not central, the passage of time may make the right to 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, 
.. 
21. 
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 u. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses 
die or move away; physical evidence is lost; memories 
fade. The successful habeas petitioner may be expected to 
support his own version of events, but the State may find 
>\1 ::6 ~~tk~~. 
itself handicapped 
"' 
in its ability toAre•p~rteL For these 
reasons, the Court has noted that "' [t]he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary.'" 






J }-~ ~~~h-.., 1\~-~-
importa~, long delays dilute ~ 
--1 
effectiveness of the reversal rule as a deterrent. /' Thel 
f 
reason for reversing convictions as a deterrent to law 
\ enforcement officials is that those officials 
22. 
accountable--to their superiors and to the public they 
serve--for failures that potentially free convicted 
criminals. That accountability disappears when the 
penalty is too long delayed: responsible officials who 
have died or retired are unaffected by any subsequent 
penalties. For this reason, those who seek to 
discriminate against blacks are unlikely to be deterred by 7 
/ penalties that materialize long after the evildoers are 
~I 
dead or retired. 
This case illustrates the point. The architect of 
the discriminatory selection system that led to 
respondent's claim was one Judge Wingrove. Judge Wingrove 
was the sole circuit judge in Kings County from 1956 until 
his death in 1966; in that capacity, he selected the grand 
jurors who indicted respondent. Respondent does not 
23. 
allege that discriminatory practices on which his claim is 
based survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evidence 
in the record that would support such an allegation. It 
seems hard to believe that the Judge might have behaved 
differently had he known that a convicted defendant might 
be freed eighteen years after his death. Yet that is 
exactly the proposition that must justify the remedy 
mposed in this case: that people in positions similar to 
Judge Wingrove's will mend their discriminatory ways out 
of the fear of successful habeas petitions long after they 
have passed from the scene. To state this proposition is 
to expose it as fallacious. 
These concerns require that a different balance be 
struck in cases like this one than in cases such as Rose 
v. Mitchell and Castaneda v. Partida, in which the grand 
24 • 
.. 
jury discrimination claims are adjudicated only a short 
time after the petitioner's conviction. 1 would therefore 
remand for a determination of whether the State would be 
substantially prejudiced in its ability to retry 
respondent. 1f such a finding were made, 1 would hold 
that respondent is not entitled to the relief he seeks. 
This approach focuses directly on the aspect of delay that 
increases the costliness of the remedy the Court applies. 
1t will also reach those cases in which granting habeas 
relief would have the least deterrent value: the State 
will likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long 
delay, and those are the same cases in which the automatic 
reversal rule is least likely to alter the behavior of 
discriminatory officials. At the same time, permitting 
the State to defeat claims such as respondent's by showing 
25. 
prejudice would leave the rule that the Court defends 
intact in precisely those cases where it does the most 
good and the least harm: cases in which retrial and 
reconviction are plausible possibilities, and in which the 
responsible officials are likely to be accountable for 
forcing the State to again prove its case. 
The courts below did not decide the extent to which 
the State would be prejudiced in its ability to retry 
respondent. Instead, they applied the same rule of 
decision this Court applies today. For the reasons stated 
above, I find that rule indefensible as applied to this 
case. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
lfp/ss 11/20/85 Rider A, p. 3 (Vasquez) 
VAS3 SALLY-POW 
~~ 1 t. My respect for state decisis has been stated 
many times. (Cite cases- e.g., Garcia last Term). It 
was recently observed, however, that decisions "must be 
subject to revision over time, or the Constitution will 
fall captive •.• to the anachronistic views of long gone 
generations." (See WJB's speech). There are numerous 
examples of the Court concluding that an interpretation of 
the Constitution adopted decades ago has lost its 
essential meaning, and no longer is an interpretation 
compelled by the Constitution or that serves the original 
purpose. (Cite cases in a footnote) No one would suggest 
that di~crimination in the composition of grand juries 
2. 
occurs frequently today, or is a problem comparable in any 
respect to the widespread prevalence of discrimination 
when this line of precedents was established in 18 
Where, as here, there was a fair trial, societal interests 
far outweigh whatever limited deterrent effect may result 
from overturning a valid conviction because of grand jury 
discrimination. 1 therefore think that the time has come 
for a critical reexamination of the line of precedents 
upon which the Court relies. It is unnecessary to do 
this, however, because in my view these precedents simply 
do not apply to a cas;b like this one, in which the 
asserted discrimination occurred in 1962. 
··' 5 ... 
~~ . 
lfp/ss 11/20/85 Rider A, p. 2 (Vasquez) 
VAS2 SALLY-POW 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a 
rational system of Justice. No one questions that 
respondent is guilty of a murder so brutal that he was 
sentenced to death. Nor does anyone question the fairness 
of his trial. 
13~-- ~1-f~ 
r~~~ 
-~~ ~ November 21, 1985 
tJ.'- 84-836 
\ ~ 1-.(f 
11/21-22_ 
f-!~41) 
VASQUEZ v. HILLE~Y 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand 
jury having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 
15-year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty~of 
/'1IP2-
that murder beyond a reasonable doubt, in a Atrial the 
fairness of which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three 
years later, we are asked to grant respondent • s petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus--and thereby require a new 
trial if that is still feasible--on the ground that blacks 
were purposefully excluded from the grand jury that 




discrimination tainted the grand jury selection process in 
1\ 
Kings County, California has long since disappeared. It 
is also undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly 
represented Kings County's population at the time of 
respondent's indictment would have contained only one 
black member. 2 The Court holds that respondent's petition 
must be granted, and that respondent must be freed unless 
the State is able to convict him again, more than two 
decades after the murder that led to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a 
rational system of justice. The Court nevertheless finds 
its decision is compelled both by a century of precedent 
and by the interests of respondent and of society as a 
whole in ending race discrimination in the selection of 
grand juries. 1 dis sent for two reasons. First, in my 
-. 
3. 
view any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming the harmless error rule does not apply, the 
remedy used here is ill-sui ted to the wrong that prompts 
it. Respondent has suffered no cognizable injury from the 
discriminatory selection of the grand jury that indicted 
him. 1 recognize, of course, that society's interest in 
ending intentional discrimination is of the greatest 
importance. But reversing respondent's conviction twenty-
three years after the grand jury indicted him is unlikely 
to have any deterrent effect on would-be wrongdoers. 
~ "-~ 
M::>reover, whatever deterrent value this outcome.A ~ must 
be weighed against the harm society suffers by freeing a 
fairly convicted murderer whom the state probably will be 
unable to retry. 
4. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless error rule 
does not apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. 
Ante, at 7. This conclusion 
~ 
is said to f~ from a long 
"\ 
line of cases going back over one hundred years. Id., at 
··~'' 
In my view, it 
1rio.ws~ om a misapplication K" ~ 1.1.1 6-7. of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
I have recently expressed my respect for the 
doctrine of stare decisis. Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1021-1022 
(1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). That doctrine provides, 
~,))..'" 
~ ~ in essence, that some •special justification• is called 
~9 . . for when we decide cases in conflict with established 
~~ ~-~~ . 
• ~~ ltJ precedents. 
~~ 
~.J ~ /)# 
~/.7,.v/ ~ ;/-- ~~ a.Y ~· tv~ ~·.;v . / /. r) i/".A r JiY .J -/ y 
J.Q~ ~P./ · f!,.r~~.Jb /~~ 
<1-£11~·1: ~1)"" -?..A·/ ./ /J.Y .. &-JC~v vfM'.,., ;.,»-: /~ 
c¥ 
Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 s.ct. 2305, 2311 
(1984) • Petitioner in this case argues that any error in 
5. 
the selection of grand juries in Kings County is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt as to respondent. The Court 
finds that petitioner • s argument is foreclosed by stare 
dec is is. This conclusion misperceives the state of the 
case law, because it looks only to ~ decisions on claims 
raising grand jury discrimination. There are other 
decisions, 
~~T~a-c.~ 
including A seme of more recent vintage than 
~~~~~~. 
those on which the Court relies,~ 
~~,~~~~~ 
,.\constitutional violations do not justify reversing 
criminal convictions where the erro7 did not alter the 
~ty~~ 
res u 1 t o ~ ey: c r imina 1 prosecution . ·,."'J!;;.~;e~z=es;;~iiii?iiiiillill>-..--..((;.. 
As Justice Stewart noted in his separate opinion in 
.lbse v. Mitchell, pretrial 
~ 
error, even when of 
constitutional dimensions, does not justify overturning a 
conviction unless it prejudiced the defendant. Gerstein 
6. 
v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103, 119 (1975) (illegal arrest); 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 u.s. 1 (1970) (denial of counsel 
at preliminary hearing). See Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
576-577 and nn. 3-4 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
judgment) • Responding to this point, the plurality in 
Rose v. Mitchell argued that grand jury discrimination 
ndestroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts 
doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. n 443 
u.s., at 555-556.1/ But every constitutional error may be 
said to raise questions as to the nintegrity of the 
judie ial process. n 
~--
Nevertheless, the Court has applied 
harmless error analysis to most constitutional 
United States v. Hasting, 461 u.s. 499, 509 
Ut-i<~ 
in Chapman v. California~ ~ 
we held that a trial judge's improper comment on the 
defendant's failure to testify--a clear violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--was not a proper basis 
for rever sal if harmless. 386 u.s., at 21-20 We also 
have held that in order to obtain relief, a defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced him. Strickland v. 
a < a t . ., · e 111: .. ,.,,~ .:.,. -f.~ 
washington, 104 s.ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). This is so even 
though "counsel made errors so serious that [he] was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." !bid. E is difficult to imagine an error 
that more directly affects the integrity of the judicial ? 
process than a failure of the accused's counsel to satisfy 
the minimal standard of quality that the Sixth Amendment 
8. 
guarantees. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 u.s. 335, 344-345 
(1963). ") 
_... 
The Court's reversal of respondent's conviction 
absent ~ plausible showing of prejudice to respondent 
conflicts with the logic of these decisions, none of which 
is discussed in the Court's opinion. Stare decisis cannot 
mean, as the Court would have it, that inconsistent lines 
of precedent need not be reconciled. Rather, that 
doctrine requires a sensitive reappraisal of the reasons 
underlying seemingly conflicting lines of decisions, and a 
principled explanation of the reasons for choosing to 
follow one precedent-strewn path rather than another. The 
Court does not undertake such an analysis. 
For reasons 1 discuss below, 
in this case did not injure r~spondent in 
t· 
/ 
th1 cogniz~l~ way. Post, j:l t ) It follows Z1 
apply \ 
- ..-
':h~pman v. California and its progeny logically 
\ 
here,3 and that the cases on which the Court relies should 1 
be reexamined. I need not undertake that reexamination 
here, however, because in my view those cases do not 
govern a case, like this one, in which the error took 
place over two decades ago. 
II 
f...l..v~ 
Even assuming the inapplicability of ~ ~ry 
~~-~ 
1\ harmless error principles, this case is an unwarranted 
ex tens ion of the rule of the "century of precedent" on 
which the Court relies. 
'T)y_ ~ ~ ht /IZ.I. Cvu-)-
~r decisions do not require 
1\ 
reversal of a decades-old conviction because it was 
preceded by an indictment issued by a d i scr imina tor ily 
10. 
selected grand jury. Careful attention to the purposes of 
the reversal rule requires otherwise. 
A 
grand jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
u.s. 545, 551 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 577-578 
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 
(White, J., dissenting). The question in this case is not 
~~.-..~~ 
whether the state erred, but rather what should be done 
~ 
about it. The question, in other words, is whether 
reversal of respondent's conviction is compelled either by 
a fi-"~ '<""' P-t ./ It 
the Constitution itself or by Qfhe need to effectuate the 
u I' . , , 




the selection of grand jurors"') See Bush v. Lucas, 462 
u.s. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 u.s. 228, 245 
(1979) ; Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 
403 u.s. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
the judgment) • 
'!'he Constitution does not compel the "rule of 
automatic reversal" that the Court applies today. In 
Hobby v. United States, 104 s.ct. 3093 (1984), we conceded 
that the discriminatory selection of grand jury foremen 
violated the Constitution, but we also concluded that 
reversing the petitioner's conviction was an inappropriate 
remedy for the constitutional violation given the minor 
import of grand jury foremen in federal criminal cases. 
104 s.ct., at 3095-3097; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 105 
s.ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) (suppression of evidence obtained 
v. ' 
7 
.~. ~ . 
12. 
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally 
compelled): United States v. Leon, 104 s.ct. 3405, 3412 
{1984) {suppress ion of' evidence obtained in violation of 
the .Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled): 
Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 489 (1976): see generally 
Monaghan, .Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev . 1 { 19 7 5 ) • The rationale of these cases cannot be 
~ ,.. 
squared with the ~n that discrimination in the makeup 
of the body that charged the defendant compels reversal of 
the defendant's conviction. Rather, as in Hobby, the 
Court in this case must determine whether reversal of 
respondent's 
)1 ~~usion of 
1\ 
-- ot-~ ~~- ;{ ~4 
conviction is an "appropriate remedy" for the ~ 
"' 
blacks from grand juries in · Kings County, 
__} 
California in 1962. Hobby, supra, at 3095; see Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 558-559 (1979) (plurality op.) 
br#zsi6LJtt.- ~~~k,_J-~ 
~~~--~~~~ 
~ ~ {~ 1~<: ~)~ 





(weighing costs and benefits of awarding relief to 
petitioners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 u. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created 
remedies are appropriate only when "necessary in order to 
preserve a specifically intended federal right") . That 
determination depends on ( i) the utility of this 
particular remedy in either correcting any injustice to 
respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by state 
officials, and (ii) the remedy's costs to society. United 
States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413; Stone v. Powell, 




The utility of the remedy depends on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court 
perceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury 
discrimination: harm to the respondent's interest in 
being fairly charged and convicted based on factors other 
than his race, and harm to society's interest in deterring 




interests, and/ the degree to which they are served in 
this case by the rule the Court applies. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that discrimination in 
the selection of the grand jury that indicted respondent 
calls into question the soundness of the grand jury's 
decision to indict. Such a contention could not withstand 
15. 
reasoned analysis. Kings County's grand jury found 
probable cause to believe that respondent had committed a 
vicious murder. Respondent was subsequently convicted of 
that charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are 
not now challenged. The conviction that was affirmed on 
direct appeal in 1965 5 and never ~1~alflenged 
'\ 
establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 
at 575-576 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cassell v. Texas, 
339 U.s. 282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless finds that discrimination in 
the selection of the Kings County grand jury potentially 
harmed respondent, because the grand jury is vested with 
broad discretion in deciding whether to indict and in 
framing the charges, and because it is impossible to tell 
16. 
whether this discretion would have been exercised 
differently by a different grand jury. Ante, at 8. The 
~~~k . 
point appears to be that a grand jury f rom which blacks 
"' . 
~./...4.U4. ~ 4 l~~-·c.cul 4 
are systematically excluded might~ in effect, ~ race an " "' -·1 ·--
~ ofG~ ~ CA•·.e"- t:£.-1..~ 
r lement of the substantive offense. Since the State may 
not imprison respondent for a crime one of the elements of 
which is his race, the argument goes, his conviction must 
be set aside. 
The argument ignores established principles of 
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. We have 
consistently declined to find a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause absent a finding of intentional 
discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 u.s. 252, 265 (1977); washington v. 
Da v i s , 4 2 6 U . S • 2 2 9 , 2 3 9 ( 19 7 6 ) • There has been no 
17. 
~ tb'v - y M /H-0 f tu U4L-




~ CJ~i/~~~1 ~~c. 
this case--indeed, respondent does not even 
~ 
~ 72.. 
allege--that the Kings County grand jury indicted g ~ 
~~ 
respondent because of his race, or that the grand _jury ~ .... 
~ 
failed to indict white suspects despite similarly strong 
evidence against them. 6 Nor is it sensible simply to 
assume that such an impermissible discrimination might 
exist because 
ll..c...._~ 
the grand jury had no black members. /1. We--
• 
have never before suggested that the racial compos:rfion of 
a grand jury gives rise to the inference that indictments 
are racially motivated, any more than we have suggested 
that a suspect arrested by a policeman of a different race 
may challenge his subsequent conviction on that basis. 
Instead, as the Court acknowledges, a criminal defendant, 
validly convicted, must show that he was "deliberately 
charged on account of his race" in order to obtain 
18. 
rever sal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 (citing United 
States v. Batchelder, 442 u.s. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Since respondent has not even alleged any discrimination 
directed at him, he cannot claim the discriminatory effect 
that, according to the Court, justifies granting relief in 
this case. 
The Court's novel discriminatory effect argument is 
not supported by our previous decisions in grand jury 
discrimination cases. For example, in Castaneda v. 
Par tid a, 430 U.S. 482 ( 1977) , the Court ordered a new 
trial for a Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a 
grand jury half of whose members were Hispanic. Whatever 
value such a result might have, it cannot be justified on 
the ground that the grand jury indicted the petitioner 
because of his race • The same point is made by other 
.!' .,_ 
19. 
cases in which the indicting grand jury included members 
of the defendant's race, but in which there was evidence 
of systematic underrepresentation over time. See, e.g., 
Cas s e 11 v • Texas , 3 3 9 U . S • 2 8 2 ( 19 50 ) ; see a 1 so i d . , at 
290-291 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
The facts of this case, meanwhile, illustrate the 
~~ 
opposite difficulty with presuming harm to respondent 
w-lw..k 
because of the Faei:-.1 composition of the grand jury that 
indicted him. At the time respondent was charged, only 
about 5% of the residents of Kings County were black. 
Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 
1983). With such a small percentage, a random selection 
system could well have resulted iri a grand jury identical 
to the one that indicted respondent; on the other hand, a 
perfectly representative grand jury--one whose composition 
20. 
reflected the county's rae ial mix--would have contained 
only one black member. Neither outcome would have 
justified an inference that respondent had been charged 
because of his race. 7 See Akins v. Texas, 325 u.s. 398, 
403 (1945). With all respect, it makes no sense to draw 
such an inference solely from the fact that persons 
outside the grand jury discriminated against blacks other 
than respondent. 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision 
to indict is placed to one side, it is impossible to 
conclude that respondent was injured in any cognizable way 
by the discriminatory selection of Kings County's grand 
~ ~ ~~Ja.- ~~J.--Ld.:t 
juries. ~~ may be ~ ceflee r :a&le--though hardly likely, 
given the strength of the evidence against respondent in 
this caseS--that a different grand jury might have decided 
.... 
21. 
not to indict, or to indict for a less serious charge· 
The fact remains, however, that the grand jury's decision 
~ 
to indict wee correct as a matter of law, given 
-4 
respondent's unchallenged subsequent conviction. 
Respondent simply has no right to a grand jury that errs 
in his favor. At most, he has a right not to be bound 
over for trial (i) based on insufficient evidence, 
Costello v. United States, 350 u.s. 359, 364 (1956) 
(Burton, J., concurring), or (ii) based on impermissible 
factors such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 
448, 456 (1962). 9 There is not even an allegation, much 
less any record support, for the proposition that this 
right was in any way violated. The Court's decision in 
this case cannot, therefore, be justified as a means of 
22. 
redressing any wrong to respondent. Any error, as to 
respondent, is harmless beyond any reasonable doubt. 
( 2) 
~~~ 
As respondent i• Rot ha'!Hiea iA aRy -eo~ntz~b-:ie way :r-
1\ 
by the grand jury discrimination that prompted his claim, 
u.lr.£~ 
the Court's decision must stand or fall based on its va~e 
as a deterrent to government officials who seek to exclude 
particular groups from grand juries, weighed against the 
cost that the Court's remedy imposes on society. United 
States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413. As I have noted, the 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination 
is "a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it 
leaps from that observation to the conclusion that no 
matter when the claim is raised the appropriate response 
23. 
is to vacate the conviction of one indicted by a 
discriminator ily selected body. That conclusion is not, 
as the Court erroneously suggests, compelled by precedent; 
equally important, it~ the public interest. 
1\ 
The cases on which the Court relies involve 
relatively brief lapses of time between the defendant's 
trial and the granting of relief. This fact is 
unsurprising, since the Court only recently determined 
that claims of grand jury discrimination may be raised in 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Mitchell, 
supra. 10 Prior to 1970, the Court's grand jury 
discrimination cases all arose on direct appeal from the 
jurisdiction that convicted the defendant. In all of 
these cases, the time between the defendant's indictment 
and this Court's decision was six years or less.ll 
24. 
Before today's decision, the Court had twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. The Court decided Castaneda v. 
Partida, 430 u.s. 482 (1977) five years after the 
petitioner's indictment. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 u.s. 493 
(1972), the Court's decision was announced six years after 
the habeas petitioner's indictment. Both decisions thus 
involve delays comparable to the kind of delay the Court 
often sees in cases arising on direct appeal. 
None of these cases ~~b'J' . h forecloses vwe poss1 , Lty t at 
1\ ~ 
where the discrimination claim is raised many years after 
#e~~ 
the defendant's conviction, and where the ~tate can show 
?'-
that the delay prejudiced its ability to retry the 
defendant, the Court should deny relief. Indeed, the 
Court has decided only two cases in which such an argument 
25. 
might have been raised. In both instances, the Court 
denied the requested relief on other grounds. Francis v. 
Henderson, 425 u.s. 536 (1977) (petitioner raised grand 
jury discrimination claim seven years after his 
conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); 
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 u.s. 258 (1973) (petitioner 
raised grand jury claim twenty-one years after conviction; 
Court held that the claim was foreclosed because the 
petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal 
advice). It is thus an open question 
-4~ 
whether the ~ 
'\ 
delay ~ in this case makes it inappropriate to grant 
respondent's petition for habeas corpus. 
Respondent's petition, in which he first raised his 
grand jury discrimination claim before a federal court, 
was filed sixteen years after his conviction.l2 Seven 
26. 
years have passed since the petition was filed. It is now 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for 
murder, and since the discrimination that prompts his 
claim for relief. The Court finds this time lapse 
irrelevant to its analysis. In my view, it is critically 
important, because it both increases the societal cost of 
the Court's chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force 
that remedy may otherwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545 (1979), the 
plurality argued that the rule of automatic reversal 
imposes only limited costs on society, since the State is 
able to retry successful petitioners, and since "the State 
remains free to use all the proof it introduced to obtain 
the conviction in the first trial." Id., at 558. This is 
not the case when relief is granted many years after the 
27. 
original conviction. Particularly in a trial whose 
outcome turned on the jury's credibility judgments, long 
delays effectively eliminate the State's ability to 
reconstruct its case. Even where credibility issues are 
not central, the passage of time may make the right to 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, 
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal 
Judgments, 38 u. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses 
die or move away; physical evidence is lost; memories 
fade. The successful habeas petitioner may be expected to 
support his own version of events, but the State may find 
itself severely handicapped in its ability to carry its 
heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
For these reasons, the Court has noted that "' [t]he 
greater the lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes 
28. 
that the state could reprosecute if retrials are held to 
be necessary."' Peyton v. Rowe, 391 u.s. 54, 62 (1968) 
(citation omitted) .13 
~ng 
~ 
delays 1\ dilute the 
effectiveness of the reversal rule as a deterrent, as the 
facts of this case illustrate. The architect of the 
discriminatory selection system that led to respondent's 
claim was one Judge Wingrove, who died nineteen years ago. 
Respondent does not allege that discriminatory practices 
on which his claim is based survived Judge Wingrove, nor 
is there any evidence in the record that would support 
such an allegation. lt seems hard to believe that Judge 
Wingrove might have behaved differently had he known that 
a convicted defendant might be freed eighteen years after 
his death. Yet that is exactly the proposition that must 
.. , 
29. 
justify the remedy imposed in this case: that people in 
positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will mend their 
discriminatory ways out of the fear of successful habeas 
41~~~ 
petitions long after they have passed from the scene. To 
A 
state this proposition is to expose it as fallacious. 
These concerns require that a different balance be 
struck in cases like this one than in cases such as Rose 
v. Mitchell and Castaneda v. Partida, in which the grand 
f,¥.L,·~ 
jury discrimination claims ~ adjudicated ~Y a short 
time after the petitioner's conviction. I~ thereforeA 
remand for a determination of whether the State would be 
substantially 
respondent. 
prejudiced in its ability to retry 
~~~-~ 
If such a finding were made, l- -weu~e hold 
.A 
that respondent is not entitled to the relief he seeks· 
This approach focuses directly on the aspect of delay that 
30. 
increases the costliness of the remedy the Court applies. 
It will also reach those cases in which granting habeas 
relief would have the least deterrent value: the State 
will likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long 
delay, and those are the same cases in which the automatic 
reversal rule is least likely to alter the behavior of 
discriminatory officials. At the same time, permitting 
the State to defeat claims such as respondent's by showing 
prejudice would leave the rule that the Court defends 
intact in precisely those cases where it does the most 
good and the least harm: cases in which retrial and 
reconviction are plausible possibilities, and in which the 
responsible officials are likely to be accountable for 
forcing the State to again prove its case. 
31. 
The courts below did not decide the extent to which 
the State would be prejudiced in its ability to retry 
respondent. Instead, they applied the same rule of 
decision this Court applies today. For the reasons stated 
above, I find that rule indefensible as applied to this 
case. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
... 
' .. :·~ :; . 
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Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand 
jury having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 
15-year-old girl. A p~tit jury found respondent guilty of 
that murder beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the 
fairness of which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three 
years later, we are asked to grant respondent's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus--and thereby require a new 
trial if that is still feasible--on the ground that blacks 
were purposefully excluded from the grand jury that 
2. 
indicted him. It is undisputed that race discrimination 
has long since disappeared from the grand jury selection 
process in Kings County, California. It is undisputed 
that a grand jury that perfectly represented Kings 
County's population at the time of respondent's indictment 
would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet the 
Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able 
to reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that 
led to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a 
rational system of justice. The Court nevertheless finds 
its decision compelled by a century of precedent and by 
the interests of respondent and of society in ending race 
discrimination in the selection of grand juries. I 
3. 
dissent for two reasons. First, in my view, any error in 
the selection of the grand jury that indicted respondent 
is constitutionally harmless. Second, even assuming the 
harmless error rule does not apply, reversal of 
respondent's conviction is an inappropriate remedy for the 
wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
'!'he Court concludes that the harmless error rule 
does not apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. 
Ante, at 7. '!'his conclusion is said to follow from a long 
line of cases going back over one hundred years. Id., at 
6-7. In my view, it follows from a misapplication of the 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
' . 
4. 
Adhering to past decisions "is usually the wise 
policy, because in most matters it is more important that 
the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be 
settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 
u.s. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The 
Court has accordingly stated that "any departure from the 
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification." 
Arizona v. Rumsey, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984): Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S.Ct. 
~ 
1005, 1021-1022 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). /1 !im~e¥e.r, ; 
when governing decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict 
with other, more recent authority, the Court "has never 
felt constrained to follow precedent." Smith v. 
Allwr ight, 321 u.s. 649, 665 (1944). Instead, 
particularly where constitutional issues are involved, 
. . 
·~. . 
" ~ •. I 
5 • 
"[t]his Court has shown a readiness to correct its errors 
even though of long standing." United States v. Barnett, 
376 u.s. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, the Court 
misapplies stare decisis, because it relies only on 
decisions concerning grand jury discrimination. There is 
other precedent, including important cases of more recent 
vintage than the cases cited by the Court, that should 
control this case. Those cases hold, or clearly imply, 
that a conviction should not be reversed for 
constitutional error where the error did not affect the 
outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 u.s. 18 (1967), the 
Court held that a trial judge's improper comment on the 
defendant's failure to testify--a clear violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments--was not a proper basis 
6. 
for reversal if harmless. Id., at 21-24. Since Chapman, 
nthe Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty 
of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a 
whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including 
most constitutional violations.n United States v. 
Hasting, 461 u.s. 499, 509 (1983). This rule has been 
applied to a variety of constitutional violations. See 
Harrington v. California, 395 u.s. 250 (1969) (use of co-
conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation ~ 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 u.s. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
u.s. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation 
of right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 u.s. 103 
(1975) (illegal arrest). 
7. 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A 
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must 
show that counsel's incompetence caused him actual 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 
(1984) • This is so even though counsel "made errors so 
serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. Similarly, a 
prisoner who is barred by a procedural default from 
raising a constitutional claim on direct appeal cannot 
raise the same claim in a habeas corpus proceeding without 
showing that the claimed error actually prejudiced him. 
United States v. Frady, 456 u.s. 152, 170 (1982): see also 
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 u.s. 72 (1977). 
The plurality in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545 
(1979), argued that the principle of these cases is 
... 
8. 
inapplicable to grand jury discrimination claims, because 
grand jury discrimination "destroys the appearance of 
justice and thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the 
judicial process." 443 u.s., at 555-556. But every 
constitutional error may be said to raise questions as to 
the "integrity of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as 
the cases cited above show, the Court has required some 
showing of actual prejudice to the defendant as a 
prerequisite to reversal, even when the constitutional 
error directly impinges on the fairness of the defendant's 
trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 2064 
(requiring a showing of prejudice in ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 u.s. 335, 344-345 (1963) (emphasizing importance of 
right to counsel). Grand jury discrimination is certainly 




a serious violation of our constitutional order, but so 
also are the deprivations of rights guaranteed by the 
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to which we have 
applied harmless error analysis or an analogous prejudice 
requirement. The Court does not adequately explain why 
grand jury discrimination is exempt from some sort of 
prejudice requirement, while other critically important 
constitutional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient 
opinion, Justice Jackson called for such an explanation. 
Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). None has been forthcoming. 3 Rose v. 
Mitchell, supra, at 574 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Since 
then, as the cases cited above show, the Court has firmly 
established the notion that error that does not affect the 
.... 
10. 
outcome of a prosecution cannot justify reversing an 
otherwise valid conviction. That proposition--and the 
decisions of the last two decades that have reinforced it-
-is flatly inconsistent with the result reached today. 
The Court's failure to address the conflict itself 
violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
1 would dissent from the Court's decision for this 
reason alone. The Court relies on cases that, in my view, 
~~4<4.....,..._ 
squarely conflict with the logic~ of the more recent 
decisions cited above. Because 1 conclude that the 
reasoning of Chapman and its progeny and of the other 
cases mentioned above is sound, 1 would apply harmless 
error analysis to the constitutional violation at issue 
here. 4 For reasons 1 discuss below, 1 also conclude that 
the error in this case did not injure respondent in any 
11. 
cognizable way. Post, at 1 ~he;ef:;~reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless error 
principles are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably 
extends the "century of precedent" on which the Court 
relies. The decisions relied on by the Court do not 
require reversal of a decades-old conviction on the ground 
that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. Careful attention 





No one questions that race discrimination in grand 
jury selection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 
545' 551 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 577-578 
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 
(White, J., dissenting). The issue in this case is not 
whether the state erred, but rather what should be done 
about it. The question, in other words, is whether 
reversal of respondent's conviction either is compelled by 
the Constitution or is an appropriate (but not 
constitutionally required) remedy for racial 
discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush 
v. Lucas, 462 u.s. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 
u.s. 228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal 
13. 
Narcotics Agents, 403 u.s. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of 
automatic reversal" that the Court applies today. In 
Hobby v. United States, 104 s.ct. 3093 (1984), we 
acknowledged that discriminatory selection of grand jury 
foremen violated the Constitution, but we concluded that 
reversing the petitioner's conviction was an inappropriate 
remedy for the violation since grand jury foremen play a 
minor part in federal prosecutions. 104 s.ct.' at 3095-
3097; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 105 s.ct. 1285, 1292 
(1985) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally compelled); 
United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412 (1984) 
(suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the 
14. 
Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled)~ Stone 
v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 489 (1976) ~ see generally 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1 (19 7 5) • The rationale of Hobby cannot be squared 
with the claim that discriminatory selection of the body 
that charged the defendant compels reversal of the 
defendant's conviction. Rather, it is necessary to 
determine whether reversal of respondent's conviction is 
an "appropriate remedy" for the exclusion of blacks from 
grand juries in Kings County, California in 1962. 5 Hobby, 
supra, at 3095~ see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545, 558-
559 (1979) (plurality op.) (weighing costs and benefits of 
awarding relief to petitioners claiming grand jury 
discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of 
Federal Courts, 52 u. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) (arguing 
15. 
that judicially created remedies are appropriate only when 
"necessary in order to preserve a specifically intended 
federal right"). That determination depends on (i) the 
utility of the remedy in either correcting any injustice 
to respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by 
state officials, and ( i i) the remedy's costs to society. 
United States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413; Stone v. 
Powell, supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the 
nature and degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The 
Court perceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury 
discrimination: harm to the respondent's interest in 
being charged and convicted based on factors other than 
16. 
his race, and harm to society's interest in deterring 
racial discrimination. I next consider these asserted 
interests and the degree to which they are served in this 
case by the automatic reversal rule. 
( 1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory 
selection of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls 
into question the soundness of the decision to indict. 
Such a contention could not withstand analysis. Following 
his indictment for murder, respondent was convicted of 
that charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are 
not now challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct 
appeal in 1965, 6 establishes that the grand jury's finding 
of probable cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. 
17. 
Mitchell, supra, at 575-576 (Stewart, J., dissenting)~ 
Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination 
in the selection of the grand jury potentially harmed 
respondent, because the grand jury is vested with broad 
discretion in deciding whether to indict and in framing 
the charges, and because it is impossible to know whether 
this discretion would have been exercised differently by a 
properly selected grand jury. Ante, at 8. The point 
appears to be that an all-white grand jury from which 
blacks are systematically excluded might be influenced by 
race in determining whether to indict and for what charge. 




one of its elements is his race, the argument goes, his 
conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of 
equal protection jurisprudence. We have consistently 
declined to find a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause absent a finding of intentional discrimination. 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corp., 429 u.s. 252, 265 (1977): Washington v. Davis, 426 
u.s. 229, 239 (1976). There has been no showing in this 
case--indeed, respondent does not even allege--that the 
Kings County grand jury indicted respondent because of his 
race, or that the grand jury declined to indict white 
suspects in the face of similarly strong evidence. 7 Nor 
is it sensible to assume that impermissible discrimination 
might have occurred simply because the grand jury had no 
.. 
19. 
black members. This Court has never suggested that the 
racial composition of a grand jury gives rise to the 
inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a 
policeman of a different race may challenge his subsequent 
conviction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that 
relief is justified in part because of the bare potential, 
unsupported by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury 
charged respondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's 
own previous decisions in this area; at the same time, it 
fails sensibly to explain the outcome of this case. In 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 u.s. 482 (1977), the Court 
ordered a new trial for a Hispanic petitioner who was 
indicted by a grand jury half of whose members were 
20. 
Hispanic. Whatever value such a result might have, it 
cannot be justified on the ground that the grand jury 
indicted the petitioner because of his race. The same 
point is made by other cases in which the indicting grand 
jury included members of the defendant's race, but in 
which there was evidence of systematic underrepresentation 
over time. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 u.s. 282 
(1950); see also id., at 290-291 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). In this case, meanwhile, due to the small 
number of blacks in Kings County, a random selection 
system could well have resulted in a grand jury identical 
to the one that indicted respondent. On the other hand, a 
perfectly representative grand jury--one whose composition 
reflected the county's racial mix--would have contained 
only one black member. Neither outcome would have 
. ~ . 
r 
21. 
justified an inference that respondent had been charged 
because of his race.9 See Akins v. Texas, 325 u.s. 398, 
403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision 
to indict is placed to one side, as it must be under our 
precedents, it is impossible to conclude that the 
discriminatory selection of Kings County's grand jurors 
caused respondent to suffer any cognizable injury. There 
may be a theoretical possibility that a different grand 
jury might have decided not to indict, or to indict for a 
less serious charge. The fact remains, however, that the 
grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a matter of 
law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not 
22. 
being bound over for trial based on insufficient evidence, 
Costello v. United States, 350 u.s. 359, 364 (1956) 
(Burton, J., concurring) , 10 or based on impermissible 
factors such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 u.s. 
448, 456 (1962). There is no allegation that those rights 
were in any way violated in this case. The Court's 
decision cannot, therefore, be justified as a means of 
redressing any wrong to respondent. 
( 2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand 
jury discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's 
remedy must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to 
government officials who seek to exclude particular groups 
from grand juries, weighed against the cost that the 
23. 
remedy imposes on society. See United States v. Leon, 
supra, at 3412-3413. The Court properly emphasizes that 
grand jury discrimination is "a grave constitutional 
trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from that observation 
to the conclusion that no matter when the claim is raised 
the appropriate response is to vacate the conviction of 
one indicted by a discriminator ily selected body. That 
conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously 
disserves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved 
relatively brief lapses of time between the defendant's 
trial and the granting of relief. This fact is 
unsurprising, since the Court only recently determined 
that claims of grand jury discrimination may be raised in 
24. 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Rose v. Mitchell, 
supra. 11 Prior to 1970, the Court's grand jury 
discrimination cases arose on direct appeal from the 
conviction. In all of those cases, the time between the 
defendant's indictment and this Court's decision was six 
years or less.12 Before today, the Court has twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. Both cases involved delays 
comparable to the delay reflected in the cases that arose 
on direct appeal. See Castaneda v. Partida, supra 
(decision announced five years after indictment); Peters 
v. Kiff, 407 u.s. 493 (1972) (decision announced six years 
after indictment) • 
This case raises the open question whether relief 
should be denied where the discrimination claim is pressed 
' ' 
25. 
many years after conviction, and where the State can show 
that the delay prejudiced its ability to retry the 
defendant. 13 Respondent first raised his grand jury 
discrimination claim before a federal court sixteen years 
after his conviction.l4 It is now almost a quarter-
century since respondent was tried for murder and since 
the discrimination occurred. The Court finds this time 
lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically important, 
because it both increases the societal cost of the Court's 
chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy 
may otherwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 u.s. 545 (1979), the 
plurality argued that the rule of automatic reversal 
imposes limited costs on society, since the State is able 
to retry successful petitioners, and since "the State 
26. 
remains free to use all the proof it introduced to obtain 
the conviction in the first trial." Id., at 558. This is 
not the case when relief is granted many years after the 
original conviction. In those circumstances, the State 
may find itself severely handicapped in its ability to 
carry its heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Where the original verdict turned on 
the jury's credibility judgments, long delays effectively 
eliminate the State's ability to reconstruct its case. 
Even where credibility is not central, the passage of time 
may make the right to retry the defendant "a matter of 
theory only." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? 
Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. 
Rev . 14 2 , 14 7 ( 19 7 0) • Witnesses die or move away; 
physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For these 
~· . 
27. 
reasons, the Court has noted that "' [t)he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary.'" 
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 u.s. 54, 62 (1968) (citation 
omitted) .15 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the 
reversal rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. 
The architect of the discriminatory selection system that 
led to respondent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died 
nineteen years ago. Respondent does not allege that the 
discriminatory practices survived Judge Wingrove, nor is 
there any evidence in the record to support such an 
allegation. It is hard to believe that Judge Wingrove 
might have behaved differently had he known that a 
convicted defendant might be freed nineteen years after 
28. 
his death. Yet that is exactly the proposition that must 
justify the remedy imposed in this case: that people in 
positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will change their 
behavior out of the fear of successful habeas petitions 
long after they have left office or otherwise passed from 
the scene. The proposition is, to say the least, highly 
questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be 
struck in a case such as this one than in cases in which 
the grand jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a 
short time after the petitioner's conviction. At the very 
least, the Court should remand for a determination of 
whether the State would be substantially prejudiced in its 
ability to retry respondent. If such a finding was made, 
the Court should hold that respondent is not entitled to 
29. 
relief. This approach focuses directly on the aspect of 
delay that increases the costliness of the remedy the 
Court applies. It will also reach those cases in which 
granting habeas relief would have the least deterrent 
value: the State will likely suffer the greatest prejudice 
in cases of long delay, and those are the same cases in 
which the automatic reversal rule is least likely to alter 
the behavior of discriminatory officials. At the same 
time, permitting the State to defeat claims such as 
respondent • s by showing prejudice would leave the rule 
that the Court defends intact in precisely those cases 
where it does the most good and the least harm: cases in 
which the responsible officials are likely to be 
accountable for forcing the State to again prove its case, 
30. 
and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
r~ Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's 
~~ \ } grand jury discrimination claim casts no doubt on the 
~ ~ .J .1 sufficiency of the procedures used to convict him or on 
j ''1 the sufficiency of the evidence of his guilt. For that 







Appeals' decision. Even assuming the harmlessness of the 
error in this case 
,(J.,.~ ~~. ' 
is irreleva~h~1 reversal is Au.,.-
'() or~r. The Court inappropriately applies a deterrence 
rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and where 
_,...-
/ 
its costs to society are especially high. 
31. 
These considerations · should at least lead the Court to 
remand for a determination of whether the long lapse of 
time since respondent's conviction would prejudice the 
State's ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but 
instead affirms a decision that will likely mean that 
respondent must be freed for no good purpose. ....J:...--ca n~ 
~r ~~~J-
x~ ~s result is compelled by precedent, But if u i\ " -
it were, its consequences would justify reconsidering 
~LI-l-t; 
those decisions ~ require it. 
"" 
dissent. 
1 therefore ~~ly 
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lRespondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. 
See People v. Hillery, 10 Cal.3d 897, 519 P.2d 572 (1974); 
ante, at n. 2. That sentence was ultimately reduced 
to life imprisonment because the California Supreme Court 
found that imposition of the death penalty was in all 
cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. 
!bid. 
2According to 1960 census figures, 4.7% of Kings County's 
population was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 
1228, 1232 (E.o. Cal. 1983). Respondent's grand jury 
•~"• ';, 
I~ 
consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom were white. 
Id., at 1231. 
3The Court d1' d t k 1 d J t · J k ' no even ac now e ge us 1ce ac son s 
argument in Cassell v. Texas, supra. 
4under the Court's harmless error decisions, the fact that 
society has an interest in deterring discrimination is not 
relevant to whether the error in this case is harmless. 
The Chapman v. 
J~~~) 
California standard asks whether the 
1\ 
particular defendant has been harmed by the violation, not 
harmless error analysis to the admission of illega 
seized evidence, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 
without regard to the societal interest 
Fourth Amendment violations. Cf. United States v. 
104 s.ct. 3405, 3412 (1984). 
5Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection 
of grand jurors continued after 1962. Nor is there 
anything in the record to support such an allegation. 
6The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's 
conviction in 1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court 
reversed respondent's death sentence but again affirmed 
his conviction. Ante, at 2 n. 2. Respondent is presently 
serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
7Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by 
information rather than indictment. In the ten years 
preceding respondent's indictment, Kings County grand 
juries indicted a total of only three persons, none of 
whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 
401 P.2d 382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 u.s. 938 
(1967). In light of these facts, any claim that 
discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism 
for applying different standards to black offenders than 
to their white counterparts seems altogether fanciful. 
.. .... 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury 
discriminated against respondent because of his race. The 
only discrimination in this case was directed not at 
respondent but at the black residents of Kings County, who 
were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding 
that the grand jurors themselves discriminated against 
anyone on the basis of race, or that they otherwise failed 
to discharge their duties properly. 
8rnstead, as the Court acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately 
charged on account of his race" in order to obtain 
reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 (citing United 
States v. Batchelder, 442 u.s. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any 
discrimination directed at him. See note 6 supra. 
9Thus, neither respondent nor the Court contends that 
respondent's conviction is tainted by the absence of any 
blacks on the trial jury in this case. Respondent 
concedes that the State did not discriminate against 
blacks in selecting petit jurors; he correctly presumes 
that the concession bars him from challenging his 
conviction on the basis that the trial jury contained no 
black members. Cf. Cassell v. Texas, supra, at 290-291 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
h .(. • ••• ~ 
... 
7 
1°Respondent would not have been able to challenge his 
indictment for insufficient evidence. See United States 
v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 345 (1974) ("an indictment 
valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the 
ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of 
inadequate or incompetent evidence"). 1 suggest only 
that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this 
case. 
ll1n my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 1 
took the position that, where a habeas petitioner is given 
a full opportunity to litigate his grand jury 
discrimination claim in state court, he should not be 
. :~ I 
permitted to litigate the claim again on federal habeas 
corpus. 443 u.s., at 579 (POWELL, J., concurring in the 
judgment) • I remain convinced that my conclusion was 
correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis 
weighs strongly against reexamining the question whether a 
defendant should be permitted to reli tigate a claim that 
has no bearing on either his guilt or on the fairness of 
the trial that convicted him. The plurality opinion in 
Rose, issued in 1979, is the only instance in which this 
Court has examined the issue. The discussion in that 
opinion was unnecessary to the result, which turned on the 
sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. Perhaps 
more important, two of the Justices who joined the 
relevant portion of the plurality opinion dissented from 
the Court's judgment. 443 U.S., at 588 (WHITE, J., 
dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). For 
that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the 
Court's rejection of this argument in Rose is binding 
precedent. !d., at 582 n. 3 (POWELL, J., concurring in 
the judgment) : see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken 
by those members who concurred in the judgment [where 
necessary to a majority] on the narrowest grounds"}. 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, 
for I conclude that the judgment should be reversed on two 
other grounds: the harmlessness of the error, and the 
inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in which 
the discrimination claim is raised so long after the 
claimant's conviction that retrial is difficult or 
impossible. 
IV 
1 2The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 u.s. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant 
was indicted in November 1874; this Court's decision was 
rendered in March 1880. 
13The Court has decided only two cases in which the State 
might logically have argued that a long delay in raising a 
grand jury discrimination claim prejudiced the State's 
ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied the requested relief on other grounds. 
Francis v. Henderson, 425 u.s. 536 (1977) (petitioner 
raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years after 
his conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion 
grounds); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 u.s. 258 (1973) 
/) 
(petitioner raised grand jury claim twenty-one years after 
conviction: Court held that the claim was foreclosed 
because the petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to 
competent legal advice). 
reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad 
faith on the State's part can be shown. Because 
respondent suffered no injury from the Kings County's 
discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly 
complain if he is given a windfall only when he raises his 
claim promptly. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been 
blameless for the long delay. The California Supreme 
Court finally rejected respondent's grand jury 
12-
discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the 
claim in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in 
state court. During the intervening nine years, 
respondent raised repeated challenges--ultimately 
successfully--to his death sentence. There is no apparent 
reason why respondent could not simultaneously have sought 
post-conviction relief on the grand jury discrimination 
claim, which if successful would require a new trial on 
guilt. 
1 5under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position 
may be wise to wait to raise his discrimination claim 
until the State could no longer reconvict him due to the 
death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
13 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit 
a prisoner to commute a legally imposed sentence of life 
or long duration. This is a risk society should tolerate 
where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or 
innocence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to 
redress a wrong done to the petitioner, but there is no 
reason to tolerate it where, as here, the claimant was 
fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
····" 
11/26 To: The Chief Justice 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
'Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at -, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
was black. Hillery v. Pulley , 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED Cal. 1983). 
Respondent's grand jury consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom 
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and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a long line of cases going 
back over one hundred years.. !d., at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984); Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 
1021-1022 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, 
when governing decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with 
other, more recent authority, the Court "has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 
649, 665 (1944). Instead, particularly where constitutional 
issues are involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to 
correct its errors even though of long standing." United 
States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, 
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the Court misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on 
decisions concerning grand jury discrimination. There is 
other precedent, including important cases of more recent 
vintage than those cited by the Court, that should control 
this case. Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a convic-
tion should not be reversed for constitutional error where the 
error did not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. Id., at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
8 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[ w ]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 104 S. Ct., at 2069. 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
The plurality in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), ar-
gued that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to grand 
jury discrimination claims, because grand jury discrimination 
"destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt 
on the integrity of the judicial process." 443 U. S., at 
555-556. But every constitutional error may be said to raise 
questions as to the "integrity of the judicial process." Nev-
ertheless, as the cases cited above show, the Court has re-
quired some showing of actual prejudice to the defendant as a 
prerequisite to reversal, even when the constitutional error 
directly affects the fairness of the defendant's trial. Com-
pare Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 2064 (requiring 
prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims) with Gid-
eon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963) (emphasiz-
ing importance of right to counsel to ensure fair trial). 
Grand jury discrimination is a serious violation of our con-
stitutional order, but so also are the deprivations of rights ~ 1~ ~ 
guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth,~ Sixth Amendments.!to' 
which we have applied harmless error analysis or an amli.o-
gous prejudice requirement. The Court does not adequately 
explain why grand jury discrimination is exempt from a prej-
udice requiremen~ while other cons tutional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typic ly prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such explanation. Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298 (1 0) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Since then, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court ha firmly established the principle 
that error that does not feet the outcome of a prosecution 
cannot justify reversing n otherwise valid conviction. That 
proposition-and the de isions of the last two decades that 
have reinforced it-is atly inconsistent with the result 
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reached today. The Court's failure to reco ile this conflict 
itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's dec· Ion for this reason 
alone. ecause I conclude that the r soning of Chapman 
and its progeny and of the other cas s mentioned above i 
sound, I would apply harmless error nalysis to the cons · u-
tional violation at issue here. 4 1\For eason~discuss elow, 
I conclude that the error in this case did not injure respond-
ent in any cognizable way. Post, at--. I therefore would 
reverse the judgment of the ~ourt of Appeals. ( 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless error princi-
ples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the "cen-
tury of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those deci-
sions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 
551 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). The issue in this case is not whether the state 
erred, but what should be done about it. The question, in 
other words, is whether reversal of respondent's conviction 
either is compelled by the Constitution or is an appropriate, 
but not constitutionally required, remedy for racial dis-
• Under the Court's harmless error decisions, the fact that society has 
an interest in deterring discrimination is not relevant to whether the error Z 
in this case is harmless. The Chapman v. California standard we have 
repeatedly applied asks whether the particular defendant has been harmed 
by the violation, not whether the violation may cause some presumed soci-
etal injury. See Hasting, supra, at 510-511. 
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crimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. Lu-
cas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of automatic re-
versal" that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), we acknowledged that dis-
criminatory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Con-
stitution, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's 
conviction was an inappropriate remedy for the violation 
since grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal pros-
ecutions. 104 S. Ct., at 3095-3097; see also Oregon v. 
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) (suppression of evidence 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitu-
tionally compelled); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 
3412 (1984) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). The rationale of Hobby cannot be 
squared with the claim that discriminatory selection of the 
body that charged the defendant compels reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction. Rather, it is necessary to determine 
whether reversal of respondent's conviction is an "appropri-
ate remedy" for the exclusion of blacks from grand juries in 
Kings County, California in 1962.5 Hobby, supra, at 3095; 
see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979) (plurality 
op.) (weighing costs and benefits of awarding relief to peti-
tioners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created remedies are ap-
propriate only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifi-
5 Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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cally intended federal right"). That determination depends 
on (i) the utility of the remedy in either correcting any injus-
tice to respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by 
state officials, and (ii) the remedy's costs to society. United 
States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413; Stone v. Powell, supra, 
at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion:. harm to the respondent's interest in being charged and 
convicted based on factors other than his race, and harm to 
society's interest in deterring racial discrimination. I con-
sider in turn these asserted'interests and the degree to which 
they are served in this case by the automatic reversal rule. 
t\ 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could not withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
6 The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
·-
84-836--DISSENT 
8 VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
7 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by information 
rather than indictment. In the ten years preceding respondent's indict-
ment, Kings County grand juries indicted a total of only three persons, 
none of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 
382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, 
any claim that discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism 
for applying different standards to black offenders than to their white 
counterparts seems altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
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more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
8 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged ... on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 7 supra. 
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matter of law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial based on insufficient evidence, Costello 
v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) (Burton, J., con-
curring), 9 or based on impermissible factors such as his race, 
see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). There is no 
allegation that those rights were in any way violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
9 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
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crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, supra. 10 Prior to 1970, the 
Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on direct ap-
peal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time between 
the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision was six 
years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice granted 
relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand jury dis-
crimination. Both cases involved delays comparable to the 
delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. See 
Castaneda v. Partida, supra (decision announced five years 
10 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, I took the position 
that, where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his 
grand jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted 
to litigate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced that my 
conclusion was correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis 
weighs strongly against reexamining the question whether a defendant 
should be permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his 
guilt or on the fairness of the trial that convicted him. The plurality opin-
ion in Rose, issued in 1979, is the only instance in which this Court has ex-
amined the issue. The discussion in that opinion was unnecessary to the 
result, which turned on the sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. 
Perhaps more important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant por-
tion of the plurality opinion dissented from the Court's judgment. 443 
U. S., at 588 (WHITE, J., dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
For that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the Court's rejec-
tion of this argument in Rose is binding precedent. !d., at 582, n. 3 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153, 169, n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken by those mem-
bers who concurred in the judgment [where necessary to a majority] on the 
narrowest grounds"). 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult or impossible. 
11 The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in November 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
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after indictment); Peters v. Kijj, 407 U. S. 493 (1972) (deci-
sion announced six years after indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court sixteen years after his conviction. 13 It is now 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for mur-
der and since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds 
this time lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically impor-
tant, because it both increases the societal cost of the Court's 
chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy 
may otherwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the plurality ar-
gued that the rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs 
on society, since the State is able to retry successful petition-
12 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1977) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 
twenty-one years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed be-
cause petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
13 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from the Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
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ers, and since "the State remains free to use all the proof it 
introduced to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 
558. This is not the case when relief is granted many years 
after the original conviction. In those circumstances, the 
State may find itself severely handicapped in its ability to 
carry its heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where the original verdict turned on the jury's 
credibility judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the 
State's ability to reconstruct its case. Even where credibil-
ity is not central, the passage of time may make the right to 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or 
move away; physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For 
these reasons, the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary."' 
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died nineteen years 
ago. Respondent does not allege that the discriminatory 
practices survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evi-
dence in the record to support such an allegation. It is hard 
to believe that Judge Wingrove might have behaved 
differently had he known that a convicted defendant might be 
"Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
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freed nineteen years after his death. Yet that is exactly the 
proposition that must justify the remedy imposed in this 
case: that people in positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will 
change their behavior out of the fear of successful habeas pe-
titions long after they have left office or otherwise passed 
from the scene. The proposition~--say-trreleaSQ highly 
questionable. 11 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the-suffici~e pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the C ld 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 15 ven assuming the 
16 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free . It is important to re-
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harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
nor innocence suffer." Berger v. United States 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); 
see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 1 (1976) (-proseeutor's dHty..A-
rto disclose exculpatory information reflects "o r overriding -Concern with .s;:::::l-
,the justice of the finding of guilt"). ~in this case plainly under- lt 'fu':-
mines the State's interest in puni,~?g he guilty, without in a~ wayupro- 1 
tecting the innocent ~sA 
()( ~'(1~14~~ +k.t. ..fut~d~:~.w-t.J-J: ~~ ~ 
-tf ~ prou.~n.o ~ vJ'Wd ont. >t.t~k eVJ 
r~t- ~~ -f"'tJ hAd Co1A"·,deJ. 
To: The Chief Justice 7' A/ 
Justice Brennan "--- f (/ . 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Warden of San Quentin State Prison asks this Court to 
retire a doctrine of equal protection jurisprudence first an-
nounced in 1880. The time has come, he urges, for us to 
abandon the rule requiring reversal of the conviction of any 
defendant indicted by a grand jury from which members of 
his own race were systematically excluded. 
I 
In 1962, the grand jury of Kings County, California in-
dicted respondent, Booker T. Hillery, for a brutal murder. 
Before trial in superior court, respondent moved to quash the 
indictment on the ground that it had been issued by a grand 
jury from which Negroes had been systematically excluded. 
A hearing on respondent's motion was held by Judge Mer-
edith Wingrove, who was the sole superior court judge in the 
county and had personally selected all grand juries, including 
the one that indicted respondent, for the previous seven 
years. Absolving himself of any discriminatory intent, 
Judge Wingrove refused to quash the indictment. 1 Re-
spondent was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder. 
1 Three thorough and well-reasoned opinions of the District Court dis-
cuss in detail the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well .as other aspects 
of the case. See Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983); 
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For the next sixteen years, respondent pursued appeals 
and collateral relief in the state courts, raising at every 
opportunity his equal protection challenge to the grand jury 
that indicted him. 2 Less than one month after the California 
Supreme Court foreclosed his final avenue of state relief in 
1978, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
federal court, raising that same challenge. The District 
Court concluded that respondent had established discrimina-
tion in the grand jury, and granted the writ. See Hillery v. 
Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983), aff'd, 733 F. 2d 644 
(CA9 1984). 
II 
As a threshold matter, we turn to petitioner's contention 
that respondent has circumvented his obligation to exhaust 
state remedies before seeking collateral relief in federal 
court. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b). The exhaustion issue had its 
genesis in this case when the federal district judge saw a 
need to "supplement and clarify" the state-court record pre-
sented for review. Record, Doc. No. 8, p. 2. Upon author-
ity of Rule 7 ofthe Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Courts, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 2254, the 
judge directed the State to provide more figures "demon-
strating what portion of the Black population in Kings 
County was eligible for grand jury service." Record, Doc. 
No. 8, p. 3. He also directed the parties to present their 
496 F. Supp. 632 (ED Cal. 1980). We repeat here only those portions rele-
vant to the issues before the Court. 
2 See People v. Hillery, - Cal. 2d -, 386 P. 2d 477 (1963) (affinn-
ing conviction; rejecting discrimination claim); People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 
692, 401 P. 2d 382 (1965) (on rehearing, rejecting discrimination claim; re-
versing sentence), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967); People v. Hillery, 65 
Cal. 2d 795, 423 P. 2d 208 (1967) (after remand, affinning sentence), cert. 
denied, 389 U. S. 986 (1968); In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 457 P. 2d 565 
(1969) (on original petition for habeas corpus, reversing sentence); People 
v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974) (after remand, reducing 
sentence); In re Hillery, Crim. No. 20424 (Cal. 1978) (affinning denial of 
state habeas corpus). 
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views regarding the application of statistical probability anal-
ysis to the facts of this case, to assist him in "focus[ing] on the 
likelihood that chance or accident alone could account for the 
exclusion of a group from grand jury service." Record, Doc. 
No. 8, p. 3. Petitioner objects that the submissions made in 
response to the judge's order "drastically" altered respond-
ent's claim and rendered it unsuitable for federal habeas re-
view without prior consideration by the state courts. Brief 
for Petitioner 81. 
The exhaustion doctrine seeks to afford the state courts a 
meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error 
without interference from the federal judiciary. Rose v. 
Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 515 (1982). Under standards estab-
lished by this Court, a state prisoner may initiate a federal 
habeas petition "[o]nly if the state courts have had the first 
opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated . . . . " 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 276 (1971). "It follows, of 
course, that once the federal claim has been fairly presented 
to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied." 
ld., at 275; see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S: 504, 
516-517, n. 18 (1975). We have never held that presenta-
tion of additional facts to the district court, pursuant to that 
court's directions, evades the exhaustion requirement, as 
long as the prisoner has presented the substance of his claim 
to the state courts. See Picard, supra, at 278. 
Rule 7 permits a federal district court in a habeas proceed-
ing to expand the existing record to "include, without limita-
tion, .. : documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, if so 
directed, to written interrogatories propounded by the 
judge. Affidavits may be submitted and considered as part 
of the record." In this case, the District Court sought to 
clarify the relevant facts, an endeavor wholly consistent with 
Rule 7 ~nd the purpose of the writ. See Townsend v. Sain, 
372 U. S. 293, 313 (1963). The sole question here is whether 
this valid exercise of the court's power to expand the record 
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had the effect of undennining the policies of the exhaustion 
requirement. 
Several affidavits challenged here as "new'' evidence sup-
ported respondent's allegations that no Negro had ever 
served on the grand jury in Kings County and that qualified 
Negroes in the county were available to serve, which he had 
pressed in his pretrial ·motion to quash in superior court, 
App. 28-30, and throughout the state proceedings. The 
California Supreme Court found that the total absence of N e-
groes from the grand jury throughout the history of Kings 
County was an undisputed fact. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 
2d 692, 709, 401 P. 2d 382 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 
(1967). That fact was entitled, therefore, to a presumption 
of correctness on federal review. Sumner v. Mata, 449 
U. S. 539, 545-546 (1981); see Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 
1189, 1201, n. 25 (ED Cal. 1982). The California Supreme 
Court also discussed Judge Wingrove's consideration of Ne-
groes' qualifications, and found that Negroes had served as 
petit jurors, 62 Cal. 2d, at 710, 401 P. 2d, at 392-393, mini-
mum eligibility requirements for which were substantially 
the same as for grand jurors, see 563 F. Supp., at 1245; Mar, 
The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 5 Pac. 
L. J. 36, 40 (1970). Consequently, the additional affidavits 
introduced no new claim upon which the state courts had not 
passed. 
The remaining "new" evidence under attack, a computer 
analysis submitted in response to the District Court's re-
quest, assessed the mathematical probability that chance or 
accident could have accounted for the exclusion of Negroes 
from the. Kings County Grand Jury over the years at issue.3 
3 The statistical expert concluded that if the grand juries selected in 
Kings County between 1900 and 1962 had been chosen by chance, the prob-
ability that no Negro would have been selected was fifty-seven in one hun-
dred thousand million. Although the State made no attempt to rebut this 
testimony, the District Court questioned the reliability of the expert's 
analysis, performed his own analysis of the data, and ultimately accepted 
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Petitioner would have us conclude that the "sophisticated 
computer techniques" rendered respondent's claim a "wholly 
different animal." Brief for Petitioner 80-81. These statisti-
cal estimates, however, added nothing to the case that this 
Court has not considered intrinsic to the consideration of any 
grand jury discrimination claim. As early as 1942, this 
Court rejected a contention that absence of Negroes on the 
grand jury was insufficient to support an inference of dis-
crimination, summarily asserting that "chance or accident 
could hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of 
negroes from the grand jury lists for so long a period as six-
teen years or more." Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 
(1942). This proposition, which the Court derived solely on 
the basis of judicial intuition, is precisely what respondent 
sought to establish by methods now considered somewhat 
more reliable. 
More recently, in reviewing a habeas corpus proceeding, 
this Court independently applied general statistical princi-
ples to the evidence on the record in order to assess the role 
of chance in the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from a 
grand jury in Texas. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 
496-497, n. 17 (1977). Form would indeed triumph over sub-
stance were we to allow the question of exhaustion to turn on 
whether a federal judge has relied on educated conjecture or 
has sought out a more sophisticated interpretative aid to ac-
complish the same objective. 
We emphasize that the District Court's request for further 
information was evidently motivated by a responsible con-
cern that he provide the meaningful federal review of con-
stitutional claims that the writ of habeas corpus has contem-
plated throughout its history. 533 F. Supp., at 1202-1203; 
see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S., at 311-312. Respondent 
had initially submitted only the evidence that had been con-
the expert's conclusions only for the 7-year period of Judge Wingrove's ten-
ure , which yielded a probability of two in one thousand that the phenome-
non was attributable to chance. 563 F. Supp., at 1241-1244. 
.. 
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sidered in state court, and subsequently complied with the 
court's request by furnishing materials no broader than nec-
essary to meet the needs of the court. Accordingly, the cir-
cumstances present no occasion for the Court to consider a 
case in which the prisoner has attempted to expedite federal 
review by deliberately withholding essential facts from the 
state courts. We hold merely that the supplemental evi-
dence presented by respondent did not fundamentally alter 
the legal claim already considered by the state courts, and, 
therefore, did not require that respondent be remitted to 
state court for consideration of that evidence. 
III 
On the merits, petitioner urges this Court to find that dis-
crimination in the grand jury amounted to harmless error in 
this case, claiming that the evidence against respondent was 
overwhelming and that discrimination no longer infects the 
selection of grand juries in Kings County. Respondent's 
conviction after a fair trial, we are told, purged any taint 
attributable to the indictment process. Our acceptance of 
this theory would require abandonment of more than a cen-
tury of consistent preced'ent. 
In 1880, this Court reversed a state conviction on the 
ground that the indictment charging the offense had been is-
sued by a grand jury from which Negroes had been excluded. 
We reasoned that deliberate exclusion of Negroes "is practi-
cally a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of 
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which 
is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that 
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 309 (1880). 
Thereafter, the Court has repeatedly rejected all argu-
ments that a conviction may stand despite racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of the grand jury. See, e. g., Neal v. 
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 396 (1881); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 
U. S. 110 (1883); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1896); 
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Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Rogers v. Alabama, 
192 U. S. 226 (1904); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 
(1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 
316 U. S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); 
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 
356 U. S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 
773 (1964); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972). 
Only six years ago, the Court explicitly addressed the ques-
tion whether this unbroken line of case law should be re-
considered in favor of a harmless-error standard, and deter-
mined that it should not. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 
(1979). We reaffirmed our conviction that discrimination on 
the basis of race .in the selection of grand jurors "strikes at 
the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society 
as a whole," and that the criminal defendant's right to equal 
protection of the laws has been denied when he is indicted by 
a grand jury from which members of a racial group purpose-
fully have been excluded. !d., at 556. 
Petitioner argues here that requiring a state to retry a de-
fendant, sometimes years later, imposes on it an unduly 
harsh penalty for a constitutional defect bearing no relation 
to the fundamental fairness of the trial. Yet intentional dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors is a grave con-
stitutional trespass, possible only und~r color of state author-
ity, and wholly within the power of the state to prevent. 
Thus, the remedy we have embraced for over a century-the 
only effective remedy for this violation 4-is not dispropor-
• As pointed out in R01ie v. Mitchell, alternative remedies are ineffec-
tual. Federal law provides a criminal prohibition against discrimination in 
the selection of grand jurors, 18 U. S. C. § 243, but according to statistics 
compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, that 
section has not been the basis for a single prosecution in the past nine 
years. With respect to prior years, for which precise information is not 
available, we have been unable to find evidence of any prosecution or con-
viction under the statute in the last century. The other putative remedy 
for grand jury discrimination is 42 U. S. C.§ 1983, which, in theory, allows 
redress for Negroes who have been excluded from grand jury service. 
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tionate to the evil that it seeks to deter. If grand jury dis-
crimination becomes a thing of -the past, no conviction will 
ever again be lost on account" of it. 
Nor are we persuaded that discrimination in the grand jury 
has no effect on the fairness of the criminal trials that result 
from that grand jury's actions. The grand jury does not de-
termine only that probable c'ause exists to believe that a de-
fendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the hands 
of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or 
a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and per-
haps most significant of all, a capital offense or a non-capital 
offense-all on the basis of the same facts. Moreover, "[t]he 
grand jury is not. bound to indict in every case where a con-
viction can be obtained." United States v. Giambrone, 601 
F. 2d 616, 629 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting). Thus, 
even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is con-
firmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, 
that confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination 
did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment 
and, consequently, the nature or very existence of the pro-
ceedings to come. 
Just as a conviction is void under the Equal Protection 
Clause if the prosecutor deliberately charged the defendant 
on account of his race, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979), a conviction cannot be under-
stood to cure the taint attributable to a charging body se-
lected on the basis· of race. Once having found discrimina-
tion in the selection of a grand jury, we simply cannot know 
that the need to indict would have been assessed in the same 
way by a grand jury properly constituted. The overriding 
imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging 
See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U. S. 430 (1970). 
These suits are also extremely rare, undoubtedly because the potential 
plaintiffs, eligible Negroes not called for grand jury service, are often with-
out knowledge of the discriminatory practices and without incentive to 
launch costly legal battles to stop them. 
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process, as well as the difficulty of assessing its effect on any 
given defendant, requires our continued adherence to a rule 
of mandatory reversal. · 
The opinion of the Court in Mitchell ably presented other 
justifications, based on the necessity for vindicating Four-
teenth Amendment rights, supporting a policy of automatic 
reversal in these cases. That analysis persuasively demon-
strated that the justifications retain their validity in modern 
times, for "114 years after the close of the War Between the 
States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other 
forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the admin-
istration of justice as in our society as a whole." 443 U. S., 
at 558-559. The six years since Mitchell have given us no 
reason to doubt the continuing truth of that observation. 
Our decision is supported, though not compelled, by the 
important doctrine of stare decisis, the means by which we 
ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but 
will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That 
doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles 
are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of indi-
viduals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our con-
stitutional system of government, both in appearance and in 
fact. While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the 
careful observer will discern that any detours from the 
straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for 
articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged 
"to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and 
with facts newly ascertained." Burnet v. Colorado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain 
the Court in the disposition of cases. Rather, its lesson is 
that every successful proponent of overruling precedent has 
borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes 
in society or in the law dictate that the values served by stare 
decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. In the case of 
grand jury discrimination, we have been offered no reason to 
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believe that any such metamorphosis has rendered the 
Court's long commitment to a rule of reversal outdated, ill-
founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to 
serious reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such 
a rule is as compelling today as it was at its inception . 
. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
'STYLISTlC CHANGES THROUGHOUT 
2nd DRAFT 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Warden of San Quentin State Prison asks this Court to 
retire a doctrine of equal protection jurisprudence first an-
nounced in 1880. The time has come, he urges, for us to 
abandon the rule requiring reversal of the conviction of any 
defendant indicted by a grand jury from which members of 
his own race were systematically excluded. 
I 
In 1962, the grand jury of Kings County, California, in-
dicted respondent, Booker T. Hillery, for a brutal murder. 
Before trial in Superior Court, respondent moved to quash 
the indictment on the ground that it had been issued by a 
grand jury from which Negroes had been systematically ex-
cluded. A hearing on respondent's motion was held by 
Judge Meredith Wingrove, who was the sole Superior Court 
judge in the county and had personally selected all grand 
juries, including the one that indicted respondent, for the 
previous seven years. Absolving himself of any discrimina-
tory intent, Judge Wingrove refused to· quash the indict-
ment. 1 Respondent was subsequently convicted of first-de-
gree murder . 
• 
1 Three thorough and well-reasoned opinions of the District Court dis-
cuss in detail the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as other aspects 
of the case. See Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983); 
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For the next 16 years, respondent pursued appeals and col-
lateral relief in the state courts, raising at every opportunity 
his equal protection challenge to the grand jury that indicted 
him. 2 Less than one month after the California Supreme 
Court foreclosed his final avenue of state relief in 1978, re-
spondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal 
court, raising that same challenge. The District Court con-
cluded that respondent had established discrimination in the 
grand jury, and granted the writ. See Hillery v. Pulley, 
563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983), aff'd, 733 F. 2d 644 (CA9 
1984). 
II 
As a threshold matter, we turn to petitioner's contention 
that respondent has circumvented his obligation to exhaust 
state remedies before seeking collateral relief in federal 
court. 28 U.S. C. §2254(b). The exhaustion issue had its 
genesis in this case when the Federal District Judge saw a 
need to "supplement and clarify'' the state-court record pre-
sented for review. Record, Doc. No. 8, p. 2. Upon author-
ity of 28 U. S. C. § 2254, Rule 7, the judge directed the State 
to provide more figures "demonstrating what portion of the 
Black population in Kings County was eligible for grand jury 
service." Record, Doc. No. 8, p. 3. He also directed the 
parties to present their views regarding the application of 
Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189 (ED Cal. 1982); Hillery v. Sumner, 
496 F . Supp. 632 (ED Cal. 1980). We repeat here only. those portions rele-
vant to the issues before the Court. 
2 See People v. Hillery, 34 Cal. Reptr. 853, 386 P. 2d 477 (1963) (affirm-
ing conviction; rejecting discrimination claim); People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 
692, 401 P. 2d 382 (1965) (on rehearing, rejecting discrimination claim; re-
versing sentence), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967); People v. Hillery, 65 
Cal. 2d 795, 423 P. 2d 208 (1967) (after remand, affirming sentence), cert. 
denied, 389 U. S. 986 (1968); In re Hillery, 71 Cal. 2d 857, 457 P. 2d 565 
(1969) (on original petition for habeas corpus, reversing sentence); People 
v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974) (after remand, reducing 
sentence); In re Hillery, Crim. No. 20424 (Cal. 1978) (affirming denial of 
state habeas corpus). 
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statistical probability analysis to the facts of this case, to 
assist him in "focus[ing] on the likelihood that chance or acci-
dent alone could account for the exclusion of a group from 
grand jury service." Ibid. Petitioner objects that the sub-
missions made in response to the judge's order "drastically" 
altered respondent's claim and rendered it unsuitable for fed-
eral habeas review without prior consideration by the state 
courts. Br'ief for Petitioner 81. 
The exhaustion doctrine seeks to afford the state courts a 
meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error 
without interference from the federal judiciary. Rose v. 
Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 515 (1982). Under standards estab-
lished by this Court, a state prisoner may initiate a federal 
habeas petition "[o]nly if the state courts have had the first 
opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated .... " 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270, 276 (1971). "It follows, of 
course, that once the federal claim has been fairly presented 
to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied." 
Id., at 275; see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 
516-517, n. 18 (1972). We have never held that presentation 
of additional facts to the district court, pursuant to that 
court's directions, evades the exhaustion requirement, as 
long as the prisoner has presented the substance of his claim 
to the state courts. See Picard, supra, at 278. 
Rule 7(b) permits a federal district court in a habeas pro-
ceeding to expand the existing record to "include, without 
limitation, .. . documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, 
if so directed, to written interrogatories propounded by the 
judge. Affidavits may be submitted and considered as a 
part of the record." In this case, the District Court sought 
to clarify the relevant facts, an endeavor wholly consistent 
with Rule 7 and the purpose of the writ. See Townsend v. 
Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 313 (1963). The sole question here is 
whether this valid exercise of the court's power to expand the 
record had the effect of undermining the policies of the ex-
haustion requirement. 
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Several affidavits challenged here as "new" evidence sup-
ported respondent's allegations that no Negro had ever 
served on the grand jury in Kings County and that qualified 
Negroes in the county were available to serve, which he had 
pressed in his pretrial motion to quash in Superior Court, 
App. 28-30, and throughout the state proceedings. The 
California Supreme Court found that the total absence of 
Negroes from the grand jury throughout the history of Kings 
County was an undisputed fact. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 
2d 692, 709, 401 P. 2d 382, 392 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 
938 (1967). That fact was entitled, therefore, to a presump-
tion of correctness on federal review. Sumner v. M ata, 449 
U.S. 539,545-546 (1981); see Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 
1189, 1201, n. 25 (ED Cal. 1982). The California Supreme 
Court also discussed Judge Wingrove's consideration of Ne-
groes' qualifications, and found that Negroes had served as 
petit jurors, 62 Cal. 2d, at 710, 401 P. 2d, at 392-393, mini-
mum eligibility requirements for which were substantially 
the same as for grand jurors, see 563 F. Supp., at 1245; Mar, 
The California Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 1 Pac. 
L. J. 36, 40 (1970). Consequently, the additional affidavits 
introduced no new claim upon which the state courts had not 
passed. 
The remaining "new" evidence under attack, a computer 
analysis submitted in response to the District Court's re-
quest, assessed the mathematical probability that chance or 
accident could have accounted for the exclusion of Negroes 
from the Kings County Grand Jury over the years at issue. 8 
3 The statistical expert concluded that if the grand juries selected in 
Kings County between 1900 and 1962 had been chosen by chance, the prob-
ability that no Negro would have been selected was 57 in 100,000 million. 
Although the State made no attempt to rebut this testimony, the District 
Court questioned the reliability of the expert's analysis , performed its own 
analysis of the data, and ultimately accepted the expert's conclusions only 
for the 7-year period of Judge Wingrove's tenure, which yielded a probabil-
ity of two in one thousand that the phenomenon was attributable to chance. 
563 F . Supp., at 1241- 1244. 
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Petitioner would have us conclude that the "sophisticated 
computer techniques" rendered respondent's claim a "wholly 
different animal." Brief for Petitioner 80-81. These statis-
tical estimates, however, added nothing to the case that this 
Court has not considered intrinsic to the consideration of any 
grand jury discrimination claim. As early as 1942, this 
Court rejected a contention that absence of Negroes on the 
grand jury was insufficient to support an inference of dis-
crimination, summarily asserting that "chance or accident 
could hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of 
negroes from the grand jury lists for so long a period as six-
teen years or more." Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 
(1942). This proposition, which the Court derived solely on 
the basis of judicial intuition, is precisely what respondent 
sought to establish by methods now considered somewhat 
more reliable. 
More recently, in reviewing a habeas corpus proceeding, 
this Court independently applied general statistical princi-
ples to the evidence on the record in order to assess the role 
of chance in the exclusion of Mexican-Americans from a 
grand jury in Texas. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 
496-497, n. 17 (1977). Form would indeed triumph over sub-
stance were we to allow the question of exhaustion to turn on 
whether a federal judge has relied on educated conjecture or 
has sought out a more sophisticated interpretative aid to 
accomplish the same objective. 
We emphasize that the District Court's request for further 
information was evidently motivated by a responsible con-
cern that it provide the meaningful federal review of con-
stitutional claims that the writ of habeas corpus has contem-
plated throughout its history. 533 F. Supp., at 1202-1203; 
see Townsend v. Sain, supra, 372 U. S., at 311-312. Re-
spondent had initially submitted only the evidence that had 
been considered in state court, and subsequently complied 
with the court's request by furnishing materials no broader 
than necessary to meet the needs of the court. Accordingly, 
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the circumstances present no occasion for the Court to con-
sider a case in which the prisoner has attempted to expedite 
federal review by deliberately withholding essential facts 
from the state courts. We hold merely that the supplemen-
tal evidence presented by respondent did not fundamentally 
alter the legal claim already considered by the state courts, 
and, therefore, did not require that respondent be remitted 
to state court for consideration of that evidence. 
III 
On the merits, petitioner urges this Court to find that dis-
crimination in the grand jury amounted to harmless error in 
this case, claiming that the evidence against respqndent was 
overwhelming and that discrimination no longer infects the 
selection of grand juries in Kings County. Respondent's 
conviction after a fair trial, we are told, purged any taint 
attributable to the indictment process. Our acceptance of 
this theory would require abandonment of more than a cen-
tury of consistent precedent. 
In 1880, this Court reversed a state conviction on the 
ground that the indictment charging the offense had been 
issued by a grand jury from which Negroes had been ex-
cluded. We reasoned that deliberate exclusion of Negroes 
"is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an as-
sertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race preju-
dice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the 
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all oth-
ers." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (1880). 
Thereafter, the Court has repeatedly rejected all argu-
ments that a conviction may stand despite racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of the grand jury. See, e. g., Neal v. 
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 396 (1881); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 
U. S. 110 (1883); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565 (1896); 
Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Rogers v. Alabama, 
192 U. S. 226 (1904); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 
(1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 
·. 
84-836--0PINION 
VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 7 
316 U. S. 400 (1942); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 282 (1950); 
Reece v. Georgia, 350 U. S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 
356 U. S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U. S. 
773 (1964); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625 (1972). 
Only six years ago, the Court explicitly addressed the ques-
tion whether this unbroken line of case law should be re-
considered in favor of a harmless-error standard, and deter-
mined that it should not. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 
(1979). We reaffirmed our conviction that discrimination on 
the basis of race in the selection of grand jurors "strikes at 
the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society 
as a whole," and that the criminal defendant's right to equal 
protection of the laws has been denied when he is indicted by 
a grand jury from which members of a racial group purpose-
fully have been excluded. I d. , at 556. 
Petitioner argues here that requiring a State to retry a 
defendant, sometimes years later, imposes on it an unduly 
harsh penalty for a constitutional defect bearing no relation 
to .the fundamental fairness of the trial. Yet intentional dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors is a grave con-
stitutional trespass, possible only under color of state author-
ity, and wholly within the power of the State to prevent. 
Thus, the remedy we have embraced for over a century-the 
only effective remedy for this violation 4-is not dispropor-
'As pointed out in Rose v. Mitchell , alternative remedies are ineffec-
tual. Federal law provides a criminal prohibition against discrimination in 
the selection of grand jurors, 18 U. S. C. § 243, but according to statistics 
compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, that 
section has not been the basis for a single prosecution in the past nine 
years. With respect to prior years, for which precise information is not 
available , we have been unable to find evidence of any prosecution or 
conviction under the statute in the last century. The other putative rem-
edy for grand jury discrimination is 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which, in theory, 
allows redress for Negroes who have been excluded from grand jury 
service. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County , 396 U. S. 320 
(1970). These suits are also extremely rare, undoubtedly because the 
potential plaintiffs, eligible Negroes not called for grand jury service, are 
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tionate to the evil that it seeks to deter. If grand jury dis-
crimination becomes a thing of the past, no conviction will 
ever again be lost on account of it. 
Nor are we persuaded that discrimination in the grand jury 
has no effect on the fairness of the criminal trials that result 
from that grand jury's actions. The grand jury does not de-
termine only that probable cause exists to believe that a de-
fendant committed a crime, or that it does not. In the hands 
of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or 
a lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and per-
haps most significant of all, a capital offense or a noncapital 
offense-all on the basis of the same facts. Moreover, "[t]he 
grand jury is not bound to indict in every case where a con-
viction can be obtained." United States v. Giambrone, 601 
F. 2d 616, 629 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting). Thus, 
even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is con-
firmed in hindsight by a conviction on the indicted offense, 
that confirmation in no way suggests that the discrimination 
did not impermissibly infect the framing of the indictment 
and, consequently, the nature or very existence of the pro-
ceedings to come. 
Just as a conviction is void under the Equal Protection 
Clause if the prosecutor deliberately charged the defendant 
on account of his race, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979), a conviction cannot be under-
stood to cure the taint attributable to a charging body se-
lected on the basis of race. Once having found discrimina-
tion in the selection of a grand jury, we simply cannot know 
that the need to indict would have been assessed in the same 
way by a grand jury properly constituted. The overriding 
imperative to eliminate this systemic flaw in the charging 
process, as weli as the difficulty of assessing its effect on any 
given defendant, requires our continued adherence to a rule 
of mandatory reversal. 
often without knowledge of the discriminatory practices and without incen-
tive to launch costly legal battles to stop them. 
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The opinion of the Court in Mitchell ably presented other 
justifications, based on the necessity for vindicating Four-
teenth Amendment rights, supporting a policy of automatic 
reversal in these cases. That analysis persuasively demon-
strated that the justifications retain their validity in modern 
times, for "114 years after the close of the War Between the 
States and nearly 100 years after Strauder, racial and other 
forms of discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the admin-
istration of justice as in our society as a whole." 443 U. S., 
at 558-559. The six years since Mitchell have given us no 
reason to doubt the continuing truth of that observation. 
Our decision is supported, though not compelled, by the 
important doctrine of stare decisis, the means by which we 
ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but 
will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That 
doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles 
are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of indi-
viduals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our con-
stitutional system of government, both in appearance and in 
fact. While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the 
careful observer will discern that any detours from the 
straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for 
articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged 
"to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and 
with facts newly ascertained." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & 
Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain 
the Court in the disposition of cases. Rather, its lesson is 
that every successful proponent of overruling precedent has 
borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes 
in society or in the law dictate that the values served by stare 
decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. In the case of 
grand jury discrimination, we have been offered no reason to 
believe that any such metamorphosis has rendered the 
Court's long commitment to a rule of reversal outdated, ill-
founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to 
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serious reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such 
a rule is as compelling today as it was at its inception. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is 
affirmed. 
It is so ordered. 
·-
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JUSTICE MARsHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
TheW arden of San Quentin State Prison asks this Court to 
retire a doctrine of equal protection jurisprudence first an-
nounced in 1880. The time has come, he urges, for us to 
abandon the rule requiring reversal of the conviction of any 
defendant indicted by a grand jury from which members of 
his own race were systematically excluded. 
I 
In 1962, the grand jury of Kings County, California, in-
dicted respondent, Booker T. Hillery, for a brutal murder. 
Before trial in Superior Court, respondent moved to quash 
the jndictment on the ground that it bad been issued by a 
grand jury from which ·blacks bad been systematically ex-
cluded. A hearing on respondent's motion was held by 
Judge Meredith Wingrove, who was the sole Superior Court 
judge in the county and bad personally selected all grand 
juries, including ~e one that indicted respondent, for the 
previous seven years. Absolving himself of any discrimina-
tory intent, Judge Wmgrove refused to quash the indict-
ment. 1 Respondent was subsequently convicted of first-
degree murder. 
'Three thorough and well-reasoned opinions of the District Court dis-
euss in detail the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as other aspects 
of the case. See Hillery v. P'Jdley, 563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983); 
• 
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For the next 16 years, respondent pursued appeals and col-
lateral relief in the state courts, raising at every opportunity 
his equal protection challenge to the grand jury that indicted 
him.1 Less than one month after the California Supreme 
Court foreclosed his final avenue of state relief in 1978, re-
spondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal 
court, raising that same challenge. The District Court eon-
eluded that respondent had established discrimination in the 
grand jury, and granted the writ. See Hillery v. Pulley, 
563 F. Supp. 1228 (ED Cal. 1983). The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, 733 F. 2d 644 (CA9 1984), and we granted certiorari, 
- u. s. - (1985). 
II 
As a threshold matter, we turn to petitioner's contention 
that respondent has circumvented his obligation to exhaust 
state remedies before seeking collateral relief in federal 
court. 28 U. S. C. §2254(b). The exhaustion issue had its 
genesis in this case when the Federal District Judge saw a 
need to "supplement and clarify" the state-court record pre-
sented for review. Record, Doc. No.8, p. 2. Upon author-
ity of28 U. S. C. §2254, Rule 7, the judge directed the State 
to provide more figures "demonstrating what portion of the 
Black population in Kings County was eligible for grand jury 
service." Record, Doc. No. 8, p. 3. He also directed the 
HiUefr v. Pv.Uq, 633 F. Supp. 1189 (ED Cal. 1982); Hilkry v. Summr, 
496 F. Supp. 632 (ED Cal. 1980). We repeat here only tboee portions rele-
vant to the iuuee before the Court. 
•See P«<pk v. H~. 84 Cal. Reptr. 853,886 P. 2d 4T1 (1963) (aftirm-
ing eonviction; rejecting ctiacrimination claim); P«<pk v. HiUefr, 62 Cal 2d 
892, ~1 P. 2d 882 (1966) (on rehearing, rejecting diacrimination claim; re-
versing aentenee), eert. denied, 886 U.S. ~ (1967); Peopu v. Hillery, 65 
Cal. 2d 796, C3 P. 2d 208 (1967) (after remand, aftirming sentence), eert. 
-· denied, 889 U.S. 986 (1968); Ita" HiUefr, 71 Cal 2d 857, 457 P. 2d 565 
(1969) (on original petition for babeas eorpus, reversing sentence); Peopu 
v. Hill.erJI, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974) (after remand, reducing 
sentence); In" Hilkry, Crim. No. 20424 (Cal. 1978) (affirming denial of 
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parties to present their views regarding the application of 
statistical probability analysis to the facts of this case, to 
assist him in "focus[ing] on the likelihood that chance or acci-
dent alone could account for the exclusion of a group from 
grand jury service." Ibid. Petitioner objects that the sub-
missions made in response to the judge's order "drastically" 
altered respondent's claim and rendered it unsuitable for fed-
eral habeas review without prior consideration by the state 
courts. Brief for Petitioner 81. 
The exhaustion doctrine seeks to afford the state courts a 
meaningful opportunity to consider allegations of legal error 
without interference from the federal judiciary. Rose v. 
Lundy, 455 U.S. 609, 615 (1982). Under standards estab-
lished by this Court, a state prisoner may initiate a federal 
habeas petition "[o]nly if the state courts have had the first 
opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated . . . . " 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). "It follows, of 
course, ~t once the federal claim has been fairly presented 
to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied., 
ld., at 275; see also HumphTe'JJ v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 
516-517, n. 18 (1972). We have never held that presentation 
of additional facts to the district court, pursuant to that 
court's directions, evades the exhaustion requirement when 
the prisoner has presented the substance of his claim to the 
state courts. See Picmd, "'P"'' at 278 . . 
Rule 7(b) permits a federal district court in a habeas pro-
ceeding to expand the existing record to "include, without 
limitation, . . . documents, exhibits, and answers under oath, 
if so directed, to written interrogatories propounded by the 
judgit Atlidavits may be submitted and considered as a 
part of the record." In this case, the District Court sought 
~ to clarify the relevant t.cts, an endeavor wholly consistent 
with Rule 7 and the purpose of the writ. See TOW1Ulend v. 
Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 313 (1963). The sole question here is 
whether this valid exercise of the court's power to expand the 
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record bad the effect of undermining the policies of the ex-
haustion requirement. 
Several affidavits ehallenged here as "new" evidence sup-
ported respondent's allegations that no black had ever served I 
on the grand jury in Kings County and that qualified blacks in I 
the county were available to serve, which he had pressed in 
his pretrial motion to quash in Superior Court, App. 28-80, 
and throughout the state proceedings. The California 
Supreme Court found that the total absence of blacks from 1 
the grand jury in the history of Kings County was an undis-
puted fact. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, '709, 401 P. 2d 
382, 892 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). That fact 
was entitled, therefore, to a presumption of correctness on 
federal review. Sumner v. Jlata, 449 U.S. 539, 645-546 
(1981); see Hillery v. Pullq, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1201, n. 25 
(ED Cal. 1982). The California Supreme Court also dis-
eussed Judge Wingrove's consideration of blacks' qualifica- \ 
tions, and found that blacks bad served as petit jurors, 62 
Cal. 2d, .at 710, 401 P. 2d, at 892-393, minimum eligibility 
requirements for which were substantially th~ same as for 
grand jurors, see 663 F. Supp., at 1245; Mar, The California 
Grand Jury: Vestige of Aristocracy, 1 Pae. L. J. 36, 40 
(1970). Consequently, the additional affidavits introduced 
no claim upon which the state courts had not passed. 
The remaining "new" evidence under attack, a computer 
analysis submitted in response to the Distriet Court's re-
quest, asaessed the mathematieal probability that chance or 
aecident could have aeeounted for the exdusion ·Of blacks 1 
from the Kings County Grand Jury over the years at issue.• 
,, 
'Tbe ltatiltieal expert concluded that if tbe erand juries eelected in 
Kmp Couuty between JJOO and 1862 bad been choeen by cbanee, the prob-
ability that 110 bllck would ban beeD leleeted ..,.. 67 iD 100,000 million. 
Although the State IDide no attempt to rebut this t.estimuuy, the District 
Court questioaed tbe reliability of tbe upert'a analysia, performed ita own 
ualy1lia of the data, and ultimately accepted the expert' a eoncluainna oaly 
for the 7-,_,. period of .Jadp W"JIIIr'O"e'• telmre, which yieJded a probabil-
• 
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Petitioner would ·have us eonc:lude that the "sophisticated 
computer techniques" rendered respondent's claim a "wholly 
different animal." Brief for Petitioner 80-81. These statis-
tical estimates, however, added nothing to the ease that this 
Court has not considered intrinsic to the consideration of any 
grand jury discrimination claim. As early as 1942, this 
Court rejected a cOntention that absence of blacks on the 
grand jury was insufficient to support an inference of dis-
crimination, summarily asserting that "chance or accident 
could hardly have accounted for the continuous omission of 
negroes from the grand jury lists for so long a period as 
sixteen years or more." Hill v. Tezas, 316 U. S. 400, 404 
(1942). This proposition, which the Court derived solely on 
the basis of judicial intuition, is precisely what respondent 
aought to establish by methods now considered somewhat 
more reliable. . 
More recently, in reviewing a habeas corpus proceeding, 
this Court independently applied general statistical princi-
ples to the evidence on the record in order to IB8eB8 the role 
of chance in the exclusion of Mexiean-Amerieans from a 
grand jury in Texas. Ca&taneda v. Pa.rlida, 430 U. S. 482, 
496-497, n. 17 (1977). Form would indeed triumph over sub-
stance were we to allow the question of exhaustion to tum on 
whether a federal judge has relied on educated conjecture or 
has sought out a more sophisticated interpretative aid to ac-
eomptiah the same objective. 
We emphasize that the District Comt's request for further 
information wu evidently motivated by a reapoDIDDle con-
eern that it provide the IIIA"'innfal federal review of eon-
ltitutioaal claims that the writ of haWs COI'pU8 baa contem-
plated tllroughout ita history. 688 F. Supp., at 1202-1203; 
aee TOIOU6fld v. Sa.in, aupra, at 811-312. Respondent had ·1 
·· initially submitted only the evidence that Ud been con-
sidered in state court, and subsequently eomplied with the 
ity of two ill ODe thoui&Dd that tbe pbeoomeDOD ... attributable to ebance. 
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court's request by· furnishing materials no broader than nec-
essary to meet the needs of the court. Accordingly, the c:ir-
eumstances present no occasion for the Court to consider a 
case in which the prisoner has attempted to expedite federal 
review by deliberately withholding essential facts from the 
state courts. We hold merely that the supplemental evi-
dence presented by respondent did not fundamentally alter 
the legal claim already considered by the state courts, and, 
therefore, did not require that respondent be remitted to 
state court for consideration of that evidence . 
III 
On the merits, petitioner urges this Court to find that dis-
c:rimination in the grand jury amounted to harmless error in 
this ease, claiming that the evidence against respondent was 
overwhelming and that discrimination no longer infects the 
aelection of grand juries in Kings Oounty. Respondent's 
conviction after a fair trial, we are told, purged any taint 
attributable to the indictment process. Our acceptance of 
this theory would require abandonment of more than· a cen-
tury of consistent precedent. 
In 1880, this Court reversed a state eonviction on the 
ground that the indictment eharging the offense had been 
issued by a grand jury from which blaeks had been excluded. 
We reuoned that deliberate exclusion of. blacks "is praeti-
eally a braDd upon them, afllxed by the law, an uaertion of 
their inferiority, md a ltimulant to that nee prejudiee whieh 
is an impectiment to warhc to bdviduala m the nee that 
equal juatice wJUeh the law aims to we to all athers." 
Strtltader v. Wat Vitpitlic&, 100 U.S. lOB, 108 (1880). 
Thereafter, the Court hu repeatedly rejected all argu-
ments tbat a CODvictioo may 8taDd delpite ncial dilcrimina-
tion in the eeleetioD af the lfiiDd j11ry. See, e. g., N«Jl v. 
Dela10are, 103 U.S. 370, 396 (1881); Bvah v. Kentuclcg, 107 
u. s. 110 (1888); Gibloft v. Jliuiuippi, 162 u.s. &66 (1896); 
Ctlrllrr v. 7'1ZCU, 1'17 U.S. 412 (1100); B.egen v. Alabama, 
--
, . .. 
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192 u. s. 226 (1904); p~ v. Lotrilitltaa, 806 u. s. 854 
(1939); Smith v. Te:ros, 311 U. S. 128 (UNO); Hill v. Te:ros, 
316 U. S. 400 (1942); Ca.aaeU v. Tcaa, 839 U.S. 282 (1950); 
Ruu v. Chorgia., 850 U. S. 85 (1965); Euba.flkl v. Lowiliana, 
856 U. S. 684 (1968); Arnold v. Nortlt. Ca.rolifta., 876 U. S. 
T13 (1964); Allmftder v. Lowiliataa, 406 U. S. 625 (1972). 
Only six years ago, the Court explicitly addressed the ques-
tion whether this unbroken line of ease law should be re-
eonsidered in favor of a harmless-error standard, and deter-
mined that it should not.• Roae v. Jlitcl&eU, 443 U. S. 545 - I 
(1979). We reaftlrmed our eonviction that discrimination on 
the basis of race in the selection of grand jurors "strikes at 
the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society 
as a whole," and that the c:riminal defendant's right to equal 
protection of the laws has been denied when he is indicted by 
a grand jury from which members of a racial group purpose-
fully have been excluded. ld., at 566 • 
. Petitioner argues here that requiring a State to retry a 
defendant, aometiJiles yean later, imposes on it an unduly 
harsh penalty for a constitutional defect bearing no relatiOn 
to the fundamental fairness of the trial. ·yet intentional dis-
•n.e diaent attempts to leuen the precedential weight of Jlitt:Wl by 
ebaraeteriliDc it Ullllldvilory apnion Potlt, at-, IL '- In hrt II of 
JlitciNU, three Juaticell twftb:.....t the priDdple that pud jury --
a jmitwtiaa :requbw revenal ~the Cllll'tictioo iD all . -..; iD Parta Ill ad 
IV, they~ that tbe priloaer W fiDed to IDUe aut a ,..._/aN 
e.1e ~ diia We 'wltW 4G U. S.,llt 1'1'- Two .witiaaalJillilt.ieM..,.. 
ltl7 JGiDed '-t n, bat ••••ated ,_ t11e ~...,.._ ..,_. tM7 ••tnc~ 
dlat .... , 4 rrtlr w .................. ad that tile~ ..... 
:::~· .. ...-led. u., lit- (WIIl'l'&, l., jGiDed.., ....... J., 
he). 'nle ............... tltatioll to 0.., "· ~. -
U. 8. 168, 1., 1L 16 (1976) {plunlity opinion), iD IUpport ~ita UDJIIeee-
dented.....-& tllllta ltlt 1 rmt ~lepl ..._jai..t bT lftJ--. ~ 
tbia Court .. -~ ....... tllaw. 'ftle **'. • ........ . 
refen oaly to the mumer in wbieh GDe may diaeern •liDIIe boldiDg of the 
Court in eMe1 iD which DO CIIJinioo Oil the illue in qa.tioD hu pa1181'ed the 
eappurt fila .... It). t'llat 11:1 a '1 il iMppHeeNe to hrt U ~ llitt:A-





8 VASQUEZ w. HILLERY 
erimination in the ~election of grand jurors is a grave con-
stitutional trespass, poesible only under eolor of state author-
ity, and wholly within the power of the State to prevent. 
Thus, the remedy we have embraced for over a century-the 
only effective remedy for this violation·~ not dispropor-
tionate to the evil that it aeeks to deter. Up-and jury ctis-
erimination beeomes a thing of the past, no eonvietion will 
ever lpin ·be lost on account of it. 
Nor are we persuaded that discrimination in the grand jury 
has no effect on the fairness of the criminal trials that result 
from that grand jury's actions. The grand jury does not de-
termine only that probable cause exists to believe that a de-
fendant eommitted a erime, or that it does not. In the bands 
of the grand jury lies the power to charge a greater offense or 
a lesser offense; numerous eounts or a single eount; and per-
haps most signifieant of all, a capital offense or a noneapital 
offense-all on the basis of the same taets. Moreover, "[t]he 
grand jury is not bound to indict in every ease where a eon-
viction can be. obtained." Uftit«l Stata v. Ciambrou, 601 
F. 2d 616,--.629 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J., diaaenting). Thus, 
even if a grand jury's determination of probable cause is eon-
finned in hindsight by a eonviction on the indieted offense, 
that eonfirmation in no way suPts that the diac:riminat.ion 
'Aa we painted out iD Roee T. llitdwll, lltel..tiTe Nir..tiel are iD-
e&etu:J. Fedenlln pvvidea a crimiDa1 prohibitjan ..-. 6c:a iwiua-
tiolliDtbuehrfunolpadjann, 18U. 8. C. tiCS, batwActolta-
tiltiea eampOed bJ the &&nlwfwtrwUq OlD of tile Ulllld a.t. o..ta, 
tMt l8edaD 11M Jilt IJeeD tile._. far a IIIIP pr_.._ID tllle )IMtlliDe 
,._... Wltll ralplet to Jfl'lar,...., far wWiit,.... Ni ratw Ia aot 
andWJie, ft llaft .............. ..W.. fll-., I* I II ........ eaa-
TietkJD 1lllldlr U.ltlltate fD U.lllt ..-,. 'fte c6er pMIItlwe NiDed.J 
for p'IDdjarJ dieerlmiroat.ion il 42 U. 8. C. I1J88, wldcb, iD tbear,y, IIDowa 
nc~re. far..._.. no....,. beaD exehMW fraa I!'IIMI,_., ...-.. See 
C.W T. Jwr eo-'la .QrwM eo..,,- U. 8.- (IIW). ft.e 
IUita are alao extremely rare, UDdoubtedly becauee tbe potential plaintffls, 
eligible Wacb DOt eaDed for p'IDd jury ...... 11ft oltell wltbaat bowl-
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did DOt lmpermisa[bly infect tbe framing of the indietment 
and, ecmsequently, the nature or very existeDee of the ~ 
eeectinp to eome. 
When eollltitutional enw calla into question the objectiv-
ity of thole charged with brineiDia defendant to judgment, a 
reviewiuc eomt can Deitber iDdulp a presumption of regular-
ity nor evaluate the resulting harm. AceordiDgly, when the 
trial judge is diseovered to have hid some basis for rendering 
a biased judgment, his actual motivatioDS are hidden from re-
view, and we must presume that the process was impaired . 
See Tvmq v. Olio, 273 U. S. 610 686 (1927) (revenal re-
quired when judge has ftnancial interest in convietion, de-
spite 1aek of indication that bias influeneed decisions). Simi-
larly, when a petit jury has been aelec:ted upon improper 
eriteria or has been exposed to prejudicial publicity, we have 
required reversal of the eonviction because the effect of the 
violation earmot be ascertained. See Dat!U v. G«wgiA, 429 
U. S. 122 (1976) (per evrilm); SINppBf"d v. JIUID8U, 884 
U.S. 188, 861-852 (1966). Like these flmdamental ' laws, 
whieh never have been thought harmless, diserimination in 
the grand jury undermines the structural integrity of the 
erimina1 tribunal itself, and is not amenable to harmless-eiTor 
review. 
Just as a conviction is YOid UDder the Equal Protection 
C1aule if the proeeeutor deliberately charged the defendant 
Gil IICCOUDt of m. nee, eee U.u.d Sttlta v. ~ • .f.U 
U. S. 114, U&, aDd n. 9 (U'li), a coaviction cwmot. be tmder-
ltood to aue the taint attrihatable to a eharJbw ~ • 
leeted- tbe ... of..... o- J.'fiDI ................. 
tioa 'ill the •leetioD of a pad jarj, we limplJ ....., lr:Dow 
that the Deed to indict would have been uaeaed in the ame 
way by a p'lllld JarJ pniaerly ~ tile natidiac 
impelative to eliminate this aylltemie law ila ....... 
process, as well as the ditlieulty of uaee•h11 its effect on any 
pvtm defenc.lant, requires oar eoatiDued ldhereuce to a nle 




The opinion of the Court in MitcMll ably presented other 
justifications, based on the necessity for vindicating Four-
teenth Amendment rights, supporting a policy of automatic 
reversal in cases of grand jury discrimination. That analysis 
persuasively demonstrated that the justifications retain their 
validity in modern times, for "114 yean after the cloee of the 
War Between the States and nearly 100 years after Stro:uder, 
racial and other forms of discrimination still remain a fact of 
life, in the administration of justice as in our IOciety as a 
whole." 443 U. S., at 558-559. The six yean since Mitchell 
have given us no reason to doubt the continuing truth of that 
observation. 
IV 
The dissent propounds a theory, not advanced by any 
party, which would condition the grant of relief upon the pas-
sage of time between a conviction and the filing of a petition 
for federal habeas corpus, depending upon the ability of a 
State to obtain a second conviction. Sound jurispnldenee 
counsels against our adoption of that approach to habeas cor-
pus claims. 
The Habeas Corpus Rules permit a State to move for dis-
missal of a habeas petition when it "has been prejudiced in its 
ability to respond to the motion by delay in filing." 28 
U. S. C. 12254, Rule 9(a). Indeed, petitioner ftled sueb a 
motion in this cue, and it was denied becawte the Distriet 
Court found that DO prejudic:ial delay had been caused by re-
spondent. BilUrw v. Svmtaer, 496 F. Supp. 682, at 687. 
Congress baa DOt 1ee11 It, however, to provide the State with 
an additional defenae to habeas corpus petitioDs ·buecJ on the 
diflieUlties that it will &c:e if forced to retry the defendant. 
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal 
Rules has drafted a propoeed amendment to Rule 9(a), whicll 
would permit dismissal of a habeas eorpus petition upon a 
demonstration· that the State bas been prejudiced, either in 
defending against the prisoner's federal claim or in bringing 
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l&ariouL R U.S. L. W.llG (September 18, 1883). 'Diat 
Jll'OPOU) .... DOt been adopted. ADd, despite many attempt.~ 
In recent J8U'I, Coapoeu hu Jet to a.te altatute oflimita-
tiaal for federal bebeu eorpaa lld.ioDa. See L. Yaclde, Post-
eooviction Remectiel 119 (1981 ed., Supp. 1886) (deleribiDc 
relevant billa IDt.rod1lced in put 1everal Ccqreuee). We 
lbould DOt JiPtly create a Dew jadic:ial naJe, In the pile of 
eoaatitutioDal interpretation, to llebieve the ume eDd . 
v 
Today'a deeiaion ia IUppUI'ted, thouah not eompelled, by 
the important doctriDe of Item d«iN, the meaD8 by whieh 
we eDBUre that the law will DOt merely ebaDae e.rratieaJly, but 
will develop In a priDcip1ed ad iDteDigible fubion. That 
doctriDe permits IOciety to piesume that bedrock priDcipJes 
are fOUDded in the law rather than in the proclivities of iDdi-
YiduaJa, aDd thereby eontributea to the intepity of oar con-
8titutioaal.,.tem of pvemn..,t, both in~ aDd in 
faet. WbDe .... deciN ia DOt 8D inuanb1e efMDJMDII, the 
eareful ... •• will dilcem that aD1 det.oan tram the 
ltniPt ,.til fll ... MUU iD ear pMt .. ft Wied far 
.......,. Jlllltw,-..,-- the c-rt .... eblipd 
'\ollriDc ....... ..., ............ with.,.._ aDd 
~W. ••b .-••...t.• ._.., -. C.Ur ado Oil at 
Gaa Co., & u. s. a, m a-> (BraDdaa, 1., • aatina). 
o.r•hta) ._ ... ,.__,l'flld .. iiil1ato•........m 
the Caart ID the dilpDrlt;km fll-. 811ther, tt. lencm Ia 
that evflf71DCC ard'W pnpcnmt of overruliDc p...teld has 
.... .. • YJ 1IUI6ia fllpa ..... the ec.rt t1lat .... 
Ill aoc:WIJWID the law tletate that the...._- ted by,.,. 
• • - :!- ·~"" -~ 
.... ....; -. 
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d«iN yield in favor of a greater objective. In the ease of 
ll'8lld jury discrimination, we have been offered no reason to 
believe that any such metamorphosis bas nmdered the 
Court's long commitment to a rule of revenal outdated, ill-
founded, unworbble, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to 
aerious reeonaideration. On the eontrary, the Deed for such 
a rule iB as eompelliDg today as it was at ita inception. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is 
aftlrmed. 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here.' Twenty-three years later, we 
. are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
'Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at -, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED Cal. 1983). 
Respondent's grand jury consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom 
were white. !d., at 1231. 
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2 VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 
and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a 1enilfne of cases going 
back over one hundred years. !d., at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984); Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005, · 
1021-1022 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, 
when governing decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with 
other, more recent authority, the Court "has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 
649, 665 (1944). Instead, particularly where constitutional 
issues are involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to 
correct its errors even though of long standing." United 
States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, 
84-836--DISSENT 
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the Court misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on 
decisions concerning grand jury discrimination. There is 
other precedent, including important cases of more recent 
vintage than those cited by the Court, that should control 
this case. Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a convic-
tion should not be reversed for constitutional error where the 
error did not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. Id., at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
3 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[ w ]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 104 S. Ct., at 2069. 
84-836--DISSENT 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
The plurality in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), ar-
gued that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to grand 
jury discrimination claims, because grand jury discrimination 
"destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt 
on the integrity of the judicial process." 443 U. S., at 
555-556. But every_ constitutional error rna be sai to raise 
questions as to the):'integrity of the judicial process." Nev-
ertheless, as the cases cited above show, the Court has re-
quired some showing of actual prejudice to the defendant as a 
prerequisite to reversal, even when the constitutional error 
directly affects the fairness of the defendant's trial. Com-
pare Strickland v. Washington, supra, at 2064 (requiring 
prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims) with Gid-
eon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344-345 (1963) (emphasiz-
ing importance of right to counsel to ensure fair trial). 
Grand jury discrimination is a serious violation of our con- d\
1 
stitutional order, but so also are the .,9eprivations of rights ) CAtiJ tc.v.~-lo.v\ 
guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, .arufSixt¥vAmendmentstO 
which we have applied harmless error ana ysis or an ~I u ?~f2,-~ 
gous prejudice requirement. !Rle Gou~es nocaGequately-<- (tll1) (liLvJ ~'fa~r-.f'k) 
e.xplaia why grand-jur-y-Qiscrimination is e empt fram--a-JWej--'l-
diee requirement, while-other constitutional-errors~ 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cas sell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Since then, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has firmly established the principle 
that error that does not affect the outcome of a prosecution 
cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid conviction. That 
proposition-and the decisions of the last two decades that 
have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with the result 
84-836--DISSENT 
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reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile this conflict 
itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. S t ~ 
I would dissent from the Court's decisio~ for this~ JN("'c \.I) r.ot(A~ k\ 
alone. ~de-tha the-reasomn of Gliiijmta;;;;;- VIA- fA a r ') 
..-and-its-progeny and-of the-Other eases men oned above · 
--sound, 'Ould-apply harmless-error analysis tQ the oonstftu..-A-
--tio:rtat-vWatioo-at-issue-here._j Fo.r-reaaons I discuss-below ,..s'-
,_J-eonclude-that-the ePrer-in-this case-did not· injure respon 
-ent-in-any-eognizable way. Post, at--. I therefore wow 
reverse-the-;judgment-of the--Court -of Appeals . .,_ 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless error princi-
ples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the "cen-
tury of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those deci-
sions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purp·oses of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 
551 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 (WHITE, J., dis-
senting). The issue in this case is not whether the state 
erred, but what should be done about it. The question~ 
-Gthet werdsiis whether reversal of respondent's conviction 
either is compelled by the Constitution or is an appropriate, 
but not constitutionally required, remedy for racial · -'Under the -Gourt!s-hannless-eLr ec~i.ons., tb8-f~ tha eieey~ 
- all interest. ill-deterring discrimi~~ ii llQt Pelevant o-whetA&l" th& error 0 
ift-'thi1Al88e -ift..harmle ~. Cali.,ti;l.'l::~' hl -::t.. 
l"eyea~e6~~f'lied aslt~ e 1Jttl"ti&Ul61¥' defimda~~ 
~~iotatjon may-eause"1!ome presumed 
-etal-injury S&e HtJet'iMfJr -s-wpra t 510-511. 9-
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crimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. Lu-
cas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 
228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring 
in the judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of automatic re-
versal" that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), we acknowledged that dis-
criminatory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Con-
stitution, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's 
conviction was an inappropriate remedy for the violation 
since grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal pros-
ecutions. 104 S. Ct., at 3095-3097; see also Oregon v. 
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) (suppression of evidence 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitu-
tionally compelled); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 
3412 (1984) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). The rationale of Hobby cannot be 
squared with the claim that discriminatory selection of the 
body that charged the defendant compels reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction. Rather, it is necessary to determine 
whether reversal of respondent's conviction is an "appropri-
ate remedy" for the exclusion of blacks from grand juries in 
Kings County, California in 1962.0 Hobby, supra, at 3095; 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979) (plurality / 
(weighing costs and benefits of awarding relief to peti- ../ 
ners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created remedies are ap-
propriate only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifi-
' Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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cally intended federal right"). That determination depends 
on (i) the utility of the remedy in either correcting any injus-
tice to respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by 
state officials, and (ii) the remedy's costs to society. United 
States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413; Stone v. Powell, supra, 
at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in being c ar e an 
convicted h1s race, an harm o 
society's interest in deterring racial discrimination. I con-
sider in turn these asserted interests and the degree to which 1 
they are served in this case by the_kmtomatic reversat ~,. s 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could not withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
• The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
-
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cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. Arlington Heights v. M etropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
7 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by information 
rather than indictment. In the ten years preceding respondent's indict-
ment, Kings County grand juries indicted a total of only three persons, 
none of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 
382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, 
any claim that discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism 
for applying different standards to black offenders than to their white 
counterparts seems altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
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more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
8 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged . . . on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 7 supra. 
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matter of law, given respondent's subseque , unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an inte est in not being ...-{:;.~ 
bound over for trial · · · RC , Costello -
v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) (Burton, J., con-
curring), 9 or based on impermissible factors such as his race, 
see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). There is no / 
allegation that those rights were -ifl-an;y '•"~la#\riolated in this ../ 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury· discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
9 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
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crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, supra. 10 Prior to 1970, the 
Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on direct ap-
peal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time between 
the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision was six 
years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice granted 
relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand jury dis-
crimination. Both cases involved delays comparable to the 
delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. See 
Castaneda v. Partida, supra (decision announced five years 
10 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, I took the position 
that, where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his 
grand jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted 
to litigate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced that my 
conclusion was correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis 
weighs strongly against reexamining the question whether a defendant 
should be permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his 
guilt or on the fairness of the trial that convicted him. The plurality opin-
ion in Rose, issued in 1979, is the only instance in which this Court has ex-
amined the issue. The discussion in that opinion was unnecessary to the 
result, which turned on the sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. 
Perhaps more important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant por-
tion of the plurality opinion dissented from the Court's judgment. 443 
U. S., at 588 (WHITE, J., dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
For that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the Court's rejec-
tion of this argument in Rose is binding precedent. !d., at 582, n. 3 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153, 169, n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken by those mem-
bers who concurred in the judgment [where necessary to a majority] on the 
narrowest grounds"). 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult or impossible. 
11 The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in November 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
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after indictment); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972) (deci-
sion announced six years after indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court sixteen years after his conviction. 13 It is now 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for mur-
der and since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds 
this time lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically impor-
tant, because it both increases the societal cost of the Court's 
chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy 
may otherwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the plurality ar-
gued that the rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs 
on society, since the State is able to retry successful petition-
12 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1977) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 
twenty-one years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed be-
cause petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
13 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from the 'ngs 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
/ 
84-836-DISSENT 
VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 13 
ers, and since "the State remains free to use all the proof it 
introduced to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 
558. This is not the case when relief is granted many years 
after the original conviction. In those circumstances, the 
State may find itself severely handicapped in its ability to 
carry its heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where the original verdict turned on the jury's 
credibility judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the 
State's ability to reconstruct its case. Even where credibil-
ity is not central, the passage of time may make the right to 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or 
move away; physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For 
these reasons, the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary.' " 
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died nineteen years 
ago. Respondent does not allege that the discriminatory 
practices survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evi-
dence in the record to support such an allegation. It is hard 
to believe that Judge Wingrove might have behaved 
differently had he known that a convicted defendant might be 
1
' Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
.,.. 
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freed nineteen years after his death. Yet that is exactly the 
proposition that must justify the remedy imposed in this 
case: that people in positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will 
change their behavior out of the fear of successful habeas pe-
titions long after they have left office or otherwise passed 
from the scene. The proposition@""to say the least~highly 
questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those ·are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's gt'and jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the et~ffieie~ofthe pro- ( o..J~czu._t~...c..y 
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 15 Even assuming the 
15 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important to re-
member that the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
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harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
nor innocence suffer." Berger v. United Sta , 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); 
see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 12 (1976) {.pFeaeel1tot 'e dl1ty.L-
..t&-dieeleli• e*91iliJ'II'I;rley:iP~ts ' ur oven:iding--Oe~ 
...the-juetiee of the flRdiflg-ef guil "'}.~ The m this case~Jainl under-~ . -fh 
mines the State's interest in punishing the guilty, without· pro- ~ 
tecting the innocent agaimt abuse. or- e.n~u.nnj -J."-t_ Pu ,_ 1 \ .('t\~P'lt.~~ ot' -lk.o.. pr?>~ure_s 
W~c1 OJ\t ~IA.ri.\ ~C., I -f'(' 1 ~.i j ~ 4 ntd lllv\d C.nwidQ.d , 
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APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
1 Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at -, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
was black. Hillery v. Pulley , 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED Cal. 1983). 
Respondent's grand jury consisted of nineteen individuals, all of whom 
were white. Id. , at 1231. 
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and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a line of cases going 
back over one hundred years. I d., at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 2311 (1984); Garcia v. San Anto-
nio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 
1021-1022 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, 
when governing decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with 
other, more recent authority, the Court "has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 
649, 665 (1944). Instead, particularly where constitutional 
issues are involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to 
correct its errors even though of long standing." United 
States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, 
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the Court !Jlisapplies stare decisis because it relies only on 
decisions concerning grand jury discrimination. There is 
other precedent, including important cases of more recent 
vintage than those cited by the Court, that should control 
this case. Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a convic-
tion should not be reversed for constitutional error where the 
error did not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. ld., at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
3 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[ w ]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 104 S. Ct., at 2069. 
/ 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
The plurality in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), ar-
gued that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to grand 
jury discrimination claims, because grand jury discrimination 
"destroys the appearance of justice and thereby casts doubt 
on the integrity of the judicial process." 443 U. S., at 
555-556. But every constitutional error may be said to raise 
questions as to the "appearance of justice" and the "integrity 
of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has required some showing of actual 
prejudice to the defendant as a prerequisite to reversal, even 
when the constitutional error directly affects the fairness of 
the defendant's trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at 2064 (requiring prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 
344-345 (1963) (emphasizing importance of right to counsel to 
ensure fair trial). Grand jury discrimination is a serious vi-
olation of our constitutional order, but so also are the deprj-
vations of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to which we have applied harmless 
error analysis or an analogous prejudice requirement. 
Moreover, grand jury discrimination occurs prior to trial, 
while the asserted constitutional violations in most of the 
above-cited cases occurred during trial. The Court does not 
adequately explain why grand jury discrimination affects the 
"integrity of the judicial process" to a greater extent than the 
deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it is 
exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitu-
tional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
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(Stewart, J., dissenting). Since then, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has finnly established the principle 
that error that does not affect the outcome of a prosecution 
cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid conviction. That 
proposition-and the decisions of the last two decades that 
have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with the result 
reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile this conflict 
itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's decision for this reason 
alone. The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rational system of justice-one that fully preserves 
constitutional rights but recognizes that not every violation 
undermines the fairness of a given conviction. In this case, 
the grand jury error did not affect the fairness of respond-
ent's trial or otherwise injure respondent in any cognizable 
way. 4 I therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless error princi-
ples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the "cen-
tury of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those deci-
sions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. · 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 
551 (1979) (plurality opinion); id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at 590-591 (WHITE, J., dis-
• Society clearly has an interest in deterring discrimination and an equal 
interest in deterring other constitutional violations. The Chapman v. 
California standard, however, focuses primarily on whether the particular 
defendant has been harmed by the violation. 
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senting). The issue in this case is not whether the state 
erred, but what should be done about it. The question is 
whether reversal of respondent's conviction either is com-
pelled by the Constitution or is an appropriate, but not con-
stitutionally required, remedy for racial discrimination in the 
selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 
378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245 (1979); 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of automatic re-
versal" that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 104 S. Ct. 3093 (1984), we acknowledged that dis-
criminatory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Con-
stitution, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's 
conviction was an inappropriate remedy for the violation 
since grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal pros-
ecutions. 104 S. Ct., at 3095-3097; see also Oregon v. 
Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1292 (1985) (suppression of evidence 
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitu-
tionally compelled); United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 
3412 (1984) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment is not constitutionally compelled); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). The rationale of Hobby cannot be 
squared with the claim that discriminatory selection of the 
body that charged the defendant compels reversal of the de-
fendant's conviction. Rather, it is necessary to determine 
whether reversal of respondent's conviction is an "appropri-
ate remedy" for the exclusion of blacks from grand juries in 
Kings County, California in 1962.5 Hobby, supra, at 3095; 
see Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 558-559 (1979) ( lurality) 
(weighing costs and benefits of awarding relief to petitioners 
6 Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The Com-
mon Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 
(1985) (arguing that judicially created remedies are appropri-
ate only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifically 
intended federal right"). That determination depends on (i) 
the utility of the remedy in either correcting any injustice to 
respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by state of-
ficials, and (ii) the remedy's costs to society. United States 
v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413; Stone v. Powell, supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in not being charged 
and convicted because of his race, and harm to society's inter-
est in deterring racial discrimination. I consider in turn 
these asserted interests and the degree to which they are 
served in this case by the Court's automatic reversal rule. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could not Withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. 
282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dfssenting). 
6 The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
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The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
7 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by information 
rather than indictment. In the ten years preceding respondent's indict-
ment, Kings County grand juries indicted a total of only three persons, 
none of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 
382, 393 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, 
any claim that discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism 
for applying different standards to black offenders than to their white 
counterparts seems altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
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crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
8 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged .. . on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 7 supra. 
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cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
matter of law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial in the absence of any evidence of his 
guilt, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) 
(Burton, J., concurring), 9 or based on impermissible factors 
such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). 
There is no allegation that those rights were violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, supra, at 3412-3413. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
9 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
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The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, supra. 10 Prior to 1970, the 
Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on direct ap-
peal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time between 
the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision was six 
years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice granted 
relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand jury dis-
'
0 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, supra, I took the position 
that, where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his 
grand jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted 
to litigate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced that my 
conclusion was correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis 
weighs strongly against reexamining the question whether a defendant 
/ should be permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his 
V guilt or on the fairness of the trial that convicted him. The plurality opin-
ion in Rose, issued in 1979, is the only instance in which this Court has ex-
amined the issue. The discussion in that opinion was unnecessary to the 
result, which turned on the sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. 
_/Perhaps more important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant por-
..,.r tion of the ~opinion dissented from the Court's judgment. 443 
U. S., at 588 (WHITE, J., dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
For that reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the Court's rejec-
tion of this argument in Rose is binding precedent. !d., at 582, n. 3 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153, 169, n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is "that position taken by those mem-
bers who concurred in the judgment [where necessary to a majority] on the 
narrowest grounds"). 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult or impossible. 
11 The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in November 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
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crimination. Both cases involved delays comparable to the 
delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. See 
Castaneda v. Partida, supra (decision announced five years 
after indictment); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972) (deci-
sion announced six years after indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court sixteen years after his conviction. 13 It is now 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for mur-
der and since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds 
this time lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically impor-
tant, because it both increases the societal cost of the Court's 
chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy 
may otherwise have. 
12 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1977) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 
twenty-one years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed be-
cause petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
13 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
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In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the plurality~ar­
gued that the rule of automatic reversal imposes linn ted costs 
on society, since the State is able to retry successful petition-
ers, and since "the State remains free to use all the proof it 
introduced to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 
558. This is not the case when relief is granted many years 
after the original conviction. In those circumstances, the 
State may find itself severely handicapped in its ability to 
carry its heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where the original verdict turned on the jury's 
credibility judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the 
State's ability to reconstruct its case. Even where credibil-
ity is not central, the passage of time may make the right to 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or 
move away; physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For 
these reasons, the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary."' 
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died nineteen years 
ago. Respondent does not allege that the discriminatory 
practices survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evi-
14 Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error . 
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dence in the record to support such an allegation. It is hard 
to believe that Judge Wingrove might have behaved 
differently had he known that a convicted defendant might be 
freed nineteen years after his death. Yet that is exactly the 
proposition that must justify the remedy imposed in this 
case: that people in positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will 
change their behavior out of the fear of successful habeas pe-
titions long after they have left office or otherwise passed 
from the scene. The proposition, to say the least, is highly 
questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
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reverse the Court of Appeals' decision.'5 Even assuming the 
harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
'
6 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important to re-
member that the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
nor innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); 
see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976). The Court's de-
cision in this case plainly undermines the State's interest in punishing the 
guilty, without either protecting the innocent or ensuring the fundamental 
fairness of the procedures which one such as respondent is tried and 
convicted. ( 
~~r-tt 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
1 Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897,"519 P. 2d 572 (19741; ante, at-, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in ~ 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 7 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population ,..,. oVer CLj e -;). ( 






alf. 19h83(. / 7\_ 
espon ent s gran JUry cons1ste o m ee m 1v1 ua s, a o w om 11 . f; 5' 
were white. I d., at 1231. v . .St nc e.., n ~ e 
g I Vts -I-;, f- -t;•'jvr1 
of~e~l 




2 VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 
and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless ;frror rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimin'ri.tion. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a line of cases going 
back over one hundred years. ([l) at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
SEE STYU in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
MANUAL, 
1 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." v Burnet v. 
I /,') , ,_,. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932)(Brandeis, 
l J., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
...y / trine of stare decisis demands s ecial justification." ,../ Arizona 
L.j(p 1f/.5. ;)o}._l-1~ v. Rumsey, . t. 2305 2311 1984); Garcia v. San Anto-
l nio Metropolttan Transit Authority, 05 S. Ct. 1005, ---1 021-102 (1985) (POWELL, J., dissenting). Nevert e ess, 
when governing decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with 
other, more recent authority, the Court "has never felt con-
strained to follow__l)recedent." ~' Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 
649, 665 (1944Y.' Instead, particularly where consti~utional 
issues are involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readmess to 
correct its errors even though of long standing.""" United 
States v. Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964Y.' In this case, 
SEE STYlE 





~ £.C MANUAL -r § f.?-
84-836--DISSENT 
VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 3 
the Court misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on 
decisions concerning grand jury discrimination. There is 
other precedent, including important cases of more recent 
vintage than those cited by the Court, that should control 
this case. Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a convic-
tion should not be reversed for constitutional error where the 
error did not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967{,' the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. .Id., at 21-24 . .,; Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions."./ United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983(' 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969( 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (197o)(denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972Y(use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975)1ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington, [04 S. Ct. 2052'[2064} (1984). This is so W6 /hiaJ'-;- ~/67 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." v Ibid. 3 / Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
3 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[ w ]hen a defendant challenges a 
~ j conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
~ absent the errors, the fact finder would have had a .·easonable doubt re-
• 
11 
specting guilt.,.,. 04 S. Ct., at 2069. 
1/ ft? ~ 1/.J. ,A. a,.r ~ '15 (!) 
I 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (19827; see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977-Y.' 
The plurality in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (19791, ar-
gued that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to grand 
jury discrimination claims, because grand jury discrimination 
"destroys the appearance of justice and thereb casts doubt 
on the integrity of the judicial process."/ ~3 U. . at p .,._ 
555-556. "' But every constitutional error may be said to raise / 
questions as to the "appearance of justice" and the "integrity 
of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has required some showing of actual 
prejudice to the defendant as a prerequisite to reversal, even 
when the constitutional error directly affects the fairness of 
the defendant's trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at ~(requiring prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 
344-345 (1963Y(emphasizing importance of right to counsel to 
ensure fair trial). Grand jury discrimination is a serious vi-
olation of our constitutional order, but so also are the depri-
vations of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to which we have applied harmless :::: j 
error analysis or an analogous prejudice requirement: 
Moreover, grand jury discrimination occurs prior to trial, 
while the asserted constitutional violations in most of the 
above-cited cases occurred during trial. The Court does not 
adequately explain why grand jury discrimination affects the 
"integrity of the judicial process" to a greater extent than the 
deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it is 
exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitu-
tional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cas sell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298 (1950}--(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
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Concvrrin4 /n Judqment / (Stewart, J., dissen m ). Since then, as the cases cited 
J J above show, the Court has firmly established the principle 
that error that does not affect the outcome of a prosecution 
cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid conviction. That 
proposition-and the decisions of the last two decades that 
have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with the result 
reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile this conflict 
itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's decision for this reason 
alone. The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rational system of justice-one that fully preserves 
constitutional rights but recognizes that not every violation 
undermines the fairnes$ of a given conviction. In this case, 
the grand jury error did not affect the fairness of respond-
ent's trial or otherwise injure respondent in any cognizable 
way. 4 I therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmles~error princi- -== / 
ples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the "cen-
tury of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those deci-
sions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
l A/ teenth Amendment. E. g., Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S.~ ./-" ~ ; 551 (1979) ( luralit o m1on , id., at 577-578-"(StewartX 1 
~ 1'-7/ concurring in~judgment); id., at 590-5911WHITE, J., dis-
~:/7/ © 
~~~ \: ~~~ 
\ ~ 
\ ~ 
• Society clearly has an interest in deterring discrimination and an equal 
interest in deterring other constitutional violations. The Chapman v. 
California standard, however, focuses primarily on whether the particular 
defendant has been harmed by the violation. 
SU STYlf 
MANUAL 
I /,J# I 
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senting). The issue in this case is not whether the ~tate ~ I~ :~.U~L 
erred, but what should be done about it. The question is 
whether reversal of respondent's conviction either is com-
pelled by the Constitution or is an appropriate, but not con-
stitutionally required, remedy for racial discrimination in the 
selection ot-grand jurors. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 
378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228, 245 (19791;' 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 
388, 403, 407 (1971)(Harlan, J., concurring in@ judgment). -«t/ 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of automatic re-
versal" that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
I States, }104 S. "<:;t. 30931 (1984), we acknowledged that dis-Lfw9 t/.~. - criminatory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Con-
stitution, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's 
conviction was an inappropriate remedy for the violation 
¢ since grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal pros-
-:J;;c/.. ~ / J ~ ecutions. 0:04 S. Cq at {3095 30~ see also Oregon v. 
t.f'70 (J, s. -,..___!I Elstad, @ 5 S. Ct. 1285. 1® (1985) (suppression of evidence 
.J I obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona is not constitu-
tionally compelled); United States v. Leon, rurs:-cr.- 05 t/6 f i/ s, -/' ____. 
;V2-f( 341 (1984) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of .J 
the Fourth Amendment is not constitutional~ compelled); · 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489 .(1976Y,'see generally ~~ 
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common _Law 89 ~ ~J.A..utd 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). The rationale of Hobby cannot be ~ 
squared with the claim that discriminatory selection of the SEE STYU 
body that charged the defendant compels reversal of the de- MANUAL 
fendant's conviction. Rather, it is n:ce.ssa~ to determin.e ~ '3,/0 
whether reversal of respondent's conviCtiOn 1s an "appropr1- -- -
ate remedy" for the exclusion of blacks from grand juries in 
Kings County, California in 1962.5 Hobby, supra, at 095· 
~1 ~I aJ':jf see Rose v. Mitchell, @.43 0. S. 5457)558-559 ura 1 ,.uy/ ) 
'~, (weighing costs and benefits of awarding relief to petitioners 
b Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. Merrill, The Com-~ ([{ii?Yj mon Law Powers of Federal Court~, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 
(1985) (arguing that judicially created remedies are appropri-
ate only when "necessary in order to preserve a specifically 
intended federal right'Y. That determination depends on (i) 
the utility of the remedy in either correcting any injustice to 
respondent or deterring unconstitutional conduct by state of-
/ 
ficials, and (ii) the remed 's costs to society. United States 
---) v. Leon, supra, at 412-3413· Stone v. Powell, supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in not being charged 
and convicted because of his race, and harm to society's inter-
est in deterring racial discrimination. I consider in turn 
these asserted interests and the degree to which they are 
served in this case by the Court's automatic reversal rule. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could not withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at . . ,. 
575-576 (Ste~1 , l;hssentin~); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U. S. ConcttNlt~ 111 Jt1djtnel'lr-/ 282, 01-302~(Jackson, J., dissenting). / 
6 The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
? 
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The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in .framing the charges, and be-
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977/, 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976{." There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis- SEE STYLl 
MANUAL 
7 Most cri~in~l cases in Kings County were i~itiated by info~at~on / /) / e::§ 10, II (a_ ) 
rather than md1ctment. In the ~years precedmg respondent's md1ct- ~· ---·-'-"--
ment, Kings County grand juries indicted a total of only ~persons, ~/ 
~ Cl')ldCnOn~ of whom was black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d I 7 382, 393 (19651, cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, 
•' 
any claim that discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism 
for applying different standards to black offenders than to their white 
counterparts seems altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
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crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977~;-for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945r. 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
8 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged ... on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)( 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. ?-..supra. 
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cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
matter of law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial in the absence of any evidence of his 
guilt, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (195~ 
(Burton, J., concurring1,9 or based on impermissible factors 
such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (196zr.---
There is no allegation that those rights were violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon,(supraJat 4 - . The ¥~ i' t/. s // --- -0/ 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is / 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
9 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974f'("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence~ I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
SlE SHll 
IM~U~l 
I t.tl 'L Y -:rd ~_-- - ~ 
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The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, @p'!_ii)r Prior to 1970, the 
Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on direct ap-
peal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time between 
the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision was six 
years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice granted 
relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand jury dis-
1/4-'3 v-~- 5"'15(/q ?q)e 
10 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell,@_~ I took the position ,.,_, / 
that, where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his 
grand jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted 
to litigate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 ...-
(POWELL, J., concurring in@judgment). I remain convinced that my 
conclusion was correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis 
weighs strongly against reexamining the question whether a defendant 
should be permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his 
guilt or on the fairness of the trial that convicted him. The plurality opin-
ion in Rose, issued in 1979, is the only instance in which this Court has ex- ~ 
amined the issue. The discussion in that opinion was unnecessary to the 
result, which turned on the sufficiency of the habeas petitioners' evidence. 
Perhaps more important, two of the Justices who joined the relevant por- / 
tion of the plurality opinion dissented from the Court's judgment. 4S) rJ.f 
.~Jat 588 (WHITE, J., dissenting); id., at 593 (STEVENS, J., dissentin7(. in _ptlrf/ 
Forthat reason, "it may fairly be questioned" whether the Court's rejec-
tion of this argument in Rose is binding precedent. I d., at 582, n. 31Pow-
ELL, J., concurring in ~ judgment); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 
153, 169, n. 15 (19781' (Court's holding is "that position taken by those _¢em- '1 j 
hers who concurred in the judgment [where necessary to a majority] on the I 
narrowest grounds")~ /'\ 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of . 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult or impossible. 
uThe longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 J 
U. S. 303 (1880(.' In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in ovembe Oc/b./ e.t... 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
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crimination. Both cases involved delays comparable to the 
delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. See 
Castaneda v. Partida,~ (decision announced five ~ars 
after indictment); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (1972)(deci-
sion announced six years after indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court s1x een years after his conviction. 18 It is now 
almost a quarter-century since respondent was tried for mur-
der and since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds 
this time lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically impor-
tant, because it both increases the societal cost of the Court's 
chosen remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy 
may otherwise have. 
12 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
~-_.,;'::'( (R ( 536 (1971) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
(~ after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973J'(petitioner raised grand jury claim 
~ / j went -o years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed be-
cause petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
13 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a .windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
SEE STYlt / grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
MANUAL A fJi in 197 4, when he sought postfconviction relief in state court. During the 
~ 1-/, , .......- intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re- I 
spondent could not simultaneously have sought postfoonviction relief on the 5:, 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
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In Rose v. Mitchell, @43 0. S. 545 IT97@ the plurality ar- ~ 1 
gued that the rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs 
on society, since the State is able to retry successful petition-
ers, and since "the State remains free to use all the proof it 
introduced to obtain the conviction in the first trial." v I d., at 
558."' This is not the case when relief is granted many years 
after the original conviction. In those circumstances, the 
State may find itself severely handicapped in its ability to 
carry its heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Where the original verdict turned on the jury's 
credibility judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the 
State's ability to reconstruct its case. Even where credibil-
ity is not central, the passage of time may make the right to 1 
retry the defendant "a matter of theory only.""' Friendly, Is ~ 
~"' / Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
fii3/ ~s, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970. Witnesses die or 
move away; physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For 
these reasons, the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the 
lapse of time, the more unlikely it becomes that the state 
could reprosecute if retrials are held to be necessary."' 
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond- I 
ent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died e ee years /1 
ago. Respondent does not allege that the discriminatory 
practices survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evi-
14 Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy. could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
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dence in the record to support such an allegation. It is hard 
to believe that Judge Wingrove might have behaved 
differently had he known that a convicted defendant might be 
freed m>ineteero years after his death. Yet that is exactly the 
proposition that must justify the remedy imposed in this 
case: that people in positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will 
change their behavior out of the fear of successful habeas pe-
titions long after they have left office or otherwise passed 
from the scene. The proposition, to say the least, is highly 
questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
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reverse the Court of Appeals' decision.15 Even assuming the 
harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
15 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important to re-
member ~hat the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
por innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935Y 
see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976Y.' The Court's de-
cision in this case plainly undermines the State's interest in punishing the 
guilty, without either protecting the innocent or ensuring the fundamental 
fairness of the procedures which one such as respondent is tried and 
convicted. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent!s petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
'Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery , 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at - , n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
over age 21 was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED 
Cal. 1983). Respondent's grand jury consisted of 19 individuals, all of 
whom were white. ld. , at 1231. 
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and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless-error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless-error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a line of cases going 
back over one hundred years. Ante, at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Accordingly, . "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984); Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. --, -- (1985) 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing 
decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with other, more re-
cent authority, the Court "has never felt constrained to fol-
low precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 
(1944). Instead, particularly where constitutional issues are 
involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to correct its 
errors even though of long standing." United States v. 
Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, the Court 
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misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on decisions 
concerning grand jury discrimination. There is other 
precedent, including important cases of more recent vintage 
than those cited by the Court, that should control this case. 
Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a conviction should 
not be reversed for constitutional error where the error did 
not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. /d. , at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Hartington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
3 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[w]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 466 U. S., at 695. 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the Court con-
tended that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to 
grand jury discrimination claims, because grand jury dis-
crimination "destroys the appearance of justice and thereby 
casts doubt on the integrity ofthejudicial process." 4 ld., at 
555-556. But every constitutional error may be said to raise 
questions as to the "appearance of justice" and the "integrity 
of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has required some showing of actual 
prejudice to the defendant as a prerequisite to reversal, even 
when the constitutional error directly affects the fairness of 
the defendant's trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at 687 (requiring prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims) ·with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 
344-345 (1963) (emphasizing importance of right to counsel to 
ensure fair trial). Grand jury discrimination is a serious vi-
olation of our constitutional order, but so also are the depri-
vations of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to which we have applied harmless-
error analysis or an analogous prejudice requirement. 
'Although all parts of JuSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell 
were joined by four other Justices, its precedential weight is subject to 
some question. In particular, part II of the opinion-the part that dis-
cusses the legal principles applicable to grand jury discrimination claims 
generally-was not joined by five Justices who also joined in the judgment. 
Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is 
"that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on 
the narrowest grounds"). Moreover, the opinion's discussion of general 
principles was irrelevant to the result, which turned on the insufficiency of 
the evidence of discrimination. In my view, therefore, Rose is little more 
than an advisory opinion. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-95 (1968); 
Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 
1005-1007 (1924). 
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Moreover, grand jury discrimination occurs prior to trial, 
while the asserted constitutional violations in most of the 
above-cited cases occurred during trial. The Court does not 
adequately explain why grand jury discrimination affects the 
"integrity of the judicial process" to a greater extent than the 
deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it is 
exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitu-
tional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 298 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Since then, as the 
cases cited above show, the Court has firmly established the 
principle that error that does not affect the outcome of a pros-
ecution cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid convic-
tion. That proposition-and the decisions of the last two 
decades that have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with 
the result reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile 
this conflict itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's decision for this reason 
alone. The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rational system of justice-one that fully preserves 
constitutional rights but recognizes that not every violation 
undermines the fairness of a given conviction. In this case, 
the grand jury error did not affect the fairness of respond-
ent's trial or otherwise injure respondent in any cognizable 
way. 5 I therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless-error prin-
ciples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the 
• Society clearly has an interest in deterring discrimination and an equal 
interest in deterring other constitutional violations. The Chapman v. 
California standard, however, focuses primarily on whether the particular 
defendant has been harmed by the violation. 
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"century of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those de-
cisions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E. g., Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 551; 
id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 
590-591 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The issue in this case is 
not whether the State erred, but what should be done about 
it. The question is whether reversal of respondent's convic-
tion either is compelled by the Constitution or is an appropri-
ate, but not constitutionally required, remedy for racial dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. 
Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U. S. 228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the "rule of automatic re-
versal" that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 468 U. S. -- (1984), we acknowledged that discrimi-
natory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Constitu-
tion, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's convic-
tion was an inappropriate remedy for the violation since 
grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal prosecutions. 
/d., at--; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.--,--
(1985) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally compelled); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. --, -- (1984) (suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment is not constitutionally compelled); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally Monaghan, Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
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The rationale of H abby cannot be squared with the claim that 
discriminatory selection of the body that charged the defend-
ant compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. Rather, 
it is necessary to determine whether reversal of respondent's 
conviction is an "appropriate remedy" for the exclusion of 
blacks from grand juries in Kings County, California in 
1962. 6 Hobby, supra, at--; see Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 
at 558-559 (1979) (weighing costs and benefits of awarding 
relief to petitioners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. 
Merrill , The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created rem-
edies are appropriate only when "necessary in order to pre-
serve a specifically intended federal right"). That deter-
mination depends on (i) the utility of the remedy in either 
correcting any injustice to respondent or deterring uncon-
stitutional conduct by state officials, and (ii) the remedy's 
costs to society. United States v. Leon, supra, at --; 
Stone v. Powell , supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm fio\\<;ng from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in not being charged 
and convicted because of his race, and harm to society's inter-
est in deterring racial discrimination. I consider in turn 
these asserted interests and the degree to which they are 
served in this case by the Court's automatic reversal rule. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
6 Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
I 
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contention could not ·withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965, ' establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. A'rlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
' The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
t 
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dence. 8 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 9 But the Court now holds that relief is 
justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
8 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by information 
rather than indictment. In the decade ending in 1962, Kings County 
grand juries indicted a total of only four persons, only one of whom was 
black. People v. Hillery , 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 382, 393 (1965), 
cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, any claim that 
discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism for applying dif-
ferent standards to black offenders than to their white counterparts seems 
altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence ' that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
9 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged ... on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 8, supra. 
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grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
matter of lau· , given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial in the absence of any evidence of his 
guilt, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) 
(Burton, J., concurring), 10 or based on impermissible factors 
such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). 
There is no allegation that those rights were violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
'
0 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
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must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at--. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979). 11 Prior to 
1970, the Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on di-
rect appeal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted , respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
11 In my separate opinion in Rose "· Mitchell, I took the position that , 
where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his grand 
jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted to liti-
gate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 (POWELL, 
J., concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced that my conclusion 
was correct. Nor do I belieYe that in this case stare decisis weighs per-
suasively against reexamining the question whether a defendant should be 
permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his guilt or on 
the fairness of the trial that convicted him. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, de-
cided in 1979, is the only case in which this Court has examined the issue, 
and Rose's authority is questionable. See note 4, supra. 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult if not impossible. 
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between the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision 
was six years or less. 12 Before today, the Court has twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. Both cases involved delays comparable 
to the delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. 
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977) (decision an-
nounced five years after indictment); Peters v. Kif!, 407 
U. S. 493 (1972) (decision announced six years after 
indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 13 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court 16 years after his conviction. 14 It is now almost a 
'
2 The longest time lapse occurred in StraudeT v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in October 
1874: this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
13 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1976) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 21 
years after conviction; Court held th~t claim was foreclosed because peti-
tioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
"The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
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quarter-century since respondent was tried for murder and 
since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds this time 
lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically important, be-
cause it both increases the societal cost of the Court's chosen 
remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy may oth-
erwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, supra, the Court reasoned that the 
rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs on society, 
since the State is able to retry successful petitioners, and 
since "the State remains free to use all the proof it introduced 
to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 558. This 
is not the case when relief is granted many years after the 
original conviction. In those circumstances, the State may 
find itself severely handicapped in its ability to carry its 
heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where the original verdict turned on the jury's credibility 
judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the State's abil-
ity to reconstruct its case. Even where credibility is not 
central, the passage of time may make the right to retry the 
defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or move away; 
physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For these reasons, 
the Court has noted that" '[t]he greater the lapse of time, the 
more unlikely it becomes that the state could reprosecute if 
retrials are held to be necessary."' Peyton v. Rowe, 391 
U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 15 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
16 Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect , this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
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Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim was Judge Wingrove, who died 19 years ago. 
Respondent does not allege that the discriminatory practices 
survived Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evidence in the 
record to support such an allegation. It is hard to believe 
that Judge Wingrove might have behaved differently had he 
known that a convicted defendant might be freed 19 years 
after his death. Yet that is exactly the proposition that 
must justify the remedy imposed in this case: that people in 
positions similar to Judge Wingrove's will change their be-
havior out of the fear of successful habeas petitions long after 
they have left office or othenvise passed from the scene. 
The proposition, to say the least, is highly questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
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its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 16 Even assuming the 
harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
16 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important to re-
member that the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); see 
also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976). The Court's deci-
sion in this case plainly undennines the State's interest in punishing the 
guilty, without either protecting the innocent or ensuring the fundamental 
fairness of the procedures pursuant to which one such as respondent is 
tried and convicted. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here.' Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
1 Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at -, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
'According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
over age 21 was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F. Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED 
Cal. 1983). Respondent's grand jury consisted of 19 individuals, all of 
whom were white. Id., at 1231. 
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and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless-error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless-error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante, at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a line of cases going 
back over one hundred years. Ante, at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent "is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co. , 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984); Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. --, -- (1985) 
(POWELL, J. , dissenting). Nevertheless, when governing 
decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with other, more re-
cent authority, the Court "has never felt constrained to fol-
low precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 
(1944). Instead, particularly where constitutional issues are 
involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to correct its 
errors even though of long standing." United States v. 
Barnett, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, the Court 
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misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on decisions 
concerning grand jury discrimination. There is other 
precedent, including important cases of more recent vintage 
than those cited by the Court, that should control this case. 
Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a conviction should 
not be reversed for constitutional error where the error did 
not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. Id., at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
8 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[w]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 466 U. S., at 695. 
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on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the Court con-
tended that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to 
grand jury discrimination claims, because grand jury dis-
crimination "destroys the appearance of justice and thereby 
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process." 4 I d., at 
555-556. But every constitutional error may be said to raise 
questions as to the "appearance of justice" and the "integrity 
of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has required some showing of actual 
prejudice to the defendant as a prerequisite to reversal, even 
when the constitutional error directly affects the fairness of 
the defendant's trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at 687 (requiring prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 
344-345 (1963) (emphasizing importance of right to counsel to 
ensure fair trial). Grand jury discrimination is a serious vi-
olation of our constitutional order, but so also are the depri-
vations of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to which we have applied harmless-
error analysis or an analogous prejudice requirement. 
• Although all parts of JusTICE BLACKMUN's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell 
were joined by four other Justices, its precedential weight is subject to 
some question. In particular, part II of the opinion-the part that dis-
cusses the legal principles applicable to grand jury discrimination claims 
generally-was not joined by five Justices who also joined in the judgment. 
Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is 
"that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on 
the narrowest grounds"). Moreover, the opinion's discussion of general 
principles was irrelevant to the result, which turned on the insufficiency of 
the evidence of discrimination. In my view, therefore, Rose is little more 
than an advisory opinion. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-95 (1968); 
Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 
1005-1007 (1924). 
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Moreover, grand jury discrimination occurs prior to trial, 
while the asserted constitutional violations in most of the 
above-cited cases occurred during trial. The Court does not 
adequately explain why grand jury discrimination affects the 
"integrity of the judicial process" to a greater extent than the 
deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it is 
exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitu-
tional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cas sell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 299 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Since then, as the 
cases cited above show, the Court has firmly established the 
principle that error that does not affect the outcome of a pros-
ecution cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid convic-
tion. That proposition-and the decisions of the last two 
decades that have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with 
the result reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile 
this conflict itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's decision for this reason 
alone. The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rational system of justice-one that fully preserves 
constitutional rights but recognizes that not every violation 
undermines the fairness of a given conviction. In this case, 
the grand jury error did not affect the fairness of respond-
ent's trial or otherwise injure respondent in any cognizable 
way. I therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless-error prin-
ciples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the 
"century of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those de-
cisions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
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discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E.g~ , Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 551; 
id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 
590-591 (WHITE, J ., dissenting). The issue in this case is 
not whether the State erred, but what should be done about 
it. The question is whether reversal of respondent's convic-
tion either is compelled by the Constitution or is an appropri-
ate, but not constitutionally required, remedy for racial dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. 
Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U. S. 228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the rule of automatic re-
versal that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 468 U. S. -- (1984), we acknowledged that discrimi-
natory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Constitu-
tion, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's convic-
tion was an inappropriate remedy for the violation since 
grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal prosecutions. 
!d., at--; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.--,--
(1985) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally compelled); 
United. States v. Leon, 468 U. S. --, -- (1984) (suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment is not constitutionally compelled); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally Monaghan, Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
The rationale of Hobby cannot be squared with the claim that 
discriminatory selection of the body that charged the defend-
ant compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. Rather, 
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it is necessary to determine whether reversal of respondent's 
conviction is an "appropriate remedy'' for the exclusion of 
blacks from grand juries in Kings County, California in 
1962.5 Hobby, supra, at--; see Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 
at 558-559 (1979) (weighing costs and benefits of awarding 
relief to petitioners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created rem-
edies are appropriate only when "necessary in order to pre-
serve a specifically intended federal right"). That deter-
mination depends on (i) the utility of the remedy in either 
correcting any injustice to respondent or deterring uncon-
stitutional conduct by state officials, and (ii) the remedy's 
costs to society. United States v. Leon, supra, at --; 
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in not being charged 
and convicted because of his race, and harm to society's inter-
est in deterring racial discrimination. I consider in turn 
these asserted interests and the degree to which they are 
served in this case by the Court's automatic reversal rule. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could not withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
5 Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of grand ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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challenged. The conviction, affirmed on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Jackson expressed the point best: 
"It hardly lies in the mouth of a defendant whom a 
fairly chosen trial jury has found guilty beyond reason-
able doubt, to say that his indictment is attributable to 
prejudice. In this case a trial judge heard the prosecu-
tion's evidence, ruled it sufficient to warrant a convic-
tion, appellate courts have held the same, and no further 
question about it is before us. Moreover, a jury admit-
tedly chosen without racial discrimination has heard the 
prosecution's and defendant's evidence and has held that 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been proved. That 
finding, too, has been affirmed on appeal and is not here. 
Under such circumstances, it is frivolous to contend that 
any grand jury, however constituted, could have done its 
duty in any way other than to indict." Cassell v. Texas, 
supra, at 302 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand · jury from which blacks are systematically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
6 The California Supreme Court affirmed respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affirmed his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
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spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. Arlington Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference· that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it has suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
7 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by infonnation 
rather than indictment. In the decade ending in 1962, Kings County 
grand juries indicted a total of only four persons, only one of whom was 
black. People v. Hillery , 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 382, 393 (1965), 
cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, any claim that 
discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism for applying dif-
ferent standards to black offenders than to their white counterparts seems 
altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
8 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged . .. on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
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justified in part because of the bare potential, unsupported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whatever value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground that the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-one whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused respondent to suffer any 
cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
matter of law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial in the absence of any evidence of his 
guilt, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not even alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 8, supra. 
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(Burton, J., concurring), 9 or based on impermissible factors 
such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962). 
There is no allegation that those rights were violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at--. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979). 10 Prior to 
9 I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. ·See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
10 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, I took the position that, 
where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his grand 
jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted to liti-
gate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 (POWELL, 
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1970, the Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on di-
rect appeal from conviction. In all of those cases, the time 
between the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision 
was six years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. Both cases involved delays comparable 
to the delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. 
See Castaneda v. Partida, ·430 U. S. 482 (1977) (decision an-
nounced five years after indictment); Peters v. Kiff, 407 
U. S. 493 (1972) (decision announced six years after 
indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
J., concurring in the judgment). I remain convinced that my conclusion 
was correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis weighs per-
suasively against reexamining the question whether a defendant should be 
permitted to relitigate a claim that has no bearing on either his guilt or on 
the fairness of the trial that convicted him. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, de-
cided in 1979, is the only case in which this Court has examined the issue, 
and Rose's authority is questionable. See note 4, supra. 
It is unnecessary to reach the issue in this case, for I conclude that the 
judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmlessness of 
the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases in 
which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's convic-
tion that retrial is difficult if not impossible. 
11 The longest time lapse occurred in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strauder, the defendant was indicted in October 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
12 The ·Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discrimination claim preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1976) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 21 
years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed because peti-
tioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
I . ' 
I 
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first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court 16 years after his conviction. 13 It is now almost a 
quarter-century since respondent was tried for murder and 
since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds this time 
lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically important, be-
cause it both increases the societal cost of the Court's chosen 
remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy may oth-
erwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, supra, the Court reasoned that the 
rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs on society, 
since the State is able to retry successful petitioners, and 
since "the State remains free to use all the proof it introduced 
to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 558. This 
is not the case when relief is granted many years after the 
original conviction. In those circumstances, the State may 
find itself severely handicapped in its ability to carry its 
heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where the original verdict turned on the jury's credibility 
judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the State's abil-
ity to reconstruct its case. Even where credibility is not 
central, the passage of time may make the right to retry the 
defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or move away; 
13 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
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physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For these reasons, 
the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the lapse of time, the 
more unlikely it becomes that the state could reprosecute if 
retrials are held to be necessary."' Peyton v. Rowe, 391 
U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim, Judge Wingrove, died 19 years ago. Respond-
ent does not allege that the discriminatory practices survived 
Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evidence in the record to 
support such an allegation. It is hard to believe that Judge 
Wingrove might have behaved differently had he known that 
a convicted defendant might be freed 19 years after his 
death. Yet that is exactly the proposition that must justify 
the remedy imposed in this case: that people in positions simi-
lar to Judge Wingrove's will change their behavior out of the 
fear of successful habeas petitions long after they have left 
office or otherwise passed from the scene. The proposition, 
to say the least, is highly questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
•• Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
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retry respondent. 15 If this showing were made, respondent's 
petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
16 The Court suggests that Rule 9(a) of the Habeas Corpus Rules, to-
gether with Congressional inaction, "counsels against" considering preju-
dice to the State's ability to retry respondent in this case. Ante, at 10-11. 
This suggestion is erroneous. Rule 9 permits the State to defend against 
both repetitious habeas petitions, see Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 
379 (1984) (POWELL, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., BLACKMUN, REHN-
QUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.) and petitions to which the State cannot ade-
quately respond due to the petitioner's delay in filing, e. g. , Mayola v. 
Alabama, 623 F . 2d 992, 999-1000 (CA51980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 913 
(1981). The rule does not by its terms foreclose other consideration of the 
lapse of time between the petitioner's conviction and the filing of the ha-
beas petition. Honeycutt v. Ward, 612 F . 2d 36, 43 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, 
J., concurring in judgment), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 985 (1980). More im-
portant, it is a rule of habeas corpus procedure applicable to habeas peti-
tions generally, and does not purport to be a rule of substantive.law that 
defines particular substantive claims for relief. Congress' decision not to 
amend it therefore says nothing about Congress' intent with regard to the 
remedy applied here. In sum, the question whether the relief respondent 
seeks is "appropriate" in this case, Hobby, 468 U. S., at--, is governed 
neither by Rule 9 nor by Congress' decisions not to amend that rule. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 474-482 (discussing relationship between ha-
beas corpus statute and the rule that evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible). As the Court stated in Fay v. Noia, 
372 u. s. 391, 438 (1963): 
[W]e recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny [habeas 
corpus] relief to an applicant under certain circumstances. Discretion is 
implicit in the statutory command that the judge, after granting the writ 
and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, 'dispose of the matter as law 
and justice require,' 28 U. S. C. § 2243; and discretion was the flexible con-
cept employed by the federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule. 
Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed 
by equitable principles. 
See also Stone v. Powell, supra, at 478 n. 11. Those "equitable principles" 
cannot, in my view, require that the Court apply a remedy that is not con-
stitutionally compelled beyond the bounds of justice and good sense. 
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those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 16 Even assuming the 
harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
16 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important tore-
member that the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); see 
also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976). The Court's deci-
sion in this case plainly undermines the State's interest in punishing the 
guilty, without either protecting the innocent or ensuring the fundamental 
fairness of the procedures pursuant to which one such as respondent is 
tried and convicted. 
" 
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considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
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JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Respondent, a black man, was indicted· by a grand jury 
having no black members for the stabbing murder of a 15-
year-old girl. A petit jury found respondent guilty of that 
charge beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of 
which is unchallenged here. 1 Twenty-three years later, we 
are asked to grant respondent's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus-and thereby require a new trial if that is still feasi-
ble-on the ground that blacks were purposefully excluded 
from the grand jury that indicted him. It is undisputed that 
race discrimination has long since disappeared from the 
grand jury selection process in Kings County, California. It 
is undisputed that a grand jury that perfectly represented 
Kings County's population at the time of respondent's indict-
ment would have contained only one black member. 2 Yet 
1 Respondent was thrice sentenced to death for this murder. See Peo-
ple v. Hillery, 10 Cal. 3d 897, 519 P. 2d 572 (1974); ante, at -, n. 2. 
That sentence was ultimately reduced to life imprisonment because the 
California Supreme Court found that imposition of the death penalty was in 
all cases inconsistent with the California Constitution. Ibid. 
2 According to 1960 census figures, 4. 7% of Kings County's population 
over age 21 was black. Hillery v. Pulley, 563 F . Supp. 1228, 1232 (ED 
Cal. 1983). Respondent's grand jury consisted of 19 individuals, all of 
whom were white. I d., at 1231. 
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the Court holds that respondent's petition must be granted, 
and that respondent must be freed unless the State is able to 
reconvict, more than two decades after the murder that led 
to his incarceration. 
It is difficult to reconcile this result with a rational system 
of justice. The Court nevertheless finds its decision com-
pelled by a century of precedent and by the interests of re-
spondent and of society in ending race discrimination in the 
selection of grand juries. I dissent for two reasons. First, 
in my view, any error in the selection of the grand jury that 
indicted respondent is constitutionally harmless. Second, 
even assuming that the harmless-error rule does not apply, 
reversal of respondent's conviction is an inappropriate rem-
edy for the wrong that prompts this case. 
I 
The Court concludes that the harmless-error rule does not 
apply to claims of grand jury discrimination. Ante,. at 7. 
This conclusion is said to follow from a line of cases going 
back over one hundred years. Ante, at 6-7. In my view, it 
follows from a misapplication of the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Adhering to precedent ''is usually the wise policy, because 
in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule 
of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J ., dissenting). Accordingly, "any departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984); Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. -,- (1985) 
(POWELL, J., diss~nting). Nevertheless, when governing 
decisions are badly reasoned, or conflict with other, more re-
cent authority, the Court "has never felt constrained to fol-
low precedent." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 665 
(1944). .Instead, particularly where constitutional issues are 
involved, "[t]his Court has shown a readiness to correct its 
errors even though of long standing." United States v. 
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Ba'T"Mtt, 376 U. S. 681, 699 (1964). In this case, the Court 
misapplies stare decisis because it relies only on decisions 
concerning grand jury discrimination. There is other 
precedent, including important cases of more recent vintage 
than those cited by the Court, that should control this case. 
Those cases hold, or clearly imply, that a conviction should 
not be reversed for constitutional error where the error did 
not affect the outcome of the prosecution. 
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court 
held that a trial judge's improper comment on the defendant's 
failure to testify-a clear violation of the Fifth and Four- · 
teenth Amendments-was not a proper basis for reversal if 
harmless. Id., at 21-24. Since Chapman, "the Court has 
consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing 
court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore er-
rors that are harmless, including most constitutional viola-
tions." United States v. Hasting, 461 U. S. 499, 509 (1983). 
This rule has been applied to a variety of constitutional viola-
tions. See Harrington v. Ca~ifornia, 395 U. S. 250 (1969) 
(use of co-conspirator confession in violation of Confrontation 
Clause); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970) (denial of 
counsel at preliminary hearing); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 
U. S. 371 (1972) (use of confession obtained in violation of 
right to counsel); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975) (ille-
gal arrest). 
Other doctrines reflect the same principle. A defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show that 
counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice. Strick-
land v. · Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (1984). This is so 
even though counsel "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." Ibid. 3 Similarly, a defendant who is barred 
3 As the Court stated in Strickland, "[w]hen a defendant challenges a 
conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, 
absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt re-
specting guilt." 466 U. S., at 695. 
84-836--DISSENT 
4 VASQUEZ v. HILLERY 
by a procedural default from asserting a constitutional claim 
on direct appeal cannot raise the claim on habeas corpus with-
out showing that the error actually prejudiced him. United 
States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977). 
In Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979), the Court con-
tended that the principle of these cases is inapplicable to 
grand jury discrimination claims, because grand jury dis-
crimination "destroys the appearance of justice and thereby 
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process."• !d., at 
555-556. But every constitutional error may be said to raise 
questions as to the "appearance of justice" and the ''integrity 
of the judicial process." Nevertheless, as the cases cited 
above show, the Court has required some showing of actual 
prejudice to the defendant as a prerequisite to reversal, even 
when the constitutional error directly affects the fairness of 
the defendant's trial. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 
supra, at 687 (requiring prejudice in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims) with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 
344-345 (1963) (emphasizing importance of right to counsel to 
ensure fair trial). Grand jury discrimination is a serious vi-
olation of our constitutional order, but so also are the depri-
vations of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to which we have applied harmless-
• Although all parts of JusTICE BLACKMUN's opinion in Rose v. Mitchell 
were joined by four other Justices, its precedential weight is subject to 
some question. In particular, part II of the opinion-the part that dis-
cusses the legal principles applicable to grand jury discrimination claims 
generally-was not joined by five Justices who also joined in the judgment. 
Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (Court's holding is 
"that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on 
the narrowest grounds"). Moreover, the opinion's discussion of general 
principles was irrelevant to the result, which turned on the insufficiency of 
the evidence of discrimination. In my view, therefore, Rose is little more 
than an advisory opinion. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-95 (1968); 
Frankfurter, Note on Advisory Opini<ms, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1002, 
1005-1007 (1924). 
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error analysis or an analogous prejudice requirement. 
Moreover, grand jury discrimination occurs prior to trial, 
while the asserted constitutional violations in most of the 
above-cited cases occurred during trial. The Court does not 
adequately explain why grand jury discrimination affects the 
''integrity of the judicial process" to a greater extent than the 
deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it is 
exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitu-
tional errors are not. 
Thirty-one years ago, in a typically prescient opinion, Jus-
tice Jackson called for such an explanation. Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 299 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
None has been forthcoming. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 575 
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Since then, as the 
cases cited above show, the Court has firmly established the 
principle that error that does not affect the outcome of a pros-
ecution cannot justify reversing an otherwise valid convic-
tion. That proposition-and the decisions of the last two 
decades that have reinforced it-is flatly inconsistent with 
· the result reached today. The Court's failure to reconcile 
this conflict itself violates the doctrine of stare decisis. 
I would dissent from the Court's decision for this reason 
alone. The reasoning of Chapman and its progeny accords 
with a rational system of justice-one that fully presezyes 
constitutional rights but recognizes that not every violation 
undermines the fairness of a given conviction. In this case, 
the grand jury error did not affect the fairness of respond-
ent's trial or otherwise injure respondent in any cognizable 
way. I therefore would reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II 
Even assuming that now-established harmless-error prin-
ciples are inapplicable, this case unjustifiably extends the 
"century of precedent" on which the Court relies. Those de-
cisions do not require reversal of a decades-old conviction on 
the ground that it was preceded by an indictment issued by a 
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discriminatorily selected grand jury. The purposes of the 
"automatic reversal" rule require otherwise. 
A 
No one questions that race discrimination in grand jury se-
lection violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. E . g., Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 551; 
id., at 577-578 (Stewart, J ., concurring in judgment); id., at 
590-591 (WHITE, J., dissenting). The issue in this case is 
not whether the State erred, but what should be done about 
it. The question is whether reversal of respondent's convic-
tion either is compelled by the Constitution or is an appropri-
ate, but not constitutionally required, remedy for racial dis-
crimination in the selection of grand jurors. See Bush v. 
Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 378 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 
U. S. 228, 245 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 403, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in judgment). 
The Constitution does not compel the rule of automatic re-
versal that the Court applies today. In Hobby v. United 
States, 468 U. S. -- (1984), we acknowledged that discrimi-
natory selection of grand jury foremen violated the Constitu-
tion, but we concluded that reversing the petitioner's convic-
tion was an inappropriate remedy for the violation since 
grand jury foremen play a minor part in federal prosecutions. 
!d., at--; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.--,--
(19~5) (suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona is not constitutionally compelled); 
United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. --, -- (1984) (suppres-
sion of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment is not constitutionally compelled); Stone v. Powell, 428 
U. S. 465, 489 (1976); see generally Monaghan, Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975). 
The rationale of Hobby cannot be squared with the claim that 
discriminatory selection of the body that charged the defend-
ant compels reversal of the defendant's conviction. Rather, 
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it is necessary to determine whether reversal of respondent's 
conviction is an "appropriate remedy'' for th,e exclusion of 
blacks from grand juries · in Kings County, California in 
1962.5 Hobby, supra, at--; see Rose v. Mitchell , supra, 
at 558-559 (1979) (weighing costs and benefits of awarding 
relief to petitioners claiming grand jury discrimination). Cf. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1, 53 (1985) (arguing that judicially created rem-
edies are appropriate only when "necessary in order to pre-
serve a specifically intended federal right"). That deter-
mination depends on (i) the utility of the remedy in either 
correcting any injustice to respondent or deterring uncon-
stitutional conduct by state officials, and (ii) the remedy's 
costs to society. United States v. Leon, supra, at --; 
Stone v. Powell, supra, at 489. 
B 
The scope of the remedy depends in part on the nature and 
degree of the harm caused by the wrong. The Court per-
ceives two kinds of harm flowing from grand jury discrimina-
tion: harm to the respondent's interest in not being charged 
and convicted because of his race, and harm to society's inter-
est in deterring racial discrimination. I consider in turn 
these asserted interests and the degree to which they are 
served in this case by the Court's automatic reversal rule. 
(1) 
The Court does not contend that the discriminatory selec-
tion of the grand jury that indicted respondent calls into 
question the correctness of the decision to indict. Such a 
contention could · not withstand analysis. Following his in-
dictment for murder, respondent was convicted of that 
charge in a trial and by a jury whose fairness are not now 
' Respondent does not allege that discriminatory selection of gnnd ju-
rors continued after 1962. Nor is there anything in the record to support 
such an allegation. 
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challenged. The conviction, affinned on direct appeal in 
1965,6 establishes that the grand jury's finding of probable 
cause was indisputably correct. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, at 
575-576 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U. S. 282, 301-302 (1950) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Jackson expressed the point best: 
"It hardly lies in the mouth of a defendant whom a 
fairly chosen trial jury has found guilty beyond reason-
able doubt, to say that his indictment is attributable to 
prejudice. In this case a trial judge heard the prosecu-
tion's evidence, ruled it sufficient to warrant a convic-
tion, appellate courts have held the same, and no further 
question about it is before us. Moreover, a jury admit-
tedly chosen without racial discrimination has heard the 
prosecution's and defendant's evidence and has held that 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been proved. That 
finding, too, has been affinned on appeal and is not here. 
Under such circumstances, it is frivolous to contend that 
any grand jury, however constituted, could have done its 
duty in any way other than to indict." Cassell v. Texas, 
supra, at 302 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court nevertheless decides that discrimination in the 
selection of the grand jury potentially harmed respondent, 
because the grand jury is vested with broad discretion in de-
ciding whether to indict and in framing the charges, and be-
cause it is impossible to know whether this discretion would 
have been exercised differently by a properly selected grand 
jury. Ante, at 8. The point appears to be that an all-white 
grand jury from which blacks are syste:t:natically excluded 
might be influenced by race in determining whether to indict 
and for what charge. Since the State may not imprison re-
• The California Supreme Court affinned respondent's conviction in 
1963; on rehearing in 1965, the court reversed respondent's death sentence 
but again affinned his conviction. Ante, at 2, n. 2. Respondent is pres-
ently serving a sentence of life imprisonment. 
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spondent for a crime if one of its elements is his race, the ar-
gument goes, his conviction must be set aside. 
This reasoning ignores established principles of equal pro-
tection jurisprudence. We have consistently declined to find 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause absent a finding of 
intentional discrimination. ArlingtOn Heights v. Metropoli-
tan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). There has 
been no showing in this case-indeed, respondent does not 
even allege-that the Kings County grand jury indicted re-
spondent because of his race, or that the grand jury declined 
to indict white suspects in the face of similarly strong evi-
dence. 7 Nor is it sensible to assume that impermissible dis-
crimination might have occurred simply because the grand 
jury had no black members. This Court has never sug-
gested that the racial composition of a grand jury gives rise 
to the inference that indictments are racially motivated, any 
more than it lias suggested that a suspect arrested by a po-
liceman of a different race may challenge his subsequent con-
viction on that basis. 8 But the Court now holds that relief is 
1 Most criminal cases in Kings County were initiated by infonnation 
rather than indictment. In the decade ending in 1962, Kings County 
grand juries indicted a total of only four persons, only one of whom was 
black. People v. Hillery, 62 Cal. 2d 692, 710, 401 P. 2d 382, 393 (1965), 
cert. denied, 386 U. S. 938 (1967). In light of these facts, any claim that 
discriminatory selection of grand jurors was a mechanism for applying dif-
ferent standards to black offenders than to their white counterparts seems 
altogether fanciful. 
Nor is there any direct evidence that the grand jury discriminated 
against respondent because of his race. The only discrimination in this 
case was directed not at respondent but at the black residents of Kings 
County, who were barred from serving on grand juries because of their 
race. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that the grand 
jurors themselves discriminated against anyone on the basis of race, or 
that they otherwise failed to discharge their duties properly. 
1 Instead, as the Court apparently acknowledges, a validly convicted 
criminal defendant must show that he was "deliberately charged .. . on ac-
count of his race" in order to obtain reversal of the conviction. Ante, at 8 
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justified in part because of the bare potential, unsl.!pported 
by any evidence, that an all-white grand jury charged re-
spondent because of his race. 
This justification does not square with the Court's previous 
decisions in this area; at the same time, it fails to explain the 
outcome of this case. In Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 
482 (1977), for example, the Court ordered a new trial for a 
Hispanic petitioner who was indicted by a grand jury half of 
whose members were Hispanic. Whateyer value such a re-
sult might have, it cannot be justified on the ground tpat the 
grand jury indicted the petitioner because of his race. In 
this case, due to the small number of blacks in Kings County, 
a random selection system could well have resulted in a grand 
jury identical to the one that indicted respondent. A per-
fectly representative grand jury-{)ne whose composition re-
flected the county's racial mix-would have contained only 
one black member. Neither outcome would have justified' an 
inference that respondent had been charged because of his 
race. See Akins v. Texas~ 325 U. S. 398, 403 (1945). 
Once the inference of racial bias in the decision to indict is 
placed to one side, as it must be under our precedents, it is 
impossible to conclude that the discriminatory selection of 
Kings County's grand jurors caused ~espondent to suffer any 
cognizable injury. There may be a theoretical possibility 
that a different grand jury might have decided not to indict or · 
to indict for a less serious charge. The fact remains, how-
ever, that the grand jury's decision to indict was correct as a 
·matter of law, given respondent's subsequent, unchallenged 
conviction. A defendant has no right to a grand jury that 
errs in his favor. At most, he has an interest in not being 
bound over for trial in the absence of any evidence of his 
guilt, see Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359, 364 (1956) 
(citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125, and n. 9 (1979)). 
Respondent has not eve!) alleged, much less shown, any discrimination di-
rected at him. See n. 8, supra. 
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(Burton, J., concurring),9 or based on impermissible factors 
such as his race, see Oyler v. Boles, 368.U. S. 448, 456 (1962). 
There is no allegation that those rights were violated in this 
case. The Court's decision cannot, therefore, be justified as 
a means of redressing any wrong to respondent. 
(2) 
As respondent suffered no prejudice from the grand jury 
discrimination that prompted his claim, the Court's remedy 
must stand or fall on its utility as a deterrent to government 
officials who seek to exclude particular groups from grand ju-
ries, weighed against the cost that the remedy imposes on so-
ciety. See United States v. Leon, 468 U. S., at--. The 
Court properly emphasizes that grand jury discrimination is 
"a grave constitutional trespass," ante, at 7, but it leaps from 
that observation to the conclusion that no matter when the 
claim is raised the appropriate response is to vacate the con-
viction of one indicted by a discriminatorily selected body. 
That conclusion is not, as the Court erroneously suggests, 
compelled by. precedent; equally important, it seriously dis-
serves the public interest. 
The cases on which the Court relies involved relatively 
brief lapses of time between the defendant's trial and the 
granting of relief. This fact is unsurprising, since the Court 
only recently determined that claims of grand jury dis-
crimination may be raised in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545 (1979). 10 Prior to 
'I do not intend to suggest that respondent could have obtained judicial 
review of the sufficiency of the evidence on which his indictment was 
based. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 345 (1974) ("an in-
dictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge on the ground that the 
grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence"). I 
suggest only that, assuming such an attack were permitted, respondent 
could show no violation of any personal right in this case. 
10 In my separate opinion in Rose v. Mitchell, I took the position that, 
where a habeas petitioner is given a full opportunity to litigate his grand 
jury discrimination claim in state court, he should not be permitted to liti-
gate the claim again on federal habeas corpus. 443 U. S., at 579 (POWELL, 
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1970, the Court's grand jury discrimination cases arose on di-
rect appeal from conviction: In all of those cases, the time 
between the defendant's indictment and this Court's decision 
was six years or less. 11 Before today, the Court has twice 
granted relief to habeas corpus petitioners alleging grand 
jury discrimination. Both cases involved delays comparable 
to the delay reflected in the cases that arose on direct appeal. 
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482 (1977) (decision an-
nounced five y~ars after indictment); Peters · v. Kif!, 407 
U. S. 493 (1972) (decisioq announced six years after 
indictment). 
This case raises the open question whether relief should be 
denied where the discrimination claim is pressed many years 
after conviction, and where the State can show that the delay 
J., concurring in judgment). I remain convinced that my conclusion was 
correct. Nor do I believe that in this case stare decisis weighs persua-
sively against reexamining the question whether a defendant should be 
permitted to relitigate a claim that ha.s no bearing on either his guilt or on 
the fairness of the trial that convicted him. Rose v. Mitchell, decided in 
1979, is the only case in which this Court has examined the issue, and 
Rose's authority is questionable. See note 4, surrra. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR has some doubt as to whether respondent had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate his grand jury discrimination claim in a 
state court. Ante, at- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Re-
spondent concedes that he did in fact relitigate that claim in state habeas 
corpus proceedings, Brief for Respondent 3, and appealed the denial of re-
lief to the California Supreme Court. Ibid. In my view, this afforded re-
spondent an entirely adequate opportunity to litigate in state courts both 
the underlying discrimination claim and the subsidiary claim that Judge 
Wingrove was a biased adjudicator. 
It is unnecessary actually to decide the issue in this case, for I conclude 
that the judgment should be reversed on two other grounds: the harmless-
ness of the error, and the inappropriateness of the Court's remedy in cases 
in which the discrimination claim is raised so long after the claimant's con-
viction that retrial is difficult if not impossible. 
11 The longest time lapse occurred in Strouder v. West Virginia, 100 
U. S. 303 (1880). In Strouder, the defendant was indicted in October 
1874; this Court's decision was rendered in March 1880. 
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prejudiced its ability to retry the defendant. 12 Respondent 
first raised his grand jury discrimination claim before a fed-
eral court 16 years after his conviction. 13 It is now almost a 
quarter-century since respondent was tried for murder and 
since the discrimination occurred. The Court finds this time 
lapse irrelevant. In my view, it is critically important, be-
cause it both increa.ses the societal cost of the Court's chosen 
remedy and lessens any deterrent force the remedy may oth-
erwise have. 
In Rose v. Mitchell, supra, the Court reasoned that the 
rule of automatic reversal imposes limited costs on society, 
since the State is able to retry successful petitioners, and 
since ''the State remains free to use all the proof it introduced 
to obtain the conviction in the first trial." I d., at 558. This 
is not the case when relief is granted many years after the 
original conviction. In those circumstances, the State may 
find itself severely handicapped in its ability to carry its 
11 The Court has decided only two cases in which the State might have 
argued that a long delay in raising a grand jury discri,mination cl~ preju-
diced the State's ability to retry the defendant. In both instances, the 
Court denied relief on other grounds. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 
536 (1976) (petitioner raised grand jury discrimination claim seven years 
after conviction; Court denied relief on exhaustion grounds); Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U. S. 258 (1973) (petitioner raised grand jury claim 21 
years after conviction; Court held that claim was foreclosed because peti-
tioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to competent legal advice). 
11 The reason for this delay is irrelevant, unless bad faith on the State's 
part can be shown. Because respondent suffered no injury from Kings 
County's discriminatory selection of grand juries, he cannot fairly complain 
if he is required to raise his claim promptly in order to secure a windfall. 
Moreover, respondent does not appear to have been blameless for the 
long delay. The California Supreme Court finally rejected respondent's 
grand jury discrimination claim in 1965. Respondent next raised the claim 
in 1974, when he sought post-conviction relief in state court. During the 
intervening nine years, respondent raised repeated challenges-ultimately 
successfully-to his death sentence. There is no apparent reason why re-
spondent could not simultaneously have sought post-conviction relief on the 
grand jury discrimination claim, which if successful would require a new 
trial on guilt. 
• 
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heavy burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Where the original verdict turned on the jury's credibility 
judgments, long delays effectively eliminate the State's abil-
ity to reconstruct its case. Even where credibility is not 
central, the passage of time may make the right to retry the 
defendant "a matter of theory only." Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 142, 147 (1970). Witnesses die or move away; 
physical evidence is lost; memories fade. For these reasons, 
the Court has noted that "'[t]he greater the lapse of time, the 
more unlikely it becomes that the state could reprosecute if 
retrials are held to be necessary.'" Peyton v. Rowe, 391 
U. S. 54, 62 (1968) (citation omitted). 14 
Long delays also dilute the effectiveness of the reversal 
rule as a deterrent. This case is illustrative. The architect 
of the discriminatory selection system that led to respond-
ent's claim, Judge Wingrove, died 19 years ago. Respond-
ent does not allege that the discriminatory practices survived 
Judge Wingrove, nor is there any evidence in the record to 
support such an allegation. It is hard to believe that Judge 
Wingrove might have behaved differently had he known that 
a convicted defendant might be freed 19 years after his 
death. Yet that is exactly the proposition that must justify 
the remedy imposed in this case: that people in positions simi-
lar to Judge Wingrove's will change their behavior out of the 
fear of successful habeas petitions long after they have left 
1
• Under the Court's approach, one in respondent's position may be wise 
to wait to raise his discrimination claim until the State could no longer re-
convict him due to the death or disappearance of witnesses or the loss of 
physical evidence. In effect, this strategy could permit a prisoner to com-
mute a legally imposed sentence of life or long duration. This is a risk so-
ciety should tolerate where the claim goes to the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence, or even where the claim seeks otherwise to redress a wrong done to 
the petitioner. But there is no reason to tolerate this risk where, as here, 
the claimant was fairly convicted and has suffered no prejudice from the 
asserted constitutional error. 
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office or otherwise passed from the scene. The proposition, 
to say the least, is highly questionable. 
These concerns require that a different balance be struck 
in a case such as this one than in cases in which the grand 
jury discrimination claim is adjudicated only a short time 
after the petitioner's conviction. At the very least, the 
Court should focus directly on the aspect of delay that in-
creases the costliness of its remedy by allowing the State to 
show that it would be substantially prejudiced in its ability to 
retry respondent. 15 If this showing were ·made, respondent's 
11 The Court suggests that Rule 9(a) of the Habeas Corpus Rules, to-
gether with Congressional inaction, "counsels against" considering preju-
dice to the State's ability to retry respondent in this case. Ante, at 10-11. 
This suggestion is erroneous. Rule 9 pennits the State to defend against 
both repetitious habeas petitions, see Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U. S. 377, 
379 (1984) (POWELL, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., BLACKMUN, REHN-
QUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.) and petitions to which the State cannot ade-
quately respond due to the petitioner's delay in filing, e. g., Mayola v. 
Alabama, 623 F. 2d 992, 999-1000 (CAS 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 913 
(1981). The rule does not by its terms foreclose other consideration of the 
lapse of time between the petitioner's conviction and the filing 'Of the ha-
beas petition. Honeycutt v. Ward, 612 F. 2d 36, 43 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, 
J., concurring in judgment), cert. denied, 446 U. S. 985 (1980). More im-
portant, it is a rule of habeas corpus procedure applicable to habeas peti-
tions generally, and does not purport to be a rule of substantive law that 
defines particular substantive claims for relief. Congress' decision not to 
amend it therefore says nothing about Congress' intent with regard to the 
remedy applied here. In sum, the question whether the relief respondent 
seeks is "appropriate" in this case, Hobby, 468 U. S., at--, is governed 
neither by Rule 9 nor by Congress' decisions not to amend that rule. See 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 474-482 (discussing relationship between ha-
beas corpus statute and the rule that evidence seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment is inadmissible). As the Court stated in Fay v. Noia, 
372 u. s. 391, 438 (1963): 
[W]e recognize a limited discretion in the federal judge to deny [habeas 
corpus] relief to an applicant under certain circumstances. Discretion is 
implicit in the statutory command that the judge, after granting the writ 
and holding a hearing of appropriate scope, 'dispose of the matter as law 
and justice require,' 28 U. S. C. § 2243; and discretion was the flexible con-
cept employed by the federal courts in developing the exhaustion rule. 
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petition for relief should be denied. Such an approach would 
also identify those cases in which granting habeas relief could 
be expected to have the least deterrent value: the State will 
likely suffer the greatest prejudice in cases of long delay, and 
those are the cases in which the automatic reversal rule is 
least likely to alter the behavior of discriminatory officials. 
This approach would leave the rule that the Court defends in-
tact in precisely those cases where it does the most good and 
the least harm: cases in which the responsible officials are 
likely to be accountable for forcing the State to again prove 
its case, and in which retrial and reconviction are plausible 
possibilities. 
III 
Twenty-three years ago, respondent was fairly convicted 
of the most serious of crimes. Respondent's grand jury dis-
crimination claim casts no doubt on the adequacy of the pro-
cedures used to convict him or on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence of his guilt. For that reason alone, the Court should 
reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 18 Even assuming the 
harmlessness of the error is irrelevant, however, reversal is 
still required. The Court inappropriately applies a deter-
rence rule in a context where it is unlikely to deter, and 
where its costs to society are likely to be especially high. 
Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed 
by equitable principles. 
See also Stone v. Powell, supra, at 478 n. 11. Those "equitable principles" 
cannot, in my view, require that the Court apply a remedy that is not con-
stitutionally compelled beyond the bounds of justice and good sense. 
11 Confidence in our system of justice is eroded when one found guilty of 
murder, in a trial conceded to be fair, is set free. It is important tore-
member that the criminal law's aim is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape 
or innocence suffer." Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935); see 
also United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976). The Court's deci-
sion in this case plainly undermines the State's interest in punishing the 
guilty, without either protecting the innocent or ensuring the fundamental 
fairness of the procedures pursuant to which one such as respondent is 
tried and convicted. 
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These considerations should at least lead the Court to re-
mand for a determination of whether the long lapse of time 
since respondent's conviction would prejudice the State's 
ability to retry respondent. 
The Court follows neither of these paths, but instead af-
firms a decision that will likely mean that respondent must be 
freed for no good purpose. This result is not compelled by 
precedent. But if it were, its consequences would justify re-
considering those decisions thought to require it. I there-
fore dissent. 
